People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 23 March 1977
• Docket Number: No. 48444,48444
• Citation: People v. Williams, 66 Ill.2d 179, 361 N.E.2d 1110, 5 Ill.Dec. 582 (Ill. 1977)
• Parties: , 5 Ill.Dec. 582 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Emmanuel WILLIAMS, Appellee. (The ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., Appellants.)
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1110

361 N.E.2d 1110

66 Ill.2d 179, 5 Ill.Dec. 582

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v.Emmanuel WILLIAMS, Appellee (The ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., Appellants.)

No. 48444.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 23, 1977.

Jeffrey C. Doane, Joseph Moscov, Joseph M. Cotugno, and Frederique Hartog-Rapp, Illinois Dept. of Corrections, Chicago, for appellants.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, and Paul Benjamin Linton, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

UNDERWOOD, Justice:

This case presents the question whether certain provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections(Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 1001--1--1 Et seq.) which establish parole eligibility for juvenile offenders and authorize the Department of Corrections to release prisoners under furlough, work release, day release and authorized absence programs unconstitutionally infringe upon the judiciary's power to impose sentences in criminal cases.

The defendant, Emmanuel Williams, age 16, was tried as an adult in a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County on indictments charging him with three counts of attempted murder and one count of aggravated battery.The court found him guilty on one count of attempted murder and sentenced him to the Department of Corrections for a term of 5 to 10 years and 5 years' parole.In its sentencing order, the trial court declared the following sections of the Unified Code of Corrections unconstitutional and in violation of sections 1and9 of article VI of the 1970 Constitution of Illinois: section 3--3--3(b) pertaining to parole eligibility of juvenile offenders (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 1003--3--3(b));section 3--11--1 authorizing furlough of prisoners (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 1003--11--1); and sections 3--13--1and3--13--2 dealing with work and day release programs for inmates (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, pars. 1003--13--1, 1003--13--2).The court held that those sections contradicted the sentence imposed by the court and constituted 'an improper delegation of Judicial Power and Jurisdiction over committed persons under sentence to the Department of Corrections of the State of Illinois in felony cases * * *.'The court enjoined the exercise of any parole authority with respect to the defendant and further enjoined the exercise of any powers and responsibilities contained in the furlough, work release and day release provisions as to the defendant or any other persons committed to the Department 'without first procuring an order and the consent of the sentencing Judge in any case, or of any Circuit Court Judge having jurisdiction over the subject matter of felony criminal cases in Cook County, and the respective Circuits in the State of Illinois * * *.'The Department of Corrections and its director were granted leave to intervene and moved to vacate that portion of the sentencing order relative to the abovecited provisions.The trial court denied the motion and expanded its sentencing order by also declaring unconstitutional sections 3--9--3 relating to day release programs (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 1003--9--3) and section 3--9--4 establishing authorized absence programs for persons committed to the Juvenile Division(Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 1003--9--4).The court further enjoined the exercise of any powers and authorities granted by those provisions 'without the permission of the committing court * * *.'The Department of Corrections and its director appealed directly to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 603(58 Ill.2d R. 603), and we stayed the injunctive portions of the trial court's order pending the appeal.

The particular sections of the Unified Code of Corrections held unconstitutional by the trial court are each concerned with the manner of confinement and rehabilitation of persons committed to the Department of Corrections.Section 3--3--3(b) provides as follows:

'Every person committed to the Juvenile Division under Section 5--10 of the Juvenile Court Act or Section 5--8--6 of this Code and confined in the State correctional institutions or facilities shall be eligible for parole without regard to the length of time the person has been confined or whether the person has served any minimum term imposed.'(Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 1003--3--3(b).)

