People v. Williams
| Decision Date | 23 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 64639,J,No. 6,6 |
| Citation | 330 N.W.2d 823,416 Mich. 25 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harold WILLIAMS, Frank Anderson, Lavoier Respress and Wilbur Johnson, Defendants-Appellees. an. Term 1981. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., County of Wayne, Edward R. Wilson, Chief Appellate, Asst. Pros. Atty., Timothy C. Scallen, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.
Charles H. Brown Law Offices, P.C. by Charles H. Brown, Detroit, for defendant-appellee Williams.
Gerald M. Lorence, Detroit, for defendant-appellee Anderson.
Cynthia R. Goldfarb, Detroit, for defendant-appellee Respress.
Arthur H. Landau, Detroit, for defendant-appellee Johnson.
Defendants in this case have called into question the constitutionality of Michigan's "rape shield" law, which is set forth in the margin below. M.C.L. Sec. 750.520j; M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(10) (). 1 All four defendants herein were prosecuted on charges of first-degree criminal sexual conduct; all four defendants asserted at trial that the complainant had consented to the various acts of sexual intercourse with them as a group. In support of this defense the defendants sought to present evidence that the complainant had had prior sexual relations with one of them and that she had practiced prostitution in the past. The trial judge, however, precluded the admission of such evidence based on the defendants' failure to timely comply with the "rape shield" law's notice provision. Thus it is the defendants' contention to us on appeal that the "rape shield" law, at least as applied to the facts of this case, violates the defendants' right of effective cross-examination protected by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. 2
Under the facts of this case we believe the trial judge reached the proper result in foreclosing inquiry, either through cross-examination of the complainant or the presentation of direct testimony, into any alleged past sexual relations of one of the defendants with the complainant or into alleged specific instances of, or reputation for, prostitution on the part of the complainant. Without deciding whether Sec. 520j embodies a mandatory preclusion sanction if its notice requirement is not met, or whether such a requirement can withstand constitutional scrutiny, we find that the evidence sought to be admitted was irrelevant in the context of this particular case to the asserted defense of consent. As such, it was properly excluded. MRE 402.
Complainant testified at trial that she met defendant Williams shortly after midnight on October 19, 1977, in the Moon Glow Lounge in the City of Detroit. According to complainant, she had a casual acquaintanceship with defendant Williams, both having lived in the same neighborhood and the complainant having had Williams' sister babysit for her daughter. After a short period of small talk in the bar during which complainant declined defendant Williams' offer to "go out and have some fun" [Plaintiff's Appendix, p. 79a], defendant Williams grabbed one of complainant's arms, telling her to come with him, defendant Anderson grabbed the other arm, and then in the company of the other two defendants, one of whom she had observed with a knife in the bar, she was ushered from the bar. Once outside the bar, according to the complainant, she was ordered into a car and then, accompanied by all four defendants, driven to defendant Respress' house. It was here, pursuant to defendant Williams' instruction that complainant do as she was told if she didn't want to get hurt, that the defendants engaged in the various sexual acts of which they were convicted.
Defendant Williams was the only one of the four accused to take the stand. He testified that while in the Moon Glow bar he asked complainant if she wanted to have sexual intercourse with him [Plaintiff's Appendix, p. 140a]. After giving an affirmative response the complainant voluntarily accompanied all four defendants to defendant Respress' house. Once inside, defendant Williams, at the request of defendants Respress and Anderson, asked complainant if she would have intercourse with all four defendants. According to defendant Williams, complainant "said it was okay, that she'd done it before" [Plaintiff's Appendix, p. 145a]. Thereafter complainant willingly engaged in sexual intercourse with all four defendants.
