People v. Williams

Decision Date05 January 1998
Docket NumberNo. S057534,S057534
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 17 Cal.4th 643B, 948 P.2d 429, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 66, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 99 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Reginald Eugene WILLIAMS, Defendant and Respondent,

Gil Garcetti, District Attorney, George M. Palmer, Acting Head Deputy District Attorney, Patrick D. Moran and Joseph N. Sorrentino, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Frank Duncan, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a) (hereafter Penal Code section 1385(a)), provides in pertinent part: "The judge or magistrate may ... of his or her own motion ..., and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes...."

In People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628 (hereafter sometimes Romero ), we explained that the "power to dismiss an action," on a trial court's own motion, "in furtherance of justice" pursuant to Penal Code section 1385(a), "includes the lesser power to strike ... allegations" or vacate findings "relevant to sentencing, such as the allegation" or finding "that a defendant has prior felony convictions." (Id. at p. 504, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628; accord, id. at p. 524, fn. 11, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628.)

In Romero, we proceeded to hold that, on its own motion, "in furtherance of justice" pursuant to Penal Code section 1385(a), a trial court may strike an allegation or vacate a finding under the so-called "Three Strikes" law (Pen.Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) 1 that a defendant has previously been convicted of a "serious" and/or "violent" felony as defined therein. (People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628.) We also held that an appellate court must review such a ruling for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)

In this cause, we shall further consider how trial and appellate courts should undertake to rule and review in this area.

I

On April 19, 1995, in the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, the district attorney filed an information against Reginald Eugene Williams.

In a single count, the district attorney charged that, on or about February 9, 1995, Williams committed the felony of driving a vehicle under the influence of an alcoholic beverage and/or a drug--specifically, as was otherwise disclosed, phencyclidine or PCP--in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a).

In connection therewith, the district attorney made various allegations, including the following.

In order to charge the offense of driving under the influence, which is alternatively a misdemeanor or a felony (see Veh.Code, § 23160 et seq.), as the latter rather than the former, the district attorney alleged, pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23175, that, within the preceding seven years, Williams had suffered three convictions for separate incidents of the same offense, two in 1991 and one in 1992.

In order to enhance any sentence of imprisonment, the district attorney alleged, pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b), that: (1) following a 1982 conviction, Williams served a prior prison term for the felony of rape (id., § 261); (2) following a 1988 conviction, he served a prior prison term for the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (id., § 12021, subd. (a)(1)); and (3) following a 1989 conviction, he served another prior prison term for another felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

Lastly, in order to bring the cause within the Three Strikes law, the district attorney alleged, pursuant to that scheme (Pen.Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), that Williams had previously been convicted of two serious and/or violent felonies, as follows: (1) in 1982, he was convicted of the felony of attempted robbery (Pen.Code, §§ 211, 664), which was at least serious (id., § 1192.7, subd. (c), including subd. (c)(19)); and (2) also in 1982, he was convicted of the felony of rape, which was both serious (id., § 1192.7, subd. (c)(3)) and violent (id., § 667.5, subd. (c)(3)).

Arraigned on the information, Williams pleaded not guilty to the charge with a denial of the allegations.

The cause was later called for trial by jury. Prior to trial, Williams moved the superior court, under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3) (hereafter Penal Code section 17(b)(3)), which authorized it to "declare[ ]" an alternative misdemeanor-felony offense to be a misdemeanor when it "grants probation to a defendant without imposition of sentence," to make such a declaration as to the offense of driving under the influence. The People opposed on grounds including that such a declaration was inappropriate in light of the circumstances and, in any event, could not be made prior to sentencing. The superior court denied the motion without prejudice to its renewal after the preparation and submission of a probation officer's report. It continued commencement of trial.

Subsequently prepared and submitted, the probation officer's report described the circumstances of the offense, to the effect that, on the afternoon of February 9, 1995, Williams, who was then 32 years of age, was driving a vehicle on the streets of Los Angeles under the influence of PCP; he was stopped by a police officer; he smelled of the drug, stared blankly, was sweating slightly and grinding his teeth; seven or eight times he was asked by the officer to present his driver's license, and seven or eight times he replied, "How are you doing sir?"; he seemed to be confused, disoriented, and jumpy; he was arrested.

The probation officer's report related Williams's prior record.

As to Williams's juvenile history, so far as it was available, the probation officer's report may be read to reflect the following: (1) a 1976 arrest for burglary (Pen.Code, § 459) with a request for the filing of a petition for an adjudication of wardship (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602) based on attempted burglary (Pen.Code, §§ 459, 664); (2) another 1976 arrest for burglary with another request for the filing of a wardship petition, this one apparently based on burglary; (3) yet another 1976 arrest for burglary with yet another request for the filing of a wardship petition, this one based on theft (id., § 484); and (4) a 1979 arrest for burglary with a request for a wardship petition apparently based on burglary. It appears that there was at least one adjudication of wardship for an unidentified offense with a commitment to a juvenile camp. 2

As to Williams's adult history, the probation officer's report may be read to reflect the following: (1) a 1981 conviction for the misdemeanor of burglary with probation along with commitment to jail; (2) a 1982 conviction for the felony of attempted robbery--as alleged in the information--with probation along with commitment to jail; (3) a 1982 conviction for the felony of rape with commitment to prison--as also alleged in the information--and parole in 1986; (4) a 1987 violation of parole as to the 1982 rape conviction with commitment to prison; (5) a 1988 conviction for the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon with commitment to prison--as alleged in the information; (6) a 1988 violation of parole based on the 1988 firearm-possession conviction with commitment to prison and parole in 1989; (7) a 1989 conviction for the felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon with commitment to prison--as alleged in the information; (8) a 1989 violation of parole based on the 1989 firearm-possession conviction with commitment to prison and parole in 1990; (9) a 1990 violation of parole apparently as to the 1989 firearm-possession conviction with commitment to prison and parole in 1991; (10) a 1991 conviction for the misdemeanor of driving under the influence--as alleged in the information--with probation; (11) another 1991 conviction for the misdemeanor of driving under the influence--as also alleged in the information--this one with suspension of driver's license; (12) a 1991 conviction for the misdemeanor of driving with driver's license suspended (Veh.Code § 14601.1) with probation; (13) a 1992 conviction for the misdemeanor of driving under the influence--as alleged in the information--with commitment to jail and/or imposition of a fine; (14) a 1992 arrest for assault with a deadly weapon (Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) leading, apparently, to revocation of parole as to the 1989 firearm-possession conviction with commitment to prison; (15) a 1995 conviction for the misdemeanor of driving without a driver's license (Veh.Code, § 12500, subd. (a)) with imposition of a fine; (16) a 1995 conviction for the misdemeanor of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf.Code, § 11377) with probation along with commitment to jail; and (17) a 1995 conviction for the misdemeanor of willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant resulting in a traumatic condition (Pen.Code, § 273.5)--so-called "spousal battery"--with commitment to jail.

In addition, the probation officer's report related Williams's personal history. Among other things, it noted that he had had a substance abuse problem since he was nine years of age; he apparently recognized the fact and stated a desire to change; but he did not follow through in efforts to bring the situation under control. It also noted that he was unemployed; he lived alone; he had cohabited with a woman for five or six years, and had two children by her, one of whom was disabled; and he wished to receive probation in order to help care for this child.

The probation officer's report recommended that, if Williams were convicted of the felony of driving under the influence, he should, among other things, be denied...

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