People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 26 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 3–13–0901.,3–13–0901.
• Citation: 403 Ill.Dec. 382,53 N.E.3d 1019
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Calvin J. WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

53 N.E.3d 1019

403 Ill.Dec. 382

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Calvin J. WILLIAMS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 3–13–0901.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

April 26, 2016.

Michael J. Pelletier and Sean Conley (argued), both of State Appellate Defender's Office, Ottawa, for appellant.

John T. Pepmeyer, State's Attorney, Galesburg (Richard T. Leonard (argued), of State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Presiding Justice O'BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The defendant, Calvin Williams, appealed from his conviction of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11–1.40(a)(1) (West 2012)) and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11–1.60(c)(1) (West 2012)).

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 The defendant was charged with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, all involving one victim, S.H. The incidents were alleged to have taken place between September 25, 2010, and April 11, 2012, while the victim was 8–9 years old.

¶ 4 Prior to trial, the State served notice upon the defendant pursuant to section 115–10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code) (725 ILCS 5/115–10 (West 2012) ) that it intended to offer hearsay statements that S.H. made to Rebecca Rossman (the Director of the Knox County Children's Advocacy Center), Kelli Moreland (a Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigator), and Sally Miskinis (a licensed counselor). At the hearing on the motion to permit the hearsay statements, the State only proceeded on the statements made to Rossman. After hearing Rossman's testimony and viewing the video of her interview with S.H., the trial court took the matter under advisement. The record does not contain a ruling on the matter.

¶ 5 The defendant signed a plea of not guilty and jury waiver on November 5, 2012. Before accepting the waiver, the trial court asked the defendant if anyone made any threats or promises to him to get him to waive his right to a jury trial. The defendant answered in the negative.

¶ 6 The case proceeded to a bench trial. Todd Olinger, a detective with the City of Galesburg police department, testified that he initiated an investigation on or about April 11, 2012, into allegations of sexual abuse by the defendant. The defendant invoked counsel, so Olinger did not question him. Olinger was present for S.H.'s interview at the Knox County Child Advocacy Center. Olinger testified that S.H. was 9 years old at the time of the interview, and the abuse was alleged to have taken place at S.H.'s home. Olinger testified that there was a custody dispute between S.H.'s mother and the family of S.H.'s father.

¶ 7 The State's next witness was Moreland. The defendant objected, arguing that any hearsay statements were inadmissible because the statements to Moreland were not addressed in the hearing held pursuant to section 115–10 of the Code. The court allowed Moreland to testify, noting that since it was a bench trial, it would take the section 115–10 motion with the testimony. Moreland testified that she was employed by DCFS as a child abuse/ neglect investigator. Moreland met with S.H. at her school. S.H. told her that the defendant was her mother's boyfriend and lived in their home. S.H. knew him as “Fresh.” S.H. told Moreland that she was afraid of Fresh because he touched her “down there.” S.H. indicated that it had happened on more than one occasion while she was in her bed. Moreland testified that S.H.'s physical examination was normal, although that did not rule out sexual abuse. Also, S.H. and three of her sisters had vaginal yeast infections.

¶ 8 Miskinis also testified. She testified that she was a therapist, and she began providing counseling to S.H. in June 2012. The defense did not object to her testimony. Miskinis testified that S.H. told her that she was mad at the defendant because he touched her. S.H. told Miskinis that the defendant would come into her room and lie on top of her. He touched her private parts, which she identified as the front part and the back part. The workbook that S.H. worked on with Miskinis was admitted without objection.

¶ 9 Rossman, the executive director of the Knox County Child Advocacy Center and a forensic interviewer, testified that she conducted a forensic interview with S.H. and her sister in April 2012. The DVD of the interview of S.H. was played for the court. In the interview, S.H. described the defendant touching her “private parts” more than once.

¶ 10 Before S.H. was to testify, the State asked that her testimony be received in chambers with defense counsel, the defendant, and the court reporter, which the court allowed after a discussion held off the record. S.H. identified the defendant as the man who hurt her, that it happened at night, and it happened almost every night.