The procedural course of defendants' attempt to introduce the contested evidence is certainly not neat. It appears that it was the prosecutor who initiated inquiry into this matter on the first day of trial. In discussing preliminary matters prior to jury selection, the prosecutor informed the court that defense counsel had informed him of its intention to offer evidence of prior sexual relations between the complainant and one defendant [Plaintiff's Appendix, p. 44a]. Counsel for defendant Williams acknowledged his intent to cross-examine the complainant about prior sexual activity with defendant Williams [Plaintiff's Appendix, p. 96a] and to offer evidence on complainant's alleged past prostitution [Plaintiff's Appendix, p. 48a]. Defense counsel attributed his lack of compliance with the notice provisions of Sec. 520j to the prosecutor's failure to comply with a prior discovery order of the court [Plaintiff's Appendix, p. 48a]. This rather informal motion to permit inquiry into these matters was joined in by counsel for the other defendants. At that time, however, the court chose to take the motion under advisement until defense counsel was to begin his cross-examination [Plaintiff's Appendix, p. 48a].
The court's initial ruling on this matter nonetheless came before cross-examination. In the opening statement of counsel for defendant Williams--and apparently contrary to specific trial court instructions on the matter [Plaintiff's Appendix, p. 58a]--reference was made to prior sexual intercourse between defendant Williams and the complainant. After objection by the prosecutor and an in camera hearing between the court and counsel, the court ruled that "[n]o discussion regarding the sexual conduct of the defendant with the actor [sic ] or in terms of prostitution will be admitted in this case" [Plaintiff's Appendix, p. 66a]. The primary basis of the trial court's ruling was the defendants' lack of compliance with the notice requirements of the "rape shield" law, although as to the alleged reputation of the complainant as a prostitute the trial court may also have read the statute as absolutely proscribing the admission of such evidence.
Prior to cross-examination of the complainant, counsel for defendant Williams and the prosecutor again argued to the trial court about the scope of cross-examination of the complainant. This argument was fueled by the fact that defense counsel had obtained a temporary "rap sheet" on the complainant indicating that she had been charged with accosting and soliciting within six days of the crimes for which the defendants were on trial. Defense counsel argued that the accosting and soliciting charge constituted newly discovered evidence under Sec. 520j(2), thus permitting defendants to offer evidence relative to a pattern of prostitution by complainant [Plaintiff's Appendix, p. 115a]. However, the trial court ruled that no new evidence or information had been discovered and that his prior ruling excluding inquiry into the contested matters would not be changed [Plaintiff's Appendix, p. 125a].
Following their jury trial, defendants Williams, Anderson and Johnson were each convicted, under separate counts, of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2). Defendant Respress was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
A divided Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. 95 Mich.App. 1, 289 N.W.2d 863 (1980). The majority held the notice provision of Sec. 520j unconstitutional when applied to preclude evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct between the complainant and one defendant. Id., 11, 289 N.W.2d 863. The majority also ruled that the remaining defendants should have been allowed to benefit from the admission of this evidence. Id., 11-12, 289 N.W.2d 863.
We granted leave to appeal and directed the parties to include among the issues to be briefed whether application of Sec. 520j violated defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and cross-examination. 408 Mich. 959 (1980).
Defendants assert on appeal to us that their Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and cross-examination were violated by the trial court's preclusion of any inquiry into alleged prior sexual relations between defendant Williams and the complainant 3 and the alleged reputation of the complainant as a prostitute. This evidence, defendants argue, is relevant to their defense of consent and the closely related issue of complainant's credibility.
The trial court excluded the evidence primarily due to defendants' failure to comply with Sec. 520j(2) which requires a defendant intending to offer evidence permitted under Sec. 520j(1), subds. (a) or (b) to file a written motion and offer of proof within ten days after the arraignment on the information. For the text see fn 1.
Were we confronted with a denial of defendants' rights to cross-examine the complainant on relevant probative matters, as well as a denial of their right to present relevant evidence on their own behalf, due solely to their failure to comply with a statutory notice provision, constitutional questions involving the Sixth Amendment might indeed be raised. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83, fn. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1897, fn. 14, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (). However, we do not reach...
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