People v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 01 July 2003
• Docket Number: Docket No. 232495.
• Citation: 257 Mich. App. 337,668 N.W.2d 371
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald L. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

668 N.W.2d 371

257 Mich. App. 337

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald L. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 232495.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 7, 2003, at Detroit.

Decided July 1, 2003, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication August 20, 2003.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David G. Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, and David C. Cannon, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.

Suzanna Kostovski, Detroit, for the defendant.

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH and HOEKSTRA, JJ.

HOEKSTRA, J.

Defendant Donald L. Wilson appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of two counts of receiving or concealing stolen property, M.C.L. § 750.535(3)(a), two counts of altering a vehicle identification number (VIN) with the intent to mislead another regarding the identity of the vehicle, M.C.L. § 750.415(2), and one count each of obtaining money by false pretenses, M.C.L. § 750.218, and insurance fraud, M.C.L. § 500.4511(1). The trial court later vacated the insurance-fraud conviction, which was charged as an alternative to the false-pretenses charge, and sentenced defendant to two years' probation, with the first nine months to be served in the county jail. Subsequently, the trial court reduced defendant's sentence to ninety days in jail with the remainder of the sentence to be spent on a tether. Defendant was required to pay $78,621 in restitution. We affirm.

I. Basic Facts

This case arose as a result of the Western Wayne Automobile Theft Unit's investigation of the involvement of Miami Motors, an automobile dealership, in a crime ring that stole automobiles and automotive parts. During the course of the investigation, officers from this unit discovered that defendant possessed two vehicles, a red 1994 Mercedes 600 SL, and a gray 1997 Jeep Grand Cherokee, both of which contained numerous replacement parts taken from stolen vehicles, specifically, a white 1995 Mercedes 500 SL, and a blue 1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee. The 1994 Mercedes and the 1997 Jeep also contained parts that were missing their identification labels. Defendant had financial and business dealings with Miami Motors and, according to a police officer, had represented himself as an agent of Miami Motors.

II. Analysis

A. The Motion to Quash

On appeal, defendant first asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash one of the charges of receiving or concealing stolen property and both charges of altering a VIN. We disagree.

We review de novo a circuit court's decision to grant or deny a motion to quash charges to determine if the district court abused its discretion in binding over the defendant for trial. People v. Libbett, 251 Mich.App. 353, 357, 650 N.W.2d 407 (2002). A district court must bind a defendant over for trial when the prosecutor presents competent evidence constituting probable cause to believe that a felony was committed and that the defendant committed that felony. MCL 766.13; MCR 6.110(E); People v. Northey, 231 Mich.App. 568, 574, 591 N.W.2d 227 (1998). "Probable cause requires a quantum of evidence `sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief' of the accused's guilt." People v. Yost, 468 Mich. 122, 126, 659 N.W.2d 604 (2003), quoting People v. Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich. 334, 344, 562 N.W.2d 652 (1997). To bind a defendant over, the magistrate must find that there is evidence regarding each element of the crime charged or evidence from which the elements may be inferred. People v. Hudson, 241 Mich.App. 268, 278, 615 N.W.2d 784 (2000).

1. Receiving or Concealing Stolen Property

With respect to the charge of receiving or concealing stolen property involving the 1998 Jeep parts, defendant argues that this count should have been quashed because the evidence did not establish that he knew that the parts taken from the 1998 Jeep and installed in the 1997 Jeep were stolen, embezzled, or converted. Defendant asserts that there was no evidence regarding the whereabouts of the 1997 Jeep between August 11, 1998 (the day Elite Motors bought it at auction and Miami Motors bought it from Elite Motors), and December 8, 1998 (the day the defendant was seen driving it during Automobile Theft Unit surveillance), or the whereabouts of the 1998 Jeep between September 29, 1998, the day it was stolen, and October 5, 1998, the day it was recovered. Consequently, there was no evidence regarding how the parts from the 1998 Jeep came to be installed in the 1997 Jeep, or that defendant knew the replacement parts were stolen.

