People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 07 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. S066106.,S066106.
• Citation: 25 Cal.4th 441,106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295,21 P.3d 1209
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arasheik Wesley WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295

25 Cal.4th 441

21 P.3d 1209

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arasheik Wesley WILLIAMS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S066106.

Supreme Court of California.

May 7, 2001.

Barry P. Helft, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald E. Niver and Karl S. Mayer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GEORGE, C.J.

A juror in this criminal case expressly refused to follow the trial court's instructions regarding the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, because the juror disagreed with the law criminalizing such behavior. The trial court dismissed the juror and replaced him with an alternate juror. On appeal following conviction, defendant claims the juror should not have been discharged, because the juror's refusal to follow the law was proper under the concept of "jury nullification." The Court of Appeal rejected that contention and affirmed the judgment of conviction. We agree with the Court of Appeal and affirm the judgment.

I

Defendant Arasheik Wesley Williams was charged in an 11-count information with committing the offenses of false imprisonment (Pen.Code, § 236),¹ assault with a deadly weapon or by force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), battery with serious bodily injury (§§ 242, 243, subd. (d)), and torture (§ 206) against his former girlfriend, Jennifer B., during three incidents occurring on December 31, 1994, January 1, 1995, and January 9, 1995. The information further alleged that defendant used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of five of the counts (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), used a deadly weapon in the commission of one of the charged rapes (§ 12022.3, subd. (a)), and inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in the commission of another of the counts (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).

As to the December 31 incident, defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (b)) as a necessarily included offense of rape. As to the January 1 incident, defendant was acquitted of all charges. As to the January 9 incident, defendant was convicted of assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, false imprisonment, and torture. The jury found true the allegation that he inflicted great bodily injury on the victim, and found each of the remaining allegations not true.

Defendant was sentenced to the middle term of three years in prison on the conviction of assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, plus a sentence enhancement of three years for inflicting great bodily injury. Sentences on the false imprisonment and torture convictions were stayed, and defendant was sentenced to a concurrent term of six months for unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, for a total term of six years in prison.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction.

II

As noted above, the charges in this case arose from three incidents involving defendant and his former girlfriend. Only the first incident is relevant to the issue upon which we granted review.

At the time of the December 31, 1994, incident, defendant was 18 years of age and his girlfriend, Jennifer B, was 16 years of age. Both defendant and Jennifer B. testified that they engaged in sexual intercourse on that date; however, defendant testified it was consensual, and Jennifer B. testified defendant forced her to engage in intercourse by threatening her with knives.

At trial, prior to the attorneys' closing arguments, the court indicated that it would instruct the jury that it could convict defendant of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor as a lesser offense included within the charged offense of rape. Defendant's objection was overruled.

During argument, defense counsel made the following statement: "Something else has happened in this case.... They have added misdemeanors to all the charges you heard.... They added statutory rape suddenly without notice or preparation. Now, what is the role of a juror on the statutory misdemeanor rape? Your role as a juror is to fairly apply the law. That's why we don't want computers. We need the input of fair people, [defendants peers, if you will. Law as you know is not uniformly applied. I can see five cars speeding and the highway patrol is not likely to arrest any of the five. Mores, custom[s] change. Times change. And the law must be applied fairly. So if the law is not being applied fairly, that's why you need fair jurors. Now there is a case called Duncan versus Alaska [Louisiana]. It's the Supreme Court of the United States, 391 U.S. 145, 88 Supreme Court 1444 . And I would like to read to you just two lines: `The guarantee of jury trial in the federal and state Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the government.' And further on in the case at the end are the lovely words, `A jury may, at times, afford a higher justice by refusing to enforce harsh laws.' Please understand."² During the first day of deliberations, the trial court received a message from the jury foreperson indicating that Juror No. 10 "refuses to adhere to Judge's instruction to uphold the law in regard to rape and statutory rape, crime Section 261.5(b) of the Penal Code. He believes the law is wrong and, therefore, will not hear any discussions."³ In response, the trial court questioned Juror No. 10 outside the presence of the other jurors:

"THE COURT: [I]t's been reported to me that you refuse to follow my instructions on the law in regard to rape and unlawful sexual intercourse, that you believe the law to be wrong and, therefore, you will not hear any discussion on that subject. Is that correct?

"[JUROR]: Pretty much, yes.

"THE COURT: All right. Are you governed by what was said during argument by counsel?

"[JUROR]: Yes.

"THE COURT: You understand that there was an improper suggestion and that it's a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct?

"[JUROR]: No, I don't know that.

"THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm telling you that's what it was. And I would remind you too that you took an oath at the outset of the case in the following language: `Do you and each of you understand and agree that you will well and truly try the cause now pending before this Court and a true verdict render according only to the evidence presented to you and to the instructions of the Court.' You understand that if you would not follow the instructions that have been given to you by the court that you would be violating that oath? Do you understand that?

"[JUROR]: I understand that.

"THE COURT: Are you willing to abide by the requirements of your oath?

"[JUROR]: I simply cannot see staining a man, a young man, for the rest of his life for what I believe to be a wrong reason.

"THE COURT: Well, you understand that statutory rape or unlawful sexual intercourse has been described to you as a misdemeanor? Did you follow that in the instructions?

"[JUROR]: I've been told it is a misdemeanor. I still don't see—if it were a $10 fine, I just don't see convicting a man and staining his record for the rest of his life. I think that is wrong. I'm sorry, Judge.

"THE COURT: What you're saying is not the law either concerning that particular aspect.

"[JUROR]: I'm trying as best I can, Judge. And I'm willing to follow all the rules and regulations on the entire rest of the charges, but on that particular charge, I just feel duty-bound to object.

"THE COURT: So you're not willing then to follow your oath?

"[JUROR]: That is correct."

The trial court, over defendant's objection, excused Juror No. 10, replaced him with an alternate juror, and instructed the jury to begin its deliberations anew. The next day, the jury convicted defendant of the above described charges, including unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor.

III

A trial court's authority to discharge a juror is granted by Penal Code section 1089, which provides in pertinent part: "If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order him to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate, who shall then take his place in the jury box, and be subject to the same rules and regulations as though he had been selected as one of the original jurors."⁴ (Italics added; see also Code Civ. Proc, §§ 233, 234.) "We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's determination to discharge a juror and order an alternate to serve. [Citation.] If there is any substantial evidence supporting the trial court's ruling, we will uphold it. [Citation.] We have also stated, however, that a juror's inability to perform as a juror must `"appear in the record as a demonstrable reality."' [Citation.]" (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 843, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280.)

A juror who refuses to follow the court's instructions is "unable to perform his duty" within the meaning of Penal Code section 1089. As soon as a jury is selected, each juror must agree to render a true verdict "`according only to the evidence presented ... and to the instructions of the court.'" (Code Civ. Proc., § 232, subd. (b), italics added.)

In People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 690, 131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742, after the jury had begun its deliberations, a juror sent a note to the judge asking to be excused because she was "`unable to follow the Court's instructions concerning deliberation.'" Upon being questioned by the...