People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 19 November 2009
• Docket Number: No. 107140.,107140.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Joel WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

920 N.E.2d 1060

235 Ill.2d 286

336 Ill.Dec. 470

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Joel WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 107140.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

November 19, 2009.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Gary R. Peterson, Deputy Defender, and Ryan R. Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Springfield, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and William A. Yoder, State's Attorney, of Bloomington (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Charles Redfern, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

At issue is whether a State's Attorney may recover a statutory $50 appeal fee (55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2008)) when the defendant is partially successful on appeal.

BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of McLean County, defendant, Joel Williams, was convicted of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(1) (West 2006)) and domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2) (West 2006)). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of five years' imprisonment plus two years' mandatory supervised release (MSR) for aggravated battery and three years' imprisonment plus one year of MSR for domestic battery.

Defendant appealed, raising four issues. One of defendant's arguments was that the trial court erred in sentencing him to two years' MSR on his aggravated battery conviction. In its response brief, the State confessed error on this point, conceding that, because defendant's aggravated battery conviction was for a Class 3 felony, the MSR term should have been one year (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(3) (West 2008)). As part of its prayer for relief, the State asked that costs be assessed pursuant to section 4-2002(a) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2008)).

In his reply brief, defendant noted the State's confession of error on the MSR issue and argued that, if the appellate court accepted the State's confession of error, then it should deny the State's request for costs. Defendant argued that the relevant statute provided that costs for the appeal could not be collected from the defendant "where judgment is in favor of the accused" (55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2008)). Defendant relied on a series of cases from the Appellate Court, Second District, holding that the State was not permitted to recover costs from the defendant when the defendant had been partially successful on appeal. See People v. Brownell, 123 Ill.App.3d 307, 78 Ill.Dec. 817, 462 N.E.2d 936 (1984)¹; People v. Merrero, 121 Ill.App.3d 716, 77 Ill.Dec. 62, 459 N.E.2d 1158 (1984); People v. Smith, 113 Ill.App.3d 917, 68 Ill.Dec. 705, 446 N.E.2d 876 (1983).

The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed as modified and remanded. 384 Ill.App.3d 327, 322 Ill.Dec. 983, 892 N.E.2d 620. The appellate court agreed with the parties that defendant's MSR term for aggravated battery should be one year rather than two years. The court, however, rejected all of defendant's other arguments and otherwise affirmed his convictions and sentences. The court also awarded the State costs pursuant to section 4-2002(a), and rejected defendant's contention that costs could not be awarded if he obtained any relief on appeal. Citing People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill.2d 166, 15 Ill.Dec. 759, 374 N.E.2d 194 (1978), and People v. Smith, 133 Ill.App.3d 613, 88 Ill.Dec. 715, 479 N.E.2d 328 (1985), the court held that the State is entitled to costs if it successfully defends any part of a criminal judgment challenged on appeal. 384 Ill.App.3d at 341-42, 322 Ill.Dec. 983, 892 N.E.2d 620.

We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal to resolve a conflict in the appellate court over whether the State may recover costs on appeal when a defendant is partially successful. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

The principal issue is one of statutory construction. Thus, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the drafters' intention, and the most reliable indicator of intent is the language used which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Davison, 233 Ill.2d 30, 40, 329 Ill.Dec. 347, 906 N.E.2d 545 (2009). In determining the plain meaning of a statute's terms, we consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. People v. Perry, 224 Ill.2d 312, 323, 309 Ill.Dec. 330, 864 N.E.2d 196 (2007). The construction of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Davison, 233 Ill.2d at 40, 329 Ill.Dec. 347, 906 N.E.2d 545.

The governing provision is section 4-2002(a) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2008)), which sets forth a schedule of fees for State's Attorneys in counties of fewer than 3 million persons. Section 4-2002(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

"For each case of appeal taken from his county or from the county to which a change of venue is taken to his county to the Supreme or Appellate Court when prosecuted or defended by him, $50.