MCL 750.535(1) provides that "[a] person shall not buy, receive, possess, conceal, or aid in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted money, goods, or property knowing the money, goods, or property is stolen, embezzled, or converted." Defendant was convicted under M.C.L. § 750.535(3)(a), receiving or concealing stolen property with a value of $1,000 or more but less than $20,000. The elements of this offense are: "(1) the property was stolen; (2) the value of the property met the statutory requirement; (3) defendant received, possessed, or concealed the property with knowledge that the property was stolen; (4) the identity of the property as being that previously stolen; and (5) the guilty actual or constructive knowledge of the defendant that the property received or concealed was stolen." People v. Pratt, 254 Mich.App. 425, 427, 656 N.W.2d 866 (2002).

Despite the lack of evidence tracing the whereabouts of the 1998 Jeep parts between the theft of the 1998 Jeep and their appearance on defendant's 1997 Jeep, there was sufficient evidence for the district court to find probable cause to bind over defendant on the charge of receiving or concealing. Defendant bought the 1997 Jeep as a salvage vehicle, knowing that it was missing numerous essential parts; he therefore knew it was rebuilt with replacement parts. Defendant owned another car, the 1994 Mercedes, that came from Miami Motors and had been rebuilt with parts from another Mercedes that defendant, himself, had once owned and reported as stolen, but which later ended up at Miami Motors. Further, defendant never went through proper channels to acquire normal title and registration for the 1997 Jeep, presumably because the stolen parts would be discovered during the inspection and recertification process. Instead, he kept the vehicle under the insurance salvage title and drove it with a dealer plate, although this practice violated subsection 217c(7) of the Michigan Vehicle Code, M.C.L. § 257.217c(7), now subsection 217c(6), M.C.L. § 257.217c(6). Because this evidence established probable cause that defendant knew his 1997 Jeep contained stolen parts, the district court did not abuse its discretion in binding over defendant, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to quash. Libbett, supra.

2. Altering a VIN

With respect to the two counts of altering a VIN, defendant argues that the evidence at the preliminary examination did not establish probable cause to bind him over under the felony provision of this statute, M.C.L. § 750.415(2), and thus the trial court should have quashed these counts because the magistrate abused its discretion in binding defendant over on these counts. According to defendant, at most, there was probable cause that he violated the misdemeanor provision of this statute, M.C.L. § 750.415(1). In a threepart argument, defendant asserts that the evidence did not establish probable cause for a felony violation because there was no evidence that he intended to mislead anyone regarding the identity of the vehicle, since the statute prohibits misidentification of vehicles, not parts, and because the evidence established that there was a legitimate reason why the labels for the parts were missing.

Defendant's assertion that the prosecution must present evidence that he intended to mislead someone regarding the identity of the vehicle contradicts our Supreme Court's decision in People v. Venticinque, 459 Mich. 90, 586 N.W.2d 732 (1998). In Venticinque, our Supreme Court stated that a plain reading of M.C.L. § 750.415 "illustrates that possession of the contraband is prima facie evidence of a violation of either subsection 415(1) or 415(2)," id. at 99, 586 N.W.2d 732, and thus held "that possession of the contraband is a prima facie showing of either the felony or the misdemeanor offense," id. at 102, 586 N.W.2d 732. The Court further commented that selection of a felony or misdemeanor charge is a matter of prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 100-101, 586 N.W.2d 732. In light of Venticinque, supra, defendant's argument that the trial court should have quashed the two counts regarding altering a VIN on grounds of insufficient evidence of intent to mislead is without merit.

Next, defendant argues that the fenders, bumpers, and hood from the 1998 Jeep, and an air bag from the 1995 Mercedes, do not constitute vehicles and that his possession of the parts cannot constitute prima facie evidence of a misidentification of a vehicle. This issue raises a question of statutory construction, which is reviewed de novo. People v. Callon, 256 Mich.App. 312, 315, 662 N.W.2d 501 (2003).

"The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Venticinque, supra at 99, 586 N.W.2d 732. If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, this Court must enforce the language as written. Id. at 99-100, 586 N.W.2d 732. "Unless defined in the statute, every word or phrase of the statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are used." People v. McDaniel, 256 Mich.App. 165, 172, 662 N.W.2d 101 (2003). Recently, in Houghton Lake Area Tourism & Convention Bureau v. Wood, 255 Mich.App. 127, 662 N.W.2d 758 (2003), this Court explained:

This Court must not

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