This provision, by creating parole eligibility for juvenile offenders without regard to length of confinement or service of minimum term, differs from the rule applicable to other prisoners contained in preceding section 3--3--3(a), which established eligibility for parole only after service of a minimum term as described therein (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 1003--3--3(a)).Section 3--9--3 provides for day release programs for persons committed to the Juvenile Division.Under that section, the Department is authorized to arrange for the release of persons on a daily basis to the custody of local schools, public or private agencies or persons approved by the Department for participation in programs and activities.Pursuant to section 3--9--4, the Department is authorized to 'extend the limits of the place of continement of a person committed to the Juvenile Division' so that such persons may leave on authorized absence for approved purposes for a period of time determined by the Department.Section 3--11--1 provides that the Department may extend the limits of the place of confinement of a committed person by permitting him to leave such place on a furlough under prescribed conditions.Furloughs may be granted for a period of time not to exceed 14 days for specified purposes as set forth in that section or may be granted for any period of time under paragraph 15 of section 55a of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois(Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 127, par. 55a).Section 3--13--1 provides that the Department shall establish and maintain work and day release facilities for persons committed to the Department and not placed on parole.It is provided in section 3--13--2 that the Department may allow a committed person to leave an institution or facility during reasonable hours for specified purposes in instances where such release would assist the individual's rehabilitation and would not cause undue risk to the public.

The trial court found the foregoing provisions to be in violation of sections 1and9 of article VI of the 1970 Constitution of Illinois, which vest judicial power in the courts and provide for original jurisdiction of the circuit courts.Section 1 of article VI provides:

'The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts.'

Section 9 of article VI states:

'Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction relating to redistricting of the General Assembly and to the ability of the Governor to serve or resume office.Circuit Courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law.'

The parties here have focused their primary attention on the parole provisions of section 3--3--3(b).The People argue that the power to impose a sentence of punishment in criminal cases is a purely judicial function.(People v. Montana(1942), 380 Ill. 596, 44 N.E.2d 569;People v. Bruner(1931), 343 Ill. 146, 175 N.E. 400.)They contend that section 3--3--3(b), which makes a juvenile tried as an adult eligible for parole consideration immediately upon execution of the sentence, without regard to the length of time he has been confined or whether he has served any minimum term, is unconstitutional because it renders meaningless the court's imposition of a minimum term and therefore unreasonably interferes with the trial court's sentence.They point out that in this case, the defendant, who was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to serve a 5- to 10-year term, could be considered for parole the same day he was sentenced, even though he had served neither the court-imposed minimum sentence of 5 years nor the 4-year minimum sentence specified by law for the crime in question.(Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, pars. 8--4(c)(1), 1005--8--1(b)(2).)They argue further that the statutory provisions relative to furlough, work release, day release, and authorized absence of prisoners have the same effect of undermining the sentence imposed by the trial judge.The Department, on the other hand, argues that the parole, release and authorized absence provisions here in question have traditionally been recognized as a proper exercise of the legislature's inherent authority to regulate the management of prisons and the rehabilitation of persons committed to the Department of Corrections.They contend that rather than constituting an unconstitutional infringement of the judiciary's power of sentencing, the trial court's order in this case requiring the prior consent of the sentencing judge on parole and related matters constitutes an invalid usurpation of a purely legislative function.

These questions have been resolved in large part by prior decisions of this court.It is well settled in this State that the legislature has the power to prohibit particular acts as crimes, fix the punishment for the commission of such crimes and determine the manner of executing such punishment.(People ex rel. Kubala v. Kinney(1962), 25 Ill.2d 491, 185 N.E.2d 337;People v. Brunett(1946), 394 Ill. 420, 68 N.E.2d 733;People v. Joyce(1910), 246 Ill. 124, 92 N.E. 607.)Although it is within the inherent power of the judiciary to impose sentences in criminal cases within the limits established by legislative act, it has been consistently held that the matter of parole following the imposition of sentence is not a judicial function but purely a legislative one.(People v. Fowler(1958), 14 Ill.2d 252, 151 N.E.2d 324;People v. Burnett(1946), 394 Ill. 420, 68 N.E.2d 733;People v. Rucker(1936), 364 Ill. 371, 4 N.E.2d...