People v. Wilson
Decision Date | 11 October 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 10CA0788.,10CA0788. |
Citation | 411 P.3d 11 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Derrick Demetrus WILSON, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Joseph G. Michaels, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Carolyn A. Blanchard, Crested Butte, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.
Opinion by Judge TAUBMAN.
¶ 1 Defendant, Derrick Demetrus Wilson, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of sexual assault with a deadly weapon, unlawful sexual contact with force or violence, and second degree kidnapping of a victim of sexual assault. He also appeals the sentence imposed after the trial court convicted him of three habitual counts. We reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
¶ 2 The prosecution's evidence established that on May 17, 2003, Wilson attacked the victim on a secluded street, dragged her to some nearby trees, sexually assaulted her after putting a gun to her head, and then escaped in his vehicle. DNA evidence collected from the victim's rape examination yielded a positive match to Wilson in 2008. Expert testimony presented at trial established a probability of one in fifteen trillion that the DNA belonged to someone other than, or unrelated to, Wilson. At trial, Wilson argued that the DNA evidence was not conclusive, and that someone else was the assailant.
¶ 3 Wilson contends the trial court clearly erred in overruling his Batson challenge to the prosecutor's peremptory strike against Mr. E, an African–American potential juror. We agree.
¶ 4 In People v. Cerrone, 854 P.2d 178 (Colo.1993), Colorado implemented the three-step analysis, created by the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), to evaluate claims of purposeful discrimination during jury selection. Under this test, (1) a defendant must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the prosecution then must give a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike; and (3) the court must decide whether the defendant has proven discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
People v. Collins, 187 P.3d 1178, 1182 (Colo.App.2008). "[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995).
¶ 5 Here, the parties acknowledge the first and second steps of the Batson analysis were satisfied. However, Wilson challenges the trial court's finding under the third step that he failed to prove racial discrimination in the prosecution's peremptory strike of Mr. E. Because the trial court is in the best position to consider the credibility of the prosecution's explanations, we afford great deference to its determination. Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339–40, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (Miller–El I ). However, "deference does not imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review," and the trial court's ruling may be overturned when unreasonable or premised on incorrect facts. Id. at 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029 ; People v. Robinson, 187 P.3d 1166, 1173–74 (Colo.App.2008). Thus, we review for clear error the trial court's factual determination regarding whether the defendant proved discrimination. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) ; Valdez v. People, 966 P.2d 587, 590 (Colo.1998).
¶ 6 A defendant has "the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected by nondiscriminatory criteria." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 404, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). Thus, the use of a peremptory challenge to purposefully discriminate against a juror of a protected class is a violation of the prospective juror's right of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Collins, 187 P.3d at 1181 (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) ). "Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure." Batson, 476 U.S. at 86, 106 S.Ct. 1712.
¶ 7 In selecting a jury, the prosecutor may not act with "discriminatory purpose" when exercising peremptory challenges. Collins, 187 P.3d at 1181. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion) (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) ).
¶ 8 Here, during voir dire, the following colloquy took place between the prosecution and the prospective juror, Mr. E:
¶ 9 Following voir dire, the prosecutor used her first and only challenge to strike Mr. E. Wilson raised a Batson challenge in response. The prosecutor gave the following reasons to support her strike:
¶ 10 Wilson's counsel responded:
¶ 11 After not allowing Wilson's counsel to respond further, the trial court denied the challenge:
¶ 12 Wilson challenges the trial court's crediting the prosecutor's race-neutral reasons for excusing Mr. E. Thus, our analysis rests on the third step of the Batson analysis.
¶ 13 The third step in Batson requires the trial court to determine whether the defendant "has established purposeful discrimination." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. "The court must review all the evidence to decide whether the opponent of the strike has shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that the proponent of the strike sought to exclude a potential juror because of a discriminatory reason." Collins, 187 P.3d at 1182 (citing Craig v. Carlson, 161 P.3d 648, 654 (Colo.2007) ). In such a determination, the decisive question is whether the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for the challenge should be believed. Id.; see Miller–El I, 537 U.S. at 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029. "[T]he plausibility of the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation becomes relevant, such that incredible explanations ‘may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.’ " People v. Gabler, 958 P.2d 505, 507 (Colo.App.1997) (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769 ).
¶ 14 To determine whether the prosecutor's explanation is credible, courts consider, among other things, how reasonable or how improbable the explanation is, whether the explanation has some basis in accepted trial strategy, and the prosecutor's demeanor. Miller–El I, 537 U.S. at 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029. The prosecutor's credibility is called into question where his or her explanation rests on a reason that could be equally applied to remaining jurors not of the protected class. See id. at 343, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Clark
...issue have held that a Batson violation constitutes structural error requiring automatic reversal." People v. Wilson , 2012 COA 63M, ¶ 22, 411 P.3d 11 (collecting cases), rev'd on other grounds , 2015 CO 54M, 351 P.3d 1126. In Wilson , a division of this court presaged the tension between t......
-
People v. Romero
...challenge and excusing Juror F.2 IV. Reversal is Required¶ 27 For the reasons articulated in People v. Wilson , 2012 COA 163M, ¶¶ 20-28, 411 P.3d 11, rev'd on other grounds , 2015 CO 54M, 351 P.3d 1126, we further conclude that this error was structural and requires automatic reversal. See ......