People v. Willis

Decision Date03 June 2005
Docket NumberNo. 97454.,97454.
Citation831 N.E.2d 531,215 Ill.2d 517
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Roy M. WILLIS, Appellee.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, Renee G. Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, John E. Nowak, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

James K. Leven, Chicago, for appellee.

Justice FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and consequently prohibits an unreasonable delay between a warrantless arrest and a probable cause determination. The fifth amendment prohibits involuntary self-incrimination, and consequently prohibits the admission of an involuntary confession into evidence at trial. When the defendant makes a confession during such a delay, the protections provided by these amendments intersect. The central issue in this case is whether a confession that may comport with the fifth amendment must be suppressed because it was obtained after a delay that violated the fourth amendment.

The appellate court decided that the proper test for the admissibility of such a confession is whether it was attenuated from the taint of the delay and that the defendant's confession failed that test. The appellate court reversed the defendant's felony criminal damage to property conviction. 344 Ill.App.3d 868, 279 Ill.Dec 755, 801 N.E.2d 47. We conclude that the proper test for the admissibility of such a confession is whether it was voluntary and that the defendant's confession passed that test. We reverse the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

On the night of June 14, 1999, a fire started on the second-floor rear porch of a Chicago Heights apartment building. Morgan Beauchamp, a 70-year-old resident of the building, died of smoke inhalation. The next day, the Chicago Heights police department assigned the fire investigation to Detective Michael Lueser.

Detective Lueser first spoke with Ralph Lawson, Beauchamp's next-door neighbor. On the night of the fire between 8 and 9 p.m., Lawson saw Kimbery Broadnex, the defendant's girlfriend and Beauchamp's reported paramour, retrieving a sweater from an area where she kept some clothes on Beauchamp's rear porch. Lawson saw Broadnex leave and less than an hour later, between 9:30 and 9:45 p.m., saw the defendant looking for her. The defendant appeared angry and asked Lawson if he had seen Broadnex. Lawson answered that he had seen her, but that she had left. The defendant walked to the rear of Beauchamp's apartment building and disappeared from Lawson's view. The defendant then reappeared a short time later and walked away from the rear of the building. Lawson soon smelled smoke and noticed a fire on the second-floor rear porch. Lawson saw Beauchamp standing on his front porch and told him to leave the building, but Beauchamp went inside. Lawson did not see him again.

Detective Lueser then spoke with Broadnex. Broadnex had been living with the defendant until the day of the fire, when she moved her belongings from the defendant's apartment to Beauchamp's rear porch. She was not near Beauchamp's apartment building when the fire started. Broadnex had a criminal case pending against the defendant for beating her, but, after talking to Lawson about his encounter with the defendant, she visited the defendant the next morning. The defendant told Broadnex that he was looking for her the night before. She detected a burning odor emanating from under the defendant's bed, but did not inquire about it.

Detective Lueser reviewed the fire marshal's reports. In an initial report, the fire marshal stated that the fire started on the second-floor rear porch, but could not determine its origin or cause. In the official report, the fire marshal again concluded that the fire started on the second-floor rear porch. It was intentionally set with an open flame, but without an accelerant.

Almost a month later, on July 13, 1999, Detective Lueser finally located the defendant. Lueser and another officer asked the defendant to accompany them to the Chicago Heights police department; the defendant agreed. He was not handcuffed and rode to the station in an unmarked squad car. At approximately 4 p.m., the defendant was placed in an interview room. Detective Lueser read Miranda warnings to the defendant from a preprinted form. The defendant said he understood his rights and signed the form. Over the course of several hours, the defendant spoke with Lueser and his superiors, Sergeant Gary Miller and Sergeant Jeff Bohlen. The defendant denied any involvement in the fire and denied going to the apartment building on the night of the fire. At 8:30 p.m., when the defendant requested to leave, Detective Lueser refused and instead placed him under arrest. The defendant was moved to the lockup. According to Lueser, the defendant was held pending further investigation. Detective Lueser left work at 9 p.m. In his absence, no other officer worked on the case against the defendant.

