People v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 29 September 1967
• Docket Number: No. 39114,39114
• Citation: 37 Ill.2d 617,230 N.E.2d 194
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. George WILSON, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 194

230 N.E.2d 194

37 Ill.2d 617

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. George WILSON, Appellant.

No. 39114.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 29, 1967.

Lawrence Gunnels, Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and John J. Stamos, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and Morton E. Friedman, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellee.

SOLFISBURG, Chief Justice.

This appeal is from the denial of a post-conviction petition in the circuit court of Cook County. The defendant, George Wilson, was indicted jointly with Allen Golson and William Perkins for the murder of two postal inspectors in Chicago. After his motion for a severance was denied, he entered pleas of guilty and was sentenced to death. This judgment was affirmed by this court. (People v. Wilson, 29 Ill.2d 82, 193 N.E.2d 449.) Golson and Perkins were tried by a jury, convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary, which judgments were also affirmed. People v. Golson, 32 Ill.2d 398, 207 N.E.2d 68.

Defendant's post-conviction petition contended that (1) his attorney's simultaneous representation of two codefendants whose interests were in direct conflict with his, deprived him of effective assistance of counsel, and (2) that the remarks and conduct of the trial judge improperly induced the defendant to plead guilty. Among other allegations, the petition specifically states: 'He (Wilson's attorney) then returned to the trial judge (Judge Canel) who told him that if he would plead Golson and Perkins guilty he would give them 199 years; that if petitioner would proceed to trial by jury he would surely get the death penalty; that if petitioner would take a bench trial, he would consider imposing the death penalty; that if petitioner would plead guilty the court would not promise what sentence it would impose but that the petitioner would be better off pleading guilty; that the court was 'personally' against capital punishment and that was in petitioner's favor.'

His petition was assigned for hearing to Judge Canel, the same trial judge who had accepted defendant's plea and sentenced him to death. The same judge had also presided at the trials of Golson and Perkins. Defendant promptly filed a verified petition for change of venue seeking reassignment to another judge. The petition for change of venue stated that some of the allegations of the post-conviction petition related to matters 'wherein the personal knowledge and/or testimony of the Honorable David A. Canel may be material and relate to charges of improper conduct by the court itself.' The petition also alleged prejudice of the judge against the defendant. The petition for change of venue was denied, and the post-conviction petition was thereafter heard by Judge Canel and denied.

Defendant, while arguing that the record clearly requires his conviction and sentence be set aside, also contends that the trial judge erred in the denial of his petition for change of venue which was timely filed and complied with both section 1 (applying to civil proceedings) and section 18 (applying to criminal proceedings) of the Venue Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 146, pars. 1, 18.

It is true that in civil or criminal matters, when a petition for change of venue and assignment to another judge is timely filed in due form, the right to a change is absolute and the petition should be granted. (People v. Moore, 26 Ill.2d 236, 186 N.E.2d 328; People v. Mosley, 24 Ill.2d 565, 182 N.E.2d 658; People v. Wallenberg, 24 Ill.2d 355, 181 N.E.2d 146; People ex rel. Little v. St. Louis Merchants Bridge Co., 282 Ill. 408, 118 N.E. 733.) However, the remedy provided by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, par. 122--1 et seq.,) does not fall strictly into the category of either a criminal or civil proceeding. The court stated in People v. Bernatowicz, 413 Ill. 181, 184, 108 N.E.2d 479. 'As to the civil or criminal nature of a post-conviction proceeding, the remedy afforded by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act closely resembles that available under the common-law writ of error Coram nobis. Both remedies perform the same specific, limited function--the review of an existing judgment,--first by the court which entered it and subsequently by a reviewing court. In each case, the scope of review is limited to specific types of error. The post-conviction proceeding reviews to determine the existence of alleged deprivations of constitutional rights; the common-law writ and its statutory substitute * * * review to determine the existence of certain familiar categories of facts unknown to the trial court. In our opinion, a proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is civil in character, just as is a writ of error Coram nobis, even though the judgment to which it is directed was entered in a criminal case. People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19, 72 N.E.2d 827.'

However, historically, the right to a change of venue was not absolute in a Coram nobis proceeding. (Chapman v. North...