People v. Williams
| Decision Date | 29 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-06-1113.,4-06-1113. |
| Citation | 892 N.E.2d 620 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joel WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
In June 2006, a jury found defendant, Joel Williams, guilty of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(1) (West 2006)) and domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2006)) and not guilty of interfering with reporting domestic violence (720 ILCS 5/12-6.3(a) (West 2006)). In September 2006, the trial court sentenced defendant to five years' imprisonment for aggravated battery followed by a two-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) and three years' imprisonment for domestic battery followed by a one-year term of MSR.
Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the victim's written statement to rebut defendant's claim that the victim was intoxicated on the night in question; (2) the court's response to a jury question was incorrect and inconsistent with the charging instrument; (3) defendant's conviction for domestic battery violates the one-act, one-crime rule because the jury instructions did not apportion the acts that defendant allegedly committed; and (4) the court erred in sentencing defendant to two years' MSR on his aggravated-battery conviction.
We affirm defendant's convictions but remand with directions to correct the sentencing judgment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the victim's statement into evidence for a limited purpose. The court's response to the jury's question was legally accurate, and the variance between the charging instrument and the evidence at trial was not fatal. Defendant's conviction for domestic battery did not violate the one-act, one-crime rule because it was based on different acts and, as charged, domestic battery was not a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery. However, the State concedes, and we agree, that the court erred by sentencing defendant to two years' MSR on his aggravated-battery conviction. Therefore, we remand for issuance of an amended sentencing judgment to reflect a one-year period of MSR for defendant's aggravated-battery conviction.
Defendant also asserts that his success on the MSR issue prevents the State from obtaining its costs for this appeal. We disagree and conclude the State is entitled to its costs for this appeal.
In April 2006, the State charged defendant with aggravated battery (count I), domestic battery (count II), and interfering with reporting of domestic violence (count III). Count I alleged that defendant knowingly and without legal justification made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Debra Billups by holding a knife, a deadly weapon, to her throat. Count II alleged that defendant knowingly and without legal justification made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Billups, a family or household member, by putting his hands around her neck. Count II was charged as a Class 4 felony because defendant had been previously convicted of domestic battery. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(b) (West 2006).
On June 19, 2006, the jury trial commenced. In his opening statement, defense counsel informed the jury that the evidence would show that Billups was so drunk she could not remember what happened that evening.
The State called Billups to testify, as well as two of the police officers who responded to the 9-1-1 call, Kendra DeRosa and Jwone Hughes. The evidence indicated that on April 4, 2006, at approximately 11:45 p.m., the police were called to the mobile home where defendant and Billups resided. Defendant left the residence at the suggestion of the police but later returned to the mobile home. At approximately 3 a.m. on April 5, 2006, the police were again dispatched to defendant and Billups' home.
Billups testified that when defendant returned to the home, she let him in but locked him out of their bedroom. According to Billups, defendant kicked the bedroom door open and choked her until she blacked out. When she regained consciousness, defendant poked her in her head, side, and back with a knife and asked her "where did [she] want it." Billups managed to call 9-1-1 during the incident.
On cross-examination, Billups admitted she was intoxicated that evening and had consumed six beers and four shots of alcohol. However, both police officers testified that Billups did not appear intoxicated. Specifically, Officer Hughes testified that he had had contact with Billups in the past and had seen her intoxicated. Officer Hughes saw no indication that Billups was "heavily intoxicated" the night in question. Officer DeRosa testified that Billups did not exhibit the signs of intoxication DeRosa typically observed in intoxicated persons, such as difficulty following verbal direction, confusion, bloodshot and glassy eyes, "stammer[ing] around," and lack of depth perception.
Billups also admitted on cross-examination that she had a phone conversation with an investigator from defense counsel's office the Friday prior to trial. Billups admitted she told the investigator that she was so intoxicated the night in question that she did not remember what occurred. Billups testified, however, that since speaking to the investigator, the events of the evening had come back to her. On redirect, Billups testified that her testimony at trial was based on her memory and that she remembered the events.
Officer DeRosa testified that when she arrived at the mobile home, Billups told her that defendant had choked her and held a knife to her head and various parts of her body. The officers found a knife in the kitchen garbage can. Officer DeRosa saw red marks around Billups' neck and a scratch on her right shoulder. Pictures of those injuries were admitted at trial. Officer DeRosa also felt the top of Billups head for an indentation Billups claimed was caused when defendant stuck the knife to her head. Officer DeRosa felt a small indentation.
Both officers testified that they witnessed Billups complete and sign a written statement on April 5, 2006, State's exhibit No. 5. Officer DeRosa testified that Billups followed her instruction to place a large "X" in the empty area on the page and initial it so as to show nothing was added. Officer Hughes testified that Billups stayed within the lines and the statement was legible.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He testified that Billups was intoxicated on the night in question. Defendant denied attempting to strangle Billups and denied ever using a knife on her.
The State sought to publish to the jury Billups' statement, exhibit No. 5, for the limited purpose of countering defendant's testimony that Billups was intoxicated. Defense counsel objected on the basis that the contents of the statement were highly prejudicial and the State failed to present an expert to testify that the handwriting was inconsistent with someone who was highly intoxicated.
The trial court overruled defense counsel's objections and admitted the exhibit for the limited purpose of considering whether Billups was highly intoxicated on the night in question. The court instructed the jury as follows:
While the exhibit was passed to the jurors, defense counsel approached the bench. The following exchange occurred:
(Brief interruption.)
(The following proceedings were had in the presence and hearing of the jury).
MR. GRIENER [assistant State's Attorney]: I believe they're finished."
The record contains no additional information about this incident.
In closing argument, the assistant State's Attorney apportioned the two acts — the choking and the use of the knife — between the two offenses. That is, the assistant State's Attorney argued that defendant committed domestic battery when he choked Billups and committed aggravated battery when he put the knife on various parts of Billup's body. The only use the State made of exhibit No. 5 in closing argument was to ask the jury to consider whether the handwriting appeared to be that of a "person who was drunk out of [her] mind." The trial court then instructed the jury, including the instruction that "evidence that was received for a limited purpose should not be considered by you for any other purpose" (People's tendered instruction No. 1, based on Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.01 (4th ed.2000)).
During deliberations, the jury submitted the following question: "By using a deadly weapon, does that mean having physical contact with the weapon?" Following a discussion with counsel, and at defense counsel's request, the court recessed to give the parties the opportunity to review the case law regarding whether actual physical contact with the weapon must be made.
After the recess, the State submitted People v. Avant, 86 Ill.App.3d 268, 42 Ill. Dec....
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