People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 30 May 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 4-17-0075,4-17-0075
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENNETH B. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2019 IL App (4th) 170075-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KENNETH B. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-17-0075

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

May 30, 2019

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County

No. 15CF656

The Honorable Thomas J. Difanis, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices DeArmond and Turner concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that the State introduced improper other-crimes evidence. The appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction because the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

¶ 2 In May 2015, the State charged defendant, Kenneth B. Williams, with (count I) armed habitual criminal and (count II) unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a), 1.1(a) (West 2014). In November 2016, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude other-crimes evidence. In December 2016, the trial court denied the motion, and the jury found defendant guilty of both counts. In January 2017, the court denied defendant's motion for a new trial in which he argued, in pertinent part, that the State violated the motion in limine. The court sentenced defendant to 10 years in prison for count I and 3 years in prison for count II, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The court also imposed various fines and fees.

¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the State introduced improper other-crimes evi- dence and (2) he is entitled to per diem credit toward eligible fines. We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 A. The Charges

¶ 6 In May 2015, the State charged defendant with (count I) armed habitual criminal and (count II) unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Id. In essence, the State alleged that defendant knowingly possessed a .38-caliber revolver and .38-caliber bullets. As related to count I, the State alleged that defendant had been previously convicted "of the offense of Unlawful Use of a Weapon by a Felon, a class 2 felony, *** and the offense of Unlawful Delivery of a Controlled Substance, a class 2 felony[.]"Although the trial court initially appointed the public defender's office, defendant elected to proceed pro se.

¶ 7 B. The Motion In Limine

¶ 8 In November 2016, defendant filed a motion in limine. In pertinent part, defendant argued that the State was going to introduce evidence of prior bad acts and uncharged conduct that was not relevant to the State's charges. Essentially, the motion in limine was intended to prevent the State from mentioning that Phillip Knee told the police that defendant had shot Terik Kendrick in the foot. Knee's claims were a partial basis for the search warrant that led to defendant's arrest and the subsequent discovery of the .38-caliber revolver and the .38-caliber bullets. However, the State never charged defendant with the shooting of Kendrick.

¶ 9 In December 2016, prior to the start of defendant's jury trial, the following exchange occurred regarding defendant's motion in limine:

"DEFENDANT: Your Honor, before the jury get here—

THE COURT: Yes.

DEFENDANT: I wonder *** will the uncharged crime be mentioned atall?

THE COURT: What?

MR. LOZAR [(ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY)]: Judge, I think he's referring to a section of the motion in limine to [his] priors. He also refers to some statements made for other parts of the investigation. It would probably be appropriate to look at those (inaudible).

THE COURT: To do what?

MR. LOZAR: To look at what he's talking about, and I think he lays it out in his motion in limine I handed you.

* * *

THE COURT: Mr. Lozar, what—this is a little bit difficult to read, but are you intending to produce any information about other offenses other than what's charged?

MR. LOZAR: The Defendant gave a recorded statement to an officer that covered some stuff that is not in my opinion related to this case. I don't intend to go anywhere near that stuff, Judge. He did make some statements explaining why he had possession of the gun. He indicated that he was concerned about retaliation towards himself based on other things that had happened which he was not implicated in. He was worried, and he said essentially I've got the gun to protect my family. So to the extent the—to the extent the conversation related to that, yes. I do intend to talk about that but as to—

THE COURT: Any of the other—

MR. LOZAR: —some of the things he talked about was him shooting oth-er people. Nothing like that. I don't intend to bring anything like that in. The only things—and—and to that end while there was a recording made the recording is, oh, more than 90 minutes and a great deal of it relates to the other things. For instance, the—the—the Phillip Knee situation. I don't intend to talk about that whatsoever. The parts that would be relevant and important here are the stuff that goes to the Defendant's state of mind as to why he was in possession of the firearm.

THE COURT: Mr. Williams [(defendant)], apparently the only part of the statement that the State wishes to use is that you acknowledge you had the weapon and you had it for protection. They're not going to get into any of the other issues that you've apparently raised in your motion.

DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor."

¶ 10 Apparently, the trial court denied defendant's motion in limine. However, the State made assurances that it would only introduce evidence "that goes to the Defendant's state of mind as to why he was in possession of the firearm."

¶ 11 C. The Jury Trial

¶ 12 Following this discussion, defendant's jury trial began. The parties stipulated that on May 5, 2015, defendant "was a convicted felon having been previously convicted of a combination of 2 of the enumerated felonies as set forth in 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 and that, further, on the 5th of May of 2015, the defendant was a convicted felon having been previously convicted of a Class 2 or greater felony under the Illinois Controlled Substances Act."

¶ 13 1. Gary Gaudio

¶ 14 Officer Gary Gaudio of the Champaign Police Department testified that on May5, 2015, he assisted with the execution of a search warrant on defendant's residence. Prior to the execution of the search warrant, defendant returned to the residence in a vehicle he was driving. The police stopped the vehicle and ordered defendant and the three passengers to exit the vehicle. The police arrested defendant and searched him incident to the arrest. The police also searched the vehicle defendant was driving. Gaudio, who was responsible for collecting and documenting evidence from the scene, testified that the police found (1) .38-caliber bullets in defendant's pocket and (2) a .38-caliber revolver under the driver's seat of the vehicle. Gaudio elaborated that the bullets found in defendant's pocket could be used for the revolver found under the driver's seat.

¶ 15 2. Jordan Hagemann

¶ 16 Officer Jordan Hagemann of the Champaign Police Department stated that on May 5, 2015, he assisted with the execution of a search warrant. Hagemann stated that a vehicle that defendant was driving arrived on the scene, and the police detained everyone inside the vehicle. Defendant was placed under arrest, and Hagemann searched defendant's person incident to the arrest. Hagemann testified that he found five .38-caliber bullets in defendant's pocket.

¶ 17 3. Mark Strzesak

¶ 18 Detective Mark Strzesak of the Champaign Police Department stated that on May 5, 2015, he searched defendant's vehicle. Strzesak testified that as he "approached the vehicle to do the search, I noticed that the floorboard mat on the driver's side had been pulled up" and that there "appeared to be a gun tucked under the driver's seat."

¶ 19 4. Robert Sumption

¶ 20 Detective Robert Sumption of the Champaign Police Department testified that he interviewed defendant following his arrest. Sumption noted that this was a "fairly lengthy inter-view" but that only "a very small portion of [the interview] actually relates to this case." Sumption stated that "there had been an ongoing dispute in Champaign County which ultimately resulted in the murder of [defendant's] brother. His brother was murdered by a man—a man by the name of David Beverly." Defendant objected to this testimony, and the trial court sustained this objection.

¶ 21 Regarding the firearm found in the vehicle, Sumption testified as follows:

"Q. He indicated he had some—some reason to be in possession of the firearm?

A. Yes, he did.

Q. Generally speaking, the general concern was what?

A. His safety as well as the safety of a female occupant of the vehicle he was in.

* * *

Q. All right. Did he indicate his motivation with regard to those females as to why he might want to be in possession of a firearm?

A. To keep them safe."

¶ 22 Sumption also testified that he "spoke [with defendant] about the firearm as it relates to a separate incident." Regarding this "separate incident," Sumption stated that defendant "invited me to have it forensically tested. At that point, he said that the forensic analysis would show that [the] gun was not related to the separate incident."

¶ 23 During cross-examination, Sumption conceded that he never specifically asked defendant whether the gun was his. During the State's redirect examination, Sumption stated that there were "several inferences made *** by [defendant] acknowledging the gun, acknowledgingthe possession of the gun. I didn't feel that during that interview based on the ammunition in his pocket and the gun underneath the seat that *** I needed to specifically ask him 'is that your gun.' "

¶ 24 On defendant's further cross-examination, Sumption testified as follows:

"Q. You stated that there was acknowledgments about [the] history of the firearm.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Would those acknowledgements become because [sic] something else transpired?

A. Yes.

* * *

Q. And earlier you stated with [the

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