People v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 05 April 1977
• Docket Number: No. 47982,47982
• Parties: , 5 Ill.Dec. 820 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James W. WILSON, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 291

362 N.E.2d 291

66 Ill.2d 346, 5 Ill.Dec. 820

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. James W. WILSON, Appellant.

No. 47982.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 5, 1977.

Ralph Ruebner, Deputy State App. Defender, and Ira A. Moltz, Asst. State App. Defender, Elgin, for appellant.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield (James B. Zagel, Jayne A. Carr, and George C. Sorensen, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for the People.

CLARK, Justice:

The appellant, James Wilson, was indicted for armed robbery and found guilty of robbery by a jury in the circuit court of Lee County. His conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Court, Second District. People v. Wilson (1975), 32 Ill.App.3d 57, 335 N.E.2d 499. The issue is whether the testimony by an accomplice was sufficient here to sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The complaining witness testified that on December 10, 1973, at 6:55 p.m., as she was preparing to leave her apartment, there was a knock on her door. The man at the door wore a jacket pulled up to just below eye level, carried a gun and demanded her purse. He then ran off with the purse. The victim failed to identify the accused at trial and admitted she identified another at a lineup which included the defendant and the accomplice, Eugene Bonnell, two months after the offense.

A police officer testified that, upon arriving at the victim's apartment, he found her agitated. He also found and followed footprints in the snow leading from the apartment and through neighboring yards to another street which had been cleared of snow. The officer said the footsteps indicated the individual had been running.

The last witness was the accomplice, Bonnell, who admitted that he had initiated the plan by choosing the victim, from whom he had rented a room two years earlier. Bonnell also admitted that he had been given immunity from prosecution for the instant offense and that two other indictments for armed robbery were pending against him. According to Bonnell's testimony, the defendant went to the victim's house around 6:45 p.m. and returned with a purse, having run through residential losts to the waiting car which Bonnell was driving. The defendant was carrying a toy gun.

At the completion of the State's case, the court denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.

The defendant contends that where accomplice testimony remains essentially uncorroborated, but is the only basis for a conviction because the complainant failed to identify him, the standard of reasonable doubt has not been met.

Although Wigmore was not satisfied with it (7 Wigmore, Evidence sec. 2056 (3d ed. 1940; see also Supp.1975)), the rule that uncorroborated accomplice testimony is a sufficient ground on which the trier may base a conviction has found almost overwhelming favor in Illinois. (See, E.g., People v. Hermens (1955), 5 Ill.2d 277, 125 N.E.2d 500; People v. Williams (1960), 19 Ill.2d 171, 166 N.E.2d 568; and People v. Pittman (1973), 55 Ill.2d 39, 302 N.E.2d 7.) This court has never questioned the wisdom of regarding such testimony with skepticism and suspicion, however. It is fraught with serious weaknesses such as the promise of leniency or immunity and malice toward the accused. (People v. Gleitsmann (1935), 361 Ill. 165, 197 N.E. 557.) Such testimony should be subject to careful scrutiny, 'acted upon with great caution' (People v. LaCoco (1950), 406 Ill. 303, 313, 94 N.E.2d 178), and have the 'absolute conviction of the truth' (People v. Zaeske (2d Dist. 1966), 67 Ill.App.2d 115, 121, 213 N.E.2d 577). It is also true that whether accomplice testimony, corroborated or uncorroborated, is a satisfactory basis for conviction goes to the weight of the evidence and is, therefore, in the province of the jury or the court. People v. Farnsley (1973), 53 Ill.2d 537, 293 N.E.2d 600; People v. Palmer (1962), 26 Ill.2d 464, 187 N.E.2d 236.

Nevertheless, this court has held that where it is 'plainly apparent that the defendant was not proved guilty * * * beyond a reasonable doubt' we will set the conviction aside. People v. Jurek (1934), 357 Ill. 626, 632, 192 N.E. 686, 688. See also People v. Palmer (1962), 26 Ill.2d 464, 187 N.E.2d 236.

We do not intend to change our law allowing uncorroborated accomplice testimony as the basis for a conviction so long as the defendant is found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, we do not believe that standard of proof was met here.

First, there simply was not the absolute conviction of truth to Bonnell's testimony. (See People v. Hermens (1955), 5 Ill.2d 277, 125 N.E.2d 500.) Bonnell, who was incarcerated pending the outcome of the other indictments and who admitted instigating the instant criminal act, was promised immunity. Testimony...