People v. Williams, 84-2094

• Decision Date: 03 July 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-2094,84-2094
• Citation: 146 Ill.App.3d 139,99 Ill.Dec. 939,496 N.E.2d 1031
• Parties: , 99 Ill.Dec. 939 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Respondent-Appellee, v. Chester A. WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1031

496 N.E.2d 1031

146 Ill.App.3d 139, 99 Ill.Dec. 939

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Respondent-Appellee, v. Chester A. WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant.

No. 84-2094.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fourth Division.

July 3, 1986.

[99 Ill.Dec. 940] James J. Doherty, Public Defender (Frank P. Madea, of counsel), Chicago, for petitioner-appellant.

Richard M. Daley, State's Atty. (Joan S. Cherry, Karyn Stratton and Maureen P. Feerick, of counsel), Chicago, for respondent-appellee.

Justice McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Chester Williams appeals from the order of the Cook County circuit court which dismissed his pro se petition for relief under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the PCHA or the Act). (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, pars. 122-1 et seq.). On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court's failure to make explicit factual findings and legal conclusions in a written order of dismissal amounted to reversible error.

For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Defendant's pro se post-conviction petition, filed May 15, 1984, alleged in substance that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Lane v. Sklodowski (1983), 97 Ill.2d 311, 73 Ill.Dec. 462, 454 N.E.2d 322, effectively extended his term of imprisonment and thus violated due process of law. Defendant had been sentenced on April 20, 1983, to serve seven years' imprisonment for his conviction of the offense of voluntary manslaughter (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, pars. 9-2(b), 1005-8-1(a)(4)) to which he had pled guilty. At the time sentence was imposed, the Director of the Department of Corrections interpreted his authority under section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3) to include the power to grant prisoners in excess of 90 days of good time credit for meritorious conduct, to be applied toward reducing the actual length of the sentence. In June 1983, however, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Lane that the Director's interpretation of section 3-6-3 was erroneous and that 90 days was the maximum amount of good time credit which an inmate could receive. Lane v. Sklodowski (1983), 97 Ill.2d 311, 316-20, 73 Ill.Dec. 462, 454 N.E.2d 322; see also Baker v. Illinois Department of Corrections (1985), 106 Ill.2d 100, 87 Ill.Dec. 560, 477 N.E.2d 686; People v. Coleman (1986), 140 Ill.App.3d 806, 812-13, 95 Ill.Dec. 234, 489 N.E.2d 455.

The defendant's petition was docketed on June 7. Approximately a week thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the petition. An entry on the half-sheet indicates that the "parties were present" before the court on June 14, and that upon "motion of the parties" the matter was continued to June 19. On this date, in the "presence of the parties" the court dismissed the petition. The transcript indicates that attorneys of both the Public Defender's Office and the Cook County State's Attorney's Office appeared before the court at its June 19 "hearing" on the pro se petition. At that time, the assistant Public Defender informed the court that she and her partner had reviewed the petition and that both agreed that it "fails to state cause of action." The trial court thereupon dismissed the pro se petition by docket entry of June 19. The trial court entered no written order, nor did the court at any time make any findings of fact or conclusions of law with regard to the merits of the defendant's post-conviction petition. Defendant's timely appeal followed.

OPINION

In People v. Mason and People v. Wilson, we conclude that an indigent pro se defendant seeking post-conviction relief is entitled to appointment of counsel prior to the court's consideration of whether his petition is frivolous or is patently without merit. (See People v. Mason (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 218, 98 Ill.Dec. 849, 494 N.E.2d 1176; People v. Wilson (1986), 146 Ill.App.3d 567 (No. 84-2095, July 3, 1986).) Based upon this determination, and the authority of this court to consider issues not raised by the parties in order to achieve fundamental fairness in the appellate disposition of claims brought before us (87 Ill.2d R. 615; see, e.g., People v. Jackson (1981), 84 Ill.2d 350, 359-60, 49 Ill.Dec. 719, 418 N.E.2d 739), we find the trial court's failure to formally appoint counsel to represent the defendant here reversible error.

In view of this disposition, we need not resolve the issue presented by the defendant on appeal here, viz., whether the trial court's failure to make specific factual findings and legal conclusions in a written order of dismissal on the ground of frivolity or patent lack of legal substance rendered the trial court's dismissal void or reversible error. (See People v. Wilson (1986), 146 Ill.App.3d 567.) However, we choose to decide the issue, and conclude that section 122-2.1(a) merely directs, and does not require, that the trial court's written order include specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. (People v. Wilson (1986), 146 Ill.App.3d 567. (No. 84-2095, July 3, 1986); see also People v. Cox (1985), 136 Ill.App.3d 623, 91 Ill.Dec. 140, 483 N.E.2d 422.) We further conclude in Wilson, and determine in the instant case, that there is no reversible error in the trial court's failure to enunciate its reasons for dismissal.

Parenthetically, we observe that, in general, the trial court complied with the procedural framework established under the PCHA as amended. (See People v. Wilson (1986), 146 Ill.App.3d 567. Under these amendments, it appears to be the function of the trial court, rather than appointed counsel, to determine in the first instance whether the indigent prisoner's pleading either states an arguably meritorious claim for post-conviction relief, or whether amendment to the petition would cure any deficiency in the pleading. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 122-2.1.) This difficult task was rendered more nettlesome to the trial court here, as the court had before it no transcript of the proceedings in which the defendant pleaded guilty. Moreover, since defendant never appealed directly from his...