¶ 11 At the close of the State's evidence, the defense moved for a directed verdict. The trial court acknowledged some of the inconsistencies in S.H.'s testimony, but it found as a whole that she was credible and unrebutted. Thus, the trial court denied the motion.

¶ 12 A stipulation with respect to the defendant's work record was admitted. He was employed by Blick Art Materials as a seasonal associate, employed from July 26, 2010–September 27, 2010, and from November 2, 2010–December 19, 2011. His work hours were from 9:30 p.m. until 5:30 a.m., although the records indicated about 100 attendance incidents during the relevant time period, including leaving early, holiday days, personal days, sick days, and unscheduled absences.

¶ 13 S.H.'s mother, Angel, testified that the defendant moved in with them in September 2011, but he visited occasionally before that. Angel made a hotline call to DCFS on April 9, 2012, after S.H.'s paternal relatives tried to keep S.H. and told her that S.H. had made allegations regarding the defendant. There was no court custody battle with S.H.'s paternal relatives, but they always wanted to keep her longer than Angel allowed. Angel testified that during the timeframe alleged in the information, September 2010 through April 2012, she was a stay-at-home mom. She did not believe that the defendant had abused S.H. ¶ 14 Before the defendant testified, defense counsel asked to have the defendant's handcuffs removed. The defendant testified that he never abused S.H. He thought that her paternal relatives put that idea into her head. Also, he disciplined S.H. and her siblings, and S.H. did not like that. He testified that he worked third shift, leaving around 9 p.m. and returning around 7 a.m.

¶ 15 As the trial court acknowledged, the only evidence in this case was the testimony of S.H. There was no medical evidence. However, S.H.'s report of the abuse outside court and her testimony in court was credible and did not change any fundamental way. The trial court found the defendant guilty of counts I and II, which alleged digital penetration, and count IV, sexual abuse, but found that the evidence was insufficient to find the defendant guilty of count III, which alleged penetration with the tongue. The defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. Prior to testifying at the hearing on the motion, the defendant again asked for his handcuffs to be removed, which the trial court allowed. After the defendant testified, prior to proceeding with sentencing, the trial court had the defendant placed back in handcuffs, stating that “we only take the cuffs off for purposes of testimony, and actually, I think we only do it during trial.” The defendant was sentenced to 10 years for counts I and II and 4 years for count IV, all to be served consecutively. The defendant appealed.

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 The defendant argues that the trial court committed structural error when it closed the proceedings for the victim's testimony without making constitutionally required findings and exploring alternatives to closure. The defendant acknowledges that he did not object to the closure and did not raise the issue in a motion for a new trial, so he argues for plain error review. The State contends that there was no plain error. The question of whether a claim is forfeited and reviewable as plain error is a question of law reviewed de novo. People v. Johnson, 238 Ill.2d 478, 485, 345 Ill.Dec. 632, 939 N.E.2d 475 (2010).

¶ 18 The plain error doctrine allows a reviewing court to considered unpreserved error when either the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Herron, 215 Ill.2d 167, 186–87, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005). The defendant argues that the closure was a structural error, making it a serious error where prejudice was presumed. We agree that we should review the claim for plain error, because “the improper closure of a courtroom is a structural error that erodes the integrity of the judicial process and undermines the fairness of a trial.” People v. Burman, 2013 IL App (2d) 110807, ¶ 49, 369 Ill.Dec. 613, 986 N.E.2d 1249.

¶ 19 When reviewing for plain error, it must first be determined whether any reversible error occurred. People v. Naylor, 229 Ill.2d 584, 593, 323 Ill.Dec. 381, 893 N.E.2d 653 (2008). A defendant is guaranteed the right to a public trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. However, section 115–11 of the Code permits a limited closure of a courtroom during the testimony of minors who are the victims of certain sex crimes. 725 ILCS 5/115–11 (West 2012). That section provides:

“In a prosecution for a criminal offense defined in Article 11 or in Section 11–1.20, 11–1.30, 11–1.40, 11–1.50, 11–1.60, 12–13, 12–14, 12–14.1, 12–15 or 12–16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Crimi nal Code of 2012, where the alleged victim of the offense is a minor under 18 years of age, the court may exclude

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