People v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 06 February 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 56824,56824 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael L. WILSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender, Chicago, for defendant-appellant; John W. Madden, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel.
Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee; Joseph Urso, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel.
Defendant, under the name of Michael L. Wilson, was charged with the offense of theft. Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, par. 16--1(a)(1). He was convicted by a judge sitting without a jury and sentenced for six months to the House of Correction. On appeal, defendant contends the complaint was fatally defective because it failed to allege the requisite mental state of 'knowledge.'
The complaint, signed by Frank O. Hampton, charged the defendant, Michael L. Wilson, with theft, 'in that he did obtain unauthorized control over property, to-wit: $75.00 to $80.00 United States Currency of the value less than $150.00, the property of Frank O. Hampton, with the intent to deprive said Frank O. Hampton permanently of the use and benefit of said property.'
Chapter 38, sec. 16--1(a)(1) provides: A person commits theft when he knowingly: (a) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner, * * * and (1) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property.
The complaint in the case at bar does not use the word 'knowingly'; it does, however, allege the specific intent on the part of the defendant to deprive the owner permanently of the use and benefit of his property. Defendant's argument has been authoritively answered by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Shelton (1969), 42 Ill.2d 490, 494--495, 248 N.E.2d 65, 68, where it was said:
'Although the information here omits the word 'knowingly,' the acts it does allege could not have been performed unless they were done
The court specifically indicated that 'knowledge' could be charged 'either in the language of the statute or in other appropriate words.' 42 Ill.2d 490, 494, 248 N.E.2d 65, 67. Here, knowledge was, in effect, charged by use of the language of subsection (1) of section 16--1(a)(1), which charged the specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property. Following the reasoning of the court in Shelton: You cannot intend to deprive someone permanently of the use and benefit of his property without...
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