People v. Wise

• Decision Date: 27 February 2019
• Docket Number: No. 2-16-0611,2-16-0611
• Citation: 429 Ill.Dec. 527,124 N.E.3d 1037,2019 IL App (2d) 160611
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie WISE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2019 IL App (2d) 160611

124 N.E.3d 1037

429 Ill.Dec. 527

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Willie WISE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-16-0611

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Opinion filed February 27, 2019

James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Darren E. Miller, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.

Michael G. Nerheim, State’s Attorney, of Waukegan (Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Sally A. Swiss, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Willie Wise, was convicted of one count of armed violence ( 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2016) ) and six counts of unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) by a felon ( 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2016) ). The police went to a building containing a tavern to execute a search warrant. They arrested defendant with a loaded semiautomatic firearm in his waistband, as drugs and several other firearms were found inside his apartment above the tavern.

¶ 2 Defendant argues that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed violence, because the State failed to prove that he was armed with a dangerous weapon in furtherance of the felony drug possession. He contends that his conviction requires a "nexus" between the firearm in his waistband and the drugs inside the apartment and that the State failed to prove that nexus.

¶ 3 Defendant also maintains that the search warrant was deficient on its face because it was based on the uncorroborated allegations of a confidential informant with no indicia of reliability and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the warrant and suppress evidence. We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 On October 15, 2015, Detective Eric Kaechele of the Lake County Sheriff's Office and "J. Doe," a confidential informant, appeared before a judge and obtained a warrant to search defendant and the northwest apartment above Frank's Lounge in North Chicago. The complaint gave detailed descriptions of defendant, the building, and the apartment. It proposed a search for firearms, ammunition, and proof of residency, as purported evidence of the offense of UUW by a felon.

¶ 6 Members of the Lake County Task Force executed the search warrant later that evening. They encountered defendant in Frank's Lounge, with a loaded, semiautomatic firearm in his waistband. The officers found a large rock of heroin, drug paraphernalia, small packages of a substance believed to be cocaine, and additional firearms in the apartment upstairs.

¶ 7 Defendant denied having access to the apartment. He insisted that his friend, Christopher Profit, who was found in the apartment, resided there. Defendant thus denied constructive possession of the items seized from the apartment, and he challenged the reliability of the confidential informant. He filed a pro se motion to quash the warrant and to suppress evidence, which was denied.

¶ 8 Defendant was tried before a jury on two counts of armed violence (counts I and II), seven counts of UUW by a felon (counts VII to XIII), and one count of possession with intent to deliver heroin, a controlled substance (count V). The jury found defendant guilty of all counts. The court merged some of the convictions and sentenced defendant to 23 years' imprisonment for one count of armed violence and to concurrent 14-year prison terms for the six counts of UUW by a felon. Following the disposition of several posttrial motions, defendant filed this timely appeal.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 11 On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of armed violence. A person commits armed violence when, while armed with a dangerous weapon, he commits any felony defined by Illinois law, with certain exceptions that are not relevant here. 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2016). A person is considered "armed with a dangerous weapon" when he or she carries on or about his person or is otherwise armed with a Category I weapon, such as a handgun. 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(c)(1), (c)(2) (West 2016). In count I, defendant was charged with armed violence, in that, while armed with a dangerous weapon, a semiautomatic firearm, defendant committed the offense of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, heroin, a felony. See 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2016); 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2016). A violation of section 33A-2(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) is a Class X felony that is punishable by a minimum of 15 years' imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/33A-3(a) (West 2016).

¶ 12 On a challenge to the evidence supporting a criminal conviction, a reviewing court does not retry the defendant. People v. Smith , 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541, 236 Ill.Dec. 779, 708 N.E.2d 365 (1999). "When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Emphasis in original.)" People v. Bishop , 218 Ill. 2d 232, 249, 300 Ill.Dec. 107, 843 N.E.2d 365 (2006) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ); People v. Collins , 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985). "Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Cunningham , 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280, 288 Ill.Dec. 616, 818 N.E.2d 304 (2004). Our duty is to carefully examine the evidence while giving due consideration to the fact that the finder of fact saw and heard the witnesses. The credibility of a witness is within the province of the trier of fact, and its finding on such matters is entitled to great weight, but the fact finder's determination is not conclusive. We will reverse a conviction where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Smith , 185 Ill. 2d at 542, 236 Ill.Dec. 779, 708 N.E.2d 365. This standard of review applies regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial and regardless of whether the defendant was tried before the bench or a jury. People v. Cooper , 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431, 252 Ill.Dec. 458, 743 N.E.2d 32 (2000).

¶ 13 In finding defendant guilty, the jury implicitly credited the State's witnesses and disbelieved defendant's testimony that he did not reside in the apartment or have access to the drugs. Defendant does not quarrel with the jury's credibility determination.

¶ 14 Instead, defendant argues that, "[e]ven if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] possessed the handgun and constructively possessed the narcotics found inside an apartment where he purportedly lived, [the State] still failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] committed the Class X offense of armed violence by concomitantly committing possession of a controlled substance ‘while armed with a dangerous weapon,’ as a single, continuous offense." Defendant's theory is that (1) the State was required to prove a nexus between the firearm in his waistband and the heroin in the apartment and (2) the State failed to establish that nexus. Defendant contends, in other words, that a person does not commit armed violence unless he is armed with a dangerous weapon in furtherance of the predicate felony.

¶ 15 Defendant frames the issue as one of statutory interpretation and advocates the de novo standard of review because "the facts are not in dispute and the defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding that he committed the offense of armed violence." People v. Smith , 191 Ill. 2d 408, 411, 247 Ill.Dec. 458, 732 N.E.2d 513 (2000) ("Because the facts are not in dispute, defendant's guilt is a question of law, which we review de novo ."). The State agrees that de novo review applies to whether the armed violence statute requires a nexus between the firearm that defendant was carrying and the predicate drug possession. However, the State adds that the standard in Jackson and Collins still applies to how the jury viewed and drew inferences from the evidence. We agree with the State.

¶ 16 The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. A court must view the statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. The court may consider the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Also, a court presumes that the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. People v. Perez , 2014 IL 115927, ¶ 9, 385 Ill.Dec. 41, 18 N.E.3d 41 ; People v. Hunter , 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 13, 369 Ill.Dec. 549, 986 N.E.2d 1185. If possible, the court must not depart from the statute's plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express. People v. McChriston , 2014 IL 115310, ¶¶ 22-23, 378 Ill.Dec. 430, 4 N.E.3d 29 ; People v. Ellis , 199 Ill. 2d 28, 39, 262 Ill.Dec. 383, 765 N.E.2d 991 (2002).

¶ 17 A person commits armed violence if he commits a felony "while" armed with a dangerous weapon. 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2016). The plain and ordinary meaning of "while" confirms that the only "nexus" needed to sustain a conviction under section 33A-2(a) is temporal; the commission of the predicate felony must occur at the same time that the accused...