When Detective Lueser returned to work the next day at 1 p.m., he attempted to track down Lawson, Broadnex, and any other possible witnesses to the fire. Although Lueser spent "more than half" of his eight-hour shift working on the defendant's case, he did not speak to the defendant on July 14; nor did any other officers. Lueser left work at 9 p.m. On July 15, 1999, while Detective Lueser again attempted to locate witnesses, Sergeant Miller asked the defendant if he would take a polygraph test. The defendant consented. Sergeant Miller and another officer transported the defendant to the Chicago police department for the test. The polygraph examiner read Miranda warnings to the defendant and administered the test. After the test, the polygraph examiner told the defendant that he had failed and that he was not telling the truth about his involvement in the fire. The defendant insisted the test was inaccurate. The officers took the defendant back to the Chicago Heights police department, where Detective Lueser spoke briefly with him around 8 p.m. about the results of the polygraph test. The defendant continued to deny any involvement in the fire.

On July 16, 1999, the police located Lawson and Broadnex and brought them to the station. Around 5 p.m., Lueser again interviewed the defendant. Detective Lueser repeated Miranda warnings to the defendant. The defendant said he understood his rights, signed the preprinted form, and spoke with Lueser for 20 minutes. Approximately 73 hours after his detention began, the defendant admitted his involvement in the fire and agreed to make a written inculpatory statement. In this statement, the defendant acknowledged that on the night of the fire he went to Beauchamp's rear porch to look for Broadnex. The defendant did not find Broadnex, but noticed some of her clothing hanging from a shelf and stuffed into pillowcases, as well as several boxes of her belongings. The defendant became upset and flicked a cigarette near the pillowcases because he "wanted to start some of her clothing on fire." According to the defendant,

"My sole intention was to burn some of her property * * *. I knew that the cigarette would light everything on fire but I didn't think it would spread beyond the storage room. After I threw the cigarette, I shut the storage door and then I walked outside * * *."

Lawson later identified the defendant in a lineup. The next day at 7:30 a.m., more than 87 hours after his detention began, the police presented the defendant to a judge for a bond hearing.

The defendant was indicted on five counts of first degree murder. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (West 1998). He filed a motion to quash his arrest. The circuit court of Cook County denied this motion, finding that the police had probable cause to arrest him. The defendant also filed a motion to suppress his inculpatory statement, arguing, inter alia, that his confession was involuntary. The trial court denied this motion as well, stating:

"It seems clear to me that Mr. Willis was kept at the police station so that they could question him and try to get a statement from him. The issue though is whether given the amount of time involved and the totality of the circumstances the statement made was involuntary.

I find that the statement made—the State has met their burden of showing that the statement was voluntary based on defendant's age, education, his intelligence. Even though the amount of time was long, that the totality of the circumstances for instance, he voluntarily went and took the polygraph after 48 hours, and they were at adding another 24 [hours]. There is no indication that he was otherwise coerced or attacked or anything during the subsequent 24 hours. So that will be the finding of the Court."

After a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of felony criminal damage to property (see 720 ILCS 5/21-1 (West 1998)) and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. He appealed.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling on the motion to quash, but reversed its ruling on the motion to suppress. 344 Ill.App.3d 868, 279 Ill.Dec. 755, 801 N.E.2d 47. Following Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991), the appellate court stated that the defendant's "lawful detention became unlawful in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution after the passage of 48 hours." 344 Ill.App.3d at 878, 279 Ill.Dec. 755, 801 N.E.2d 47. The appellate court turned to the appropriate remedy for the fourth amendment violation and decided that the exclusionary rule should apply. 344 Ill.App.3d at 884, 279 Ill.Dec. 755, 801 N.E.2d 47.

The appellate court then concluded that, under Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), the defendant...

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