People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 20 October 1923
• Docket Number: No. 15410.,15410.
• Citation: 141 N.E. 296,309 Ill. 492
• Parties: PEOPLE v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

309 Ill. 492

141 N.E. 296

PEOPLE

v.WILLIAMS.

No. 15410.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 20, 1923.

Error to Circuit Court, Edgar County; A. A. Partlow, Judge.

Ezekiel Williams was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, and he brings error.

Affirmed.Wilber H. Hickman, of Paris, for plaintiff in error.

Edward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., George W. Bristow, State's Atty., of Paris, and George C. Dixon, of Dixon, for the People.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

An indictment was returned into the circuit court of Edgar county, charging the plaintiff in error, Ezekiel Williams, in four counts with selling intoxicating liquor in violation of the statute. He was found guilty by a jury on all the counts. Upon his motion for a new trial a nolle prosequi was entered as to the fourth court, and the motion was overruled. He was sentenced to confinement in jail 150 days and to pay a fine of $500 on the first count, and to pay a fine of $100 and costs on each of the second and third counts. He sued out a writ of error from this court on the ground that he was deprived of rights secured to him by the Constitution by being prosecuted and convicted under a void statute.

[1]The question of the validity of the statute was raised by a motion to quash the indictment, and one objection presented in argument going to the validity of the whole act is that the title embraces more than one subject. The title is:

‘An act to restrict the manufacture, sale, transportation, possession and use of intoxicating liquor, aiding thereby in establishing uniformity in state and federal laws in regard thereto.’ Hurd's Rev. St. 1921, c. 43, §§ 79-127.

The object of the constitutional provision that the title of an act shall not embrace more than one subject is that the title shall give information of the subject of legislation and that unrelated matters shall not be included. People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865,123 Am. St. Rep. 82,14 Ann. Cas. 994;People v. Nellis, 249 Ill. 12, 94 N. E. 165;People v. Horan, 293 Ill. 314, 127 N. E. 673. The argument is that the subject of aiding in establishing uniformity in state and federal laws in regard to prohibition is another and different subject from regulation of the liquor traffic and is not related thereto. The Eighteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution prohibits the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes, and provides that Congress and the several states shall have concurrent power to enforce the article by appropriate legislation. The statute was enacted for the enforcement of the amendment, and it legitimately expresses the legislative purpose in accordance with the provision of the federal Constitution. It is not an unrelated matter, but expresses the object of the legislation, and does not violate the rule.

[2][3] It is further contended that the act is void because of provisions contained in various sections, none of which concerned or affected the defendant in any manner unless their inclusion in the act, if void, would render the whole act void, and that is not the case. It is alleged that the sections attempt to delegate to the Attorney General and a prohibition commissioner, if there should be one, legislative and judicial powers; that search and seizure are authorized, in violation of constitutional rights; and that one is not permittedto accumulate and retain a certain kind of property, contrary to natural right. If any provision referred to is invalid it would be without legal effect, but none of them would affect the validity of the statute as a whole, unless so blended with and made a part of the remainder that the Legislature would not have passed the statute without such provisions. Sheldon v. Hoyne, 261 Ill. 222, 103 N. E. 1021;Joel v. Bennett, 276 Ill. 537, 115 N. E. 5. The provisions referred to could be separated from the rest of the act and leave a complete and valid prohibition against the sale of intoxicating liquor, with which the defendant was charged. The questions sought to be raised will not be considered, and the court did not err in overruling the motion to quash the indictment.

[4] Counsel says that the Prohibition Act does not repeal any part of the Local Option Act of 1907 (Laws 1907-08, p. 297); that different penalties are fixed by the two acts for the same offense; and that plaintiff in error is liable to prosecution under the LocalOption Act for the same sales of liquor. The Prohibition Act is a revision of the whole subject under the amendment of the federal Constitution, and was intended as a substitute for the existing law on that subject. It operated as a repeal, except as to pending proceedings, although it contained no express repealing clause. Board of Trustees v. City of Chicago, 14 Ill. 334;Culver v. Third Nat. Bank, 64 Ill. 528;Devine v. Board of Com'rs, 84 Ill. 590;People v. Nelson, 156 Ill. 364, 40 N. E. 957;People v. Board of Education, 166 Ill. 388, 46 N. E. 1099;People v. Town of Thornton, 186 Ill. 162, 57 N. E. 841;State Board of Health v. Ross, 191 Ill. 87, 60 N. E. 811.

[5] The defendant made a motion for a continuance, supported by his affidavit that two persons named therein were residents of Clinton, Ind.; that a subpoena had been issued for each of them; and that they could and would appear to testify at the June term. The abstract of the affidavit does not state any fact showing reasonable ground to believe that the attendance of the witnesses could be procured at the June term, so that the court could see that the belief was reasonable, and the affidavit was insufficient. Eubanks v. People, 41 Ill. 486;Wilhelm v. People, 72 Ill. 468.

Counsel says that on a motion for a bill of particulars...