People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 13 November 1923
• Docket Number: No. 126.,126.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

225 Mich. 133

195 N.W. 818

PEOPLE

v.WILLIAMS et al.

No. 126.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Nov. 13, 1923.

Error to Recorder's Court of Detroit; Thomas M. Cotter, Judge.

Donald Williams and Goebel Baker were convicted of breaking and entering dwelling houses at nighttime and stealing therefrom. From an order refusing to set aside the convictions, defendants bring error. Affirmed.

Argued before WIEST, C. J., and FELLOWS, McDONALD, CLARK, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, and STEERE, JJ. J. H. M. Alexander, of Detroit, for appellants.

Andrew B. Dougherty, Atty. Gen., and Paul W. Voorhies, Pros. Atty., and Eugene A. Walling, Asst. Pros. Atty. both of Detroit, for the People.

WIEST, C. J.

Defendants entered pleas of not guilty to informations charging them with breaking and entering two dwelling houses in the nighttime with intent to steal, and with stealing certain goods and chattels therein, and were remanded to await trial. The trial judge having been informed by an assistant probation officer that defendants desired to change their pleas had them brought into court, and the record shows the following:

‘The Court: You want to plead guilty in both of these cases, Goebel?

‘Mr. Baker: Grand larceny, is it?

‘The Court: Both of them are charges of breaking and entering. One is on complaint of Eva Young, and the other is Alice Squires.

‘Mr. Baker: Will your honor let me plead guilty to a larceny charge?

‘Mr. Toy (Assistant Prosecutor): His attorney was here, and he said he talked to him and he was to plead guilty.

‘The Court: You do want to plead guilty to breaking and entering?

‘Mr. Baker: Yes, sir.

‘The Court: Are you pleading guilty of your own free will?

‘Mr. Baker: Yes, sir.

‘The Court: Because you are guilty?

‘Mr. Baker: Yes, sir.

‘The Court: Not because of any promises or threats?

‘Mr. Baker: No, sir.

‘The Court: You did break into both the these places in the nighttime?

‘Mr. Baker: Yes, sir.

‘The Court: They were dwellings?

‘Mr. Baker: Yes, sir.

‘The Court: I will refer you to the probation officer for investigation and set it for one week from to-day.

‘The Court: Donald Williams, you want to change your plea also to guilty in this case-both cases?

‘Mr. Williams: Yes, sir.

‘The Court: Breaking and entering in the nighttime?

‘Mr. Williams: Yes, sir.

‘The Court: You are pleading guilty of your own free will?

‘Mr. Williams Yes, sir.

‘The Court: Nobody threatened you or promised you anything?

‘Mr. Williams: No, sir.

‘The Court: I accept your plea, and refer you to the probation department for one week.’

When defendants were called for sentence, they again stated that they were guilty and had entered pleas of guilty of their own free will, without inducement, threats, or promises, confessed previous crimes and prison records, and were sentenced under one of the informations.

While in prison serving their sentences they moved the court to vacate their pleas of guilty and set their convictions aside, claiming they had first pleaded not guilty; were then interviewed by the probation officers who notified the court that they wished to change their pleas to guilty; that their pleas of guilty were not freely entered but under restraint and duress; that the court was in error in construing their answers ‘to his leading questions and accusations as a full, free, deliberate, and unreserved plea of guilty’; that the court could not sentence them to prison unless they deliberately pleaded guilty to an information, the charges and contents of which they thoroughly understood; that they did not have the assistance of an attorney to advise them and they could not freely and intelligently act without such assistance; that the court stated in sentencing them, ‘Defendants were no good, had records,’ and accused them of crimes not charged in the information and thereby showed said court was prejudiced against defendants; that the court did not investigate their pleas of guilty by an examination as required by C. L. 1915, § 15830, and they were entitled to have their guilt passed upon by an impartial jury.

An accused is not entitled as of right, to have counsel assigned by the court to advise him relative to his plea. The state Constitution, art. 2, § 19, secures to an accused the right ‘to have * * * counsel for his defense.’ This does not mean he shall have counsel at public expense. It is a guaranty of right to employ and have counsel, a right not always recognized in early English criminal cases. Section 15623, C. L. 1915, also allows an accused to be heard by counsel. This is only declaratory of the right secured to an accused by the provision mentioned in the Constitution, and is on a par with the right to produce witnesses and proofs in his favor, but does not mean he shall have counsel at public expense. Section 15912, C. L. 1915, permits the court to appoint an attorney at public expense to conduct the defense of an accused when he is unable to procure counsel. This statute is permissive; its provisions require a showing of inability of an accused to procure counsel, and as a rule, to which, of course, there may be exceptions, cannot be invoked by an accused until after plea, and not at all under a plea of guilty. The record discloses no application by defendants for counsel during the period their pleas of not guilty stood, or at any other time, and there is no merit in the claim that counsel should have been appointed to represent them.

We cannot see any harm in the probation officer informing the court of the desire of defendants to change their pleas. It is said in behalf of defendants:

‘In the case at bar the state of Michigan, acting by its judicial tribunal, the lower court, flagrantly violated the constructional rights of defendants and unlawfully confined them in prison.’

The record does not bear out this sweeping statement....