People v. Witzkowski
| Decision Date | 02 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 12727,12727 |
| Citation | 357 N.E.2d 1348,44 Ill.App.3d 152 |
| Parties | , 2 Ill.Dec. 905 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Valerie A. WITZKOWSKI, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Lawrence Silver, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
James R. Burgess, Jr., State's Atty., Robert G. Frederick, Urbana, G. Michael Prall, Principal Atty., Ill. State's Attys. Assn., Statewide App. Assistance Service, Stephen M. Deitsch, Staff Atty., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant appeals a conviction by jury verdict of a violation of Illinois Revised Statutes 1969, chapter 38, paragraph 21.2--2(c). A fine of $25 was imposed.
The offense charged is stated in a statute having six sections or parts, paragraphs 21.2--1 through 21.2--6. Part 1 includes a declaration of the legislative purpose, part 2 defines the conduct constituting the offense, part 3 provides that the statute shall not prevent lawful assembly or orderly petition for redress of aggrievances, part 4 provides penalties and part 5 states certain definitions.
The conduct proscribed by statute is stated:
'A person commits interference with a public institution of higher education when, on the campus of a public institution of higher education, or at or in any building or other facility owned, operated or controlled by the institution, without authority from the institution he, through force or violence, actual or threatened:
(a) willfully denies to a trustee, employee, student or invitee of the institution:
(1) Freedom of movement at such place; or
(2) Use of the property or facilities of the institution; or
(3) The right of ingress or egress to the property or facilities of the institution; or
(b) willfully impedes, obstructs, interferes with or disrupts:
(1) the performance of institutional duties by a trustee or employee of the institution; or
(2) The pursuit of educational activities, as determined or prescribed by the institution, by a trustee, employee, student or invitee of the institution; or
(c) knowingly occupies or remains in or at any building, property or other facility owned, operated or controlled by the institution after due notice to depart.'
The trial court initially dismissed the information upon a finding that the statute, in its several parts, was facially unconstitutional as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. In The People v. Witzkowski (1972), 53 Ill.2d 216, 290 N.E.2d 236, the Supreme Court reversed the finding of the trial court. The United States Supreme Court dismissed defendant's appeal for want of a final judgment. Defendant's complaint in the United States District Court to enjoin the enforcement of the Act was dismissed.
The opinion in Witzkowski determined that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad as to the language upon which issues of constitutionality were raised, i.e., 'without authority from the institution' (2--2(c)); 'force or violence * * * otherwise to interfere with the conduct of the authorized activities' (2--5); 'due notice' (2--2(c)), (2--5), and 'authorized representative' (2--5). See also The People v. Barnett (1972), 7 Ill.App.3d 185, 287 N.E.2d 247.
On the afternoon of May 6, 1971, defendant, as a part of a group of some 100 students at the University conducted an 'antiwar demonstration' in the Union building. The Undergraduate Students Association had been authorized to hold a demonstration in the south lounge of the afternoon from 12 to 5 p.m. on that date. Room 129 in the Union building had been reserved by recruiting officers of the Marine Corps on that date. This office was entered from a lobby which contained elevators and was a passageway to parts of the building, including library and eating facilities. The defendant, with the other students participating in the demonstration, moved from the south lounge reserved to them to the lobby area in front of Room 129 and seated themselves on the floor. The director of campus security identified himself and informed the students that they were obstructing traffic, creating a safety hazard and violating university regulations and the statutes of the State. Repeated announcements of such information were made. The members of the group did not depart but continued to occupy the corridor. Certain speeches were made and a stink bomb discharged in the office occupied by the Marine recruiters. Beginning at about 2:45 p.m., the security director used a megaphone to advise the individuals to vacate the area or be subject to arrest. The warnings were repeated and the arrests were ordered. The arresting officers advised the demonstrating students individually that if they would stand up and leave they would not be arrested and only those who refused to depart were arrested.
Photographs in evidence disclose a compact group of individuals sitting in the corridors from wall to wall and occupying a substantial length of the lobby area. Defendant produced testimony that one could possibly pick his or her way through the group, but it is apparent that there was a denial of normal, ready access to persons using the building, although there is testimony that there was no actual, forcible restraint directed against any individual seeking to use the corridor.
Upon this appeal defendant argues that the statute, an employed in her conviction, is an unconstitutional denial of First Amendment rights. It is contended that the record does not show that she was guilty of any Active force and violence, that she did not damage any property or injure any person or did not actually stop any one from proceeding through the corridor, but rather that the sit-in protest was a constitutionally protected peaceful demonstration.
The statute is to be read as a whole. (Garner v. Louisiana (1961), 368 U.S. 157, 167, 82 S.Ct. 248, 7 L.Ed.2d 207, 216; Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222. The statute reflects substantial evidence that it was drawn with conscientious attention to the constitutional rights of free speech which are protected by law. The legislative purpose is declared to be specifically limited to unlawful disorders at public institutions of higher education:
'(W)hich are disruptive of the educational process, dangerous to the health and safety of persons, damaging to public and private property, and which divert the use of institutional facilities from the primary function of education * * *.'
The conduct actually proscribed is stated in definitive terms in the second portion of the statutes as one who, without authority, wilfully denies freedom of movement of others or use of the institutional facilities, interferes with the rights of others to ingress or egress, or wilfully impedes, obstructs or disrupts the performance of institutional duties, educational activities or who knowingly occupies or remains in the facility after due notice to depart. In part 5 of the statute 'due notice' is defined as oral or written notice from an authorized representative of the institution given orally or in writing 'in a manner reasonably designated (sic) to inform him, or the group of which he is a part, that he or they should cease such action or depart from such premises'. Construing the statute as a whole, it is apparent that 'such action' are the acts actually proscribed in part 2. Defendant's argument that one might be charged with the offense without having actual knowledge of 'due process' given to 'the group of which he is a part' is not persuasive in the light of the statutory requirement that he be a part of the group notified that the notice must be reasonably designed to inform him and that there be a knowing failure to comply with the notice given.
There is also definition of 'force or violence' as individual or concerted action 'to impede access to or movement within or otherwise to interfere with the conduct of the authorized activities of a public institution of higher education, * * *'.
When so considered in its entirety it is apparent that the statute proscribes only conduct which wilfully impedes the free movement of other persons, or interferes with or disrupts its normal activities. There is legislative direction that the statute shall not be used to restrict purely free speech or assembly.
The offense charged that defendant 'did knowingly remain within * * * after having been given due notice to depart by a University of Illinois Officer * * *', is clearly dependent upon the presence of the condition of the interference by a person or persons with the movements of persons or the normal activities of the institution.
In Cameron v. Johnson (1968), 390 U.S. 611, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182. (Reh. Den.), the court upheld the constitutionality of a Mississippi antipicketing statute which prohibited the obstruction of, or unreasonable interference with free ingress or egress to and from described public buildings, saying:
'(T)he statute clearly and precisely delineates its reach in words of common understanding.' 390 U.S. 611, 616, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1338, 20 L.Ed.2d 182, 187.
Here, as in Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 114, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2302, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 231, enforcement of the statute requires some administrative judgment, '(B)ut, as confined, that degree of judgment here is permissible'. The statute requires an interference with the normal activities of the institution. It does not permit suppression of an unpopular point of view and contains no invitation to subjective or discriminatory enforcement. It:
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