People v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 07 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 102562.,102562.
• Citation: 228 Ill.2d 35,885 N.E.2d 1033
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Johnnie WILSON, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

885 N.E.2d 1033

228 Ill.2d 35

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Johnnie WILSON, Appellee.

No. 102562.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

February 7, 2008.

Rehearing Denied March 24, 2008.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine State's Attorney, Chicago (Michael M. Glick, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Michael J.A. Pasquinelli, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Melinda Grace Palacio, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

At issue in this case is whether a warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee is prohibited by the fourth amendment.

In the instant case, a parole officer, acting on an anonymous tip that defendant Johnnie Wilson was violating the conditions of his parole agreement, ordered two police officers to search defendant's bedroom, despite not having a search warrant or receiving defendant's consent. After the search yielded cocaine and heroin, defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibited the search of his bedroom.

The circuit court of Cook County denied the motion, finding that defendant consented to the search when he signed his mandatory supervised release (MSR) agreement. The appellate court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the matter for a suppression hearing. 364 Ill. App.3d 762, 301 Ill.Dec. 743, 847 N.E.2d 753. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

On February 27, 2002, defendant was placed on mandatory supervised release (MSR)¹ from a 15-year sentence for armed violence. When defendant was released, he signed a "Parole or Mandatory Supervised Release Agreement" (MSR agreement), which set forth the conditions of his release in accordance with section 3-3-7 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-3-7 (West 2002)). Two of the conditions were as follows:

"You shall consent to a search of your person, property, or residence under your control";

and

"You shall refrain from the use or possession of narcotics or other controlled substances in any form, or both."

The MSR agreement also stated:

"If such rules are violated, parole or mandatory supervised release may be revoked under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Prisoner Review Board or other releasing authority. * * * Until final discharge, you shall at all times be under the legal custody of the Department of Corrections, subject to being retaken at any time, with the establishment of probable cause, and the lodging of a warrant, within the enclosure of an Illinois State correctional center."

On February 3, 2003, defendant, who was on parole, was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Prior to his bench trial, defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. A hearing on defendant's motion was held on March 18, 2003.

At the hearing, parole officer Raymond Hayes testified that, on February 3, 2003, his office received an anonymous tip that defendant had narcotics and weapons in his apartment. Hayes stated that, based on this tip, he visited defendant's apartment with two Chicago police officers to investigate this possible parole violation. At the apartment, he was given permission to enter by a relative who was "either [defendant's] mother or grandmother."

Upon entering the apartment, Hayes saw defendant emerge from a bedroom just a few feet from the front door. Defendant told Hayes that the bedroom was his. Hayes then instructed the police officers to search defendant's bedroom. The police officers found several containers of substances that the Illinois Crime Lab later determined to be cocaine and heroin.

Hayes admitted that he did not have a warrant to search defendant or his room and did not ask defendant for his consent to search the room. Hayes testified that he felt neither a warrant nor defendant's consent was needed because defendant's MSR agreement constituted defendant's consent to any searches of his person, property, or residence.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress evidence, finding that defendant consented to the search when he signed his MSR agreement. Following a bench trial on September 23, 2003, defendant was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellate court held, based on a totality of the circumstances, that the search of defendant's bedroom was improper. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. People v. Wilson, 361 Ill.App.3d 93, 296 Ill. Dec. 744, 836 N.E.2d 159 (2005). The State then appealed to this court. We denied the appeal, but ordered the appellate court to vacate its decision and reconsider its judgment in light of People v. Moss, 217 Ill.2d 511, 299 Ill.Dec. 662, 842 N.E.2d 699 (2005). Upon reconsideration, the appellate court again reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. 364 Ill.App.3d 762, 301 Ill.Dec. 743, 847 N.E.2d 753. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Initially, we note that the search in question was nonconsensual. Officer Hayes did not ask for consent before ordering the search of defendant's bedroom. Moreover, defendant's search condition, which mandated that he "shall consent to a search," did not constitute prospective consent. See People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill.2d 231, 260-61, 278 Ill.Dec. 244, 798 N.E.2d 91 (2003) ("shall submit" in a search condition charges a probationer with the duty to submit to a search when directed to do so; it does not constitute prospective consent). The State concedes that the search was nonconsensual, but argues that it was reasonable nonetheless and that the appellate court erred in reversing the circuit court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence.

Generally, our review of a circuit court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence involves both questions of fact and law. Moss, 217 Ill.2d at 517, 299 Ill.Dec. 662, 842 N.E.2d 699. We will uphold findings of historical fact made by the circuit court unless such findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d 502, 512, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93 (2004). If we uphold the factual findings, we review de novo whether suppression is appropriate under those facts. Moss, 217 Ill.2d at 518, 299 Ill.Dec. 662, 842 N.E.2d 699. In the instant case, there are no questions of fact disputed by the parties. Accordingly, we review the application of law to the facts de novo.

Applicable Law

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, which guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, applies to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. People v. James, 163 Ill.2d 302, 311, 206 Ill.Dec. 190, 645 N.E.2d 195 (1994). Generally, the fourth amendment requires the government to possess a warrant supported by probable cause for a search to be considered reasonable. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S.Ct. 946, 949, 148 L.Ed.2d 838, 847 (2001). However, the requirement for a warrant has been held unnecessary in cases involving probationers and parolees when the search is deemed reasonable. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122, 122 S.Ct. 587, 593, 151 L.Ed.2d 497, 507 (2001); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 856-58, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2202, 165 L.Ed.2d 250, 262 (2006); Moss, 217 Ill.2d at 534, 299 Ill.Dec. 662, 842 N.E.2d 699. In determining the reasonableness of a warrantless search, a court must examine the totality of the circumstances and assess, on the one hand, the degree to which the search intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19, 122 S.Ct. at 591, 151 L.Ed.2d at 505.

In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court and this court have held that probationers and parolees enjoy a greatly diminished expectation of privacy due to their status as probationers and parolees, and the salient government interest in preventing recidivism and protecting society from future crimes. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3172, 97 L.Ed.2d 709, 722 (1987) (warrantless search of probationer's home by state probation officers pursuant to Wisconsin regulation requiring "reasonable grounds" held not to violate fourth amendment); Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, 122 S.Ct. at 593, 151 L.Ed.2d at 506-07 ("When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable"); Lampitok, 207 Ill.2d at 251, 278 Ill.Dec. 244, 798 N.E.2d 91 (search of a probationer's residence is reasonable as long as it is performed by a probation officer who has reasonable suspicion to investigate violations of probation); Moss, 217 Ill.2d at 532, 299 Ill.Dec. 662, 842 N.E.2d 699 (warrantless, suspicionless pat-down search of parolee for weapons is reasonable, and any evidence found during such a search is admissible, when the safety of an investigating officer is at issue). In contrast to the diminished expectations of privacy of probationers and parolees, the state's interest in supervising parolees has been held to be substantial. See Knight...