People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 05 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 1-88-3114,1-88-3114
• Citation: 206 Ill.App.3d 1071,151 Ill.Dec. 893,565 N.E.2d 164
• Parties: , 151 Ill.Dec. 893 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Henry WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 164

565 N.E.2d 164

206 Ill.App.3d 1071, 151 Ill.Dec. 893

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Henry WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-88-3114.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Third Division.

Dec. 5, 1990.

Cecial A. Partee, Chicago (Inge Fryklund, Bonnie Meyer Sloan, Eileen Rubin, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Justice RIZZI delivered the opinion of the court:

The People of the State of Illinois appeal from an order of the circuit court which granted defendant Henry Williams' motion to suppress evidence. The sole issue on appeal is whether collateral estoppel precludes an issue from being litigated in a DUI criminal proceeding (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501), because the issue was decided previously in a statutory summary suspension hearing (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 95 1/2, par. 2-118.1). We reverse and remand.

On October 26, 1987, Chicago Police Officers Michael Brown and Fred McCad observed defendant slumped over the steering wheel of a stationary automobile. The officers ascertained that there had been an automobile accident and noted that the front end of defendant's vehicle was damaged. Brown testified that when he approached the vehicle in which defendant was sitting, he detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from defendant. He also noted that defendant was the only person present in the auto and that the keys were in the ignition. When Brown asked defendant if he was alright, defendant did not respond.

Brown instructed defendant to step out of the car and asked him if he had been drinking. Defendant responded that he had not been drinking. However, Brown noted that defendant's speech was slurred. After talking with witnesses, Brown concluded that defendant was the driver of the automobile that was involved in the accident, and placed him under arrest for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.

Brown's report indicated that defendant swayed and swaggered as he walked and that his balance was so poor that he had to be helped into the police car. In addition, Brown testified that based on his personal and professional experience it was his opinion that defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of his arrest. At the police station, defendant took a breathalizer test which indicated that his blood alcohol level was .10 or above. As a result, defendant's driving privileges were summarily suspended.

On December 9, 1987, defendant filed a request for a hearing to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver's license. A hearing was held on January 13, 1988. Following the hearing, the trial court held that there was no clear and convincing evidence that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was under actual physical control of an automobile while under the influence of alcohol. As a result, the court rescinded the summary suspension of defendant's driving privileges.

Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to suppress in the DUI criminal proceeding alleging that the issue of probable cause had already been litigated and resolved in his favor in the proceeding to rescind the summary suspension of his driving privileges. Defendant argued therefore, that the State was precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from offering any evidence in the DUI proceeding that was obtained after and pursuant to the arrest. The trial court agreed and ruled that because the issue of probable cause had been fully litigated between the parties in the statutory summary suspension hearing, collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the issue in the DUI proceeding. This appeal followed.

The appellee has not filed a brief. However, because the record is simple and the claimed error can easily be decided without the aid of an appellee's brief, we decide the merits of this appeal. First Capitol Mortgage v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill.2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493, 495.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to bar the trial of an...