* * *

All the foregoing fees shall be taxed as costs to be collected from the defendant, if possible, upon conviction. But in cases of inquiry into the mental illness of any person alleged to be mentally ill, in cases on a charge of paternity and in cases of appeal in the Supreme or Appellate Court, where judgment is in favor of the accused, the fees allowed the State's attorney therein shall be retained out of the fines and forfeitures collected by them in other cases." (Emphasis added.) 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2008).

Defendant first contends that, because he obtained partial relief on appeal, the State must seek its fee from other sources. According to defendant, "where judgment is in favor of the accused" means any situation in which part of the appellate court's judgment is for the defendant. Decisions from the Second District of our appellate court, as well as from the fifth division of the First District, have refused to award the State fees when the defendant is successful on any part of an appeal. See People v. Bonds, 391 Ill.App.3d 182, 202, 330 Ill.Dec. 250, 908 N.E.2d 102 (1st Dist.2009); Merrero, 121 Ill.App.3d at 723-24, 77 Ill.Dec. 62, 459 N.E.2d 1158; Smith, 113 Ill.App.3d at 926, 68 Ill.Dec. 705, 446 N.E.2d 876.² By contrast, the State argues that the meaning of the above language is that the State's Attorney must seek its fee from other sources only when the defendant obtains complete relief on appeal, such that he is no longer a convicted defendant following entry of the appellate court's judgment. The State draws support from section 124A-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/124A-5 (West 2008)), which provides in relevant part that "[w]hen a person is convicted of an offense under a statute, or at common law, the court shall enter judgment that the offender pay the costs of the prosecution." (Emphasis added.) The State reads this provision in concert with section 4-2002(a), which provides that the fees set forth in the statute are collected from the defendant upon conviction. Section 4-2002(a) then provides three exceptions to the rule that fees are collected from the defendant: (1) inquiry into mental illness of a person alleged to be mentally ill; (2) paternity cases; and (3) appeals where the judgment is in favor of the accused. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2008). The State notes that the first two exceptions to the rule that the fees are collected from the defendant are for situations in which there is not a convicted defendant: inquiry into mental illness and a charge of paternity. Reading these provisions together, the State argues that it is clear that the third exception—in cases of appeal where the judgment is in favor of the accused—must refer to a situation in which the accused is no longer a convicted defendant following the appeal. The third division of the First District, as well as the Fourth and Fifth Districts, have routinely awarded costs in cases where the defendant is only partially successful on appeal. See, e.g., People v. Leach, 385 Ill.App.3d 215, 223, 325 Ill.Dec. 649, 898 N.E.2d 696 (4th Dist.2008); People v. Moreland, 292 Ill.App.3d 616, 624, 226 Ill.Dec. 814, 686 N.E.2d 597 (1st Dist.1997); People v. Smith, 133 Ill.App.3d 613, 619-20, 88 Ill. Dec. 715, 479 N.E.2d 328 (5th Dist.1985) (expressly rejecting Second District's position as contrary to Nicholls).

This court has already resolved this issue in favor of the State's position. In Nicholls, the defendant argued that the State's Attorney is not entitled to a fee when a convicted defendant is partially successful on appeal. The governing statutory language was identical to that which we consider today, but at the time was codified as section 8 of "AN ACT concerning fees and salaries * * *" (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1975, ch. 53, par. 8). In response to the defendant's argument, this court held as follows:

"Another issue raised in this appeal is whether the State's Attorney is entitled to his fee when a convicted defendant is partially successful on appeal. Section 8 of `An Act concerning fees and salaries * * *' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 53, par. 8) provides that the State's Attorney shall receive a fee for each conviction and further provides that no fees shall be charged on more than 10 counts in any one indictment or information on trial and conviction. Thus in the trial court the State's Attorney would be entitled to a fee taxed as costs for each count on which a conviction is obtained (see People v. Kawoleski (1923), 310 Ill. 498). However, section 8 also provides that, `[f]or each case of appeal' to the supreme or appellate court when prosecuted or defended by him the State's Attorney shall receive a fee of $50. Section 8 also provides that `where judgment is in favor of the accused' the fees allowed the State's Attorney shall be retained out of the...