People v. Wolff
| Decision Date | 18 June 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 7,7 |
| Citation | 389 Mich. 398,208 N.W.2d 457 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert WOLFF, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
State Appellate Defender Office, by Judith K. Munger, Asst. Appellate Defender, Detroit, for Robert Wolff.
William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Dept., Leonard Meyers, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for People.
Before the Entire Bench, except LEVIN, J.
WILLIAMS, Justice (to reverse and remand).
I agree with the reasoning of my Brother T. G. Kavanagh that the original guilty plea of April 7th was in fact properly 'accepted.'
But, regardless of whether M.C.L.A. § 768.35; M.S.A. § 28.1058 is or is not mandatory, as my Sister Mary S. Coleman holds, its provisions are not satisfied in the instant case. The statute provides that a guilty plea shall be vacated when the trial judge 'shall Have reason to doubt the truth' of such plea. (Emphasis added.) No valid reason is shown in the transcript of the proceedings of May 8, 1969.
The only additional data presented to the trial judge was defendant's statement that, on the same facts, he no longer felt that he was 'really' guilty. Since 'the truth' of the plea depends upon whether or not the defendant did in fact commit certain acts constituting a crime, that defendant feels what he did was or was not a crime is not relevant. Just as the defendant saying he was guilty without relating the facts necessary to constitute a crime does not satisfy finding the truth of a plea, so a defendant's saying he does not really feel guilty after relating the commission of acts that do constitute a crime does not disestablish the truth of the plea, if the defendant still wants to plead guilty. I would like to make it very clear, unlike my Brother Kavanagh's opinion, that defendants Do not have the right to insist on acceptance of guilty pleas under M.C.L.A. § 768.35. In those cases where the trial judge is presented with objective facts which would legitimately cause him to doubt the truth of a plea of guilty, M.C.L.A. § 768.35 commands him not to accept the plea. The dispositive consideration is whether or not the facts as found by the judge indicate that defendant was guilty. It is the trial judge, not the defendant who is to make the determination of whether there are sufficient facts and allegations under law to justify a plea of guilty. People v. Taylor, 387 Mich. 209, 224, 195 N.W.2d 856 (1972). The facts upon which the trial judge acted in vacating defendant's guilty plea were no less compelling of guilt than those facts elicited at the original hearing. Indeed, aside from defendant's expressed reversal of his feelings of culpability, the facts are identical. Thus the trial judge, having on the record no 'reason to doubt the truth of such plea of guilty,' improperly vacated that plea.
I would therefore vote to reverse. Defendant should be remanded to Recorder's Court for sentencing of the original plea of guilty, now reinstated, to robbery unarmed.
This case and the case of People v. McMiller, Mich., reported 208 N.W.2d 451, were submitted together so taht we might consider the matter of setting aside a plea of guily and retrial on a higher offense arising out of the same transaction.
In this case the plea was vacated Sua sponte by the judge after he said he would accept it but before he had imposed sentence.
In McMiller the plea was overturned on appeal after sentence.
Defendant Robert William Wolff was arrested on November 16, 1968 and charged with aiding and abetting an armed robbery. 1 On April 7, 1969 he offered a plea of guilty to the reduced charge of robbery unarmed. 2
After ascertaining defendant's understanding of the charge and voluntariness of his plea, the following colloquy took place:
'The Court: What did you do that makes you think that you are guilty?
'The Defendant: I drove the participants and let them out of the car.
'The Court: Are you saying that a robbery occurred on September 8 at 2912 Cochrane, a robbery of Adelbert Circle, and you drove the get-away car for that robbery?
'The Defendant: Not the get-away car. I drove them to the scene.
'The Court: What else did you do?
'The Defendant: I left.
'The Court: Did you know that they were going to commit a robbery?
'The Defendant: Yes, sir.
'The Court: You knew it?
'The Defendant: Yes, sir.
'The Court: Did they have a gun?
'The Defendant: There was a gun there, I believe.
'The Court: What did you do, discuss it with someone else--was it one or two that you drove there?
'The Defendant: I drove three men there besides myself.
'The Court: Did you have a discussion (8) about this robbery before you drove them over there?
'The Defendant: No. They asked me to drive them there. It is right in my neighborhood.
'The Court: So you drove them over there?
'The Defendant: They are all from the same neighborhood.
'The Court: But you had a discussion about the robbery before you drove them?
'The Defendant: They had a discussion in the car after I had stopped there.
'The Court: And before you drove them you knew there was going to be a robbery?
'The Defendant: Yes, sir. I knew there was going to be a robbery.
In his interview with the presentence investigator from the probation department the defendant made the following statement:
On May 8, 1969, defendant appeared before the trial court for sentencing. The court questioned the defendant about his statements to the court on April 7th and then said:
'The Court: * * *
You indicate from what you tell the probation officer, taking in connection with what you said there at the time of the plea, that you don't have any guilt in this matter at all.
'The Defendant: Not really.
'The Court: I don't know why you wasted the Court's time and pled guilty.
'The Defendant: I was not trying to waste the Court's time.
'The Court: What were you doing?
'The Defendant: In a way I felt I had some guilty because I knew they were going to pull off a crime. But as far as out and out extent of armed robbery, no.
'The Court: I cannot accept his plea. . . .
'Counsel: Thank you your Honor. If you question Mr. Upham (another defendant) you will find that they did meet after that and divided the proceeds of the robbery.
'The Court: I know that, but he does not admit that. He says he did not get any of the proceeds.
'The Defendant: I was in the house when they divided the proceeds.
'The Court: You were in the car also?
The Defendant: I was in the car at the start, yes, sir, but after, nor during or after.
'The Court: You didn't take any of the money either, you were just present?
'The Defendant: Yes, sir, that is right.
'The Court: And you indicate in your statement to the court that you were present but you did not receive any of the money?
'The Defendant: Yes, sir.
In order to decide the ultimate questions raised by this case it is necessary first to decide several subsidiary questions:
1. Was the guilty plea in this case in fact accepted?
At the April 7th arraignment the court concluded:
We are not persuaded by the People's argument the judge had not accepted the plea at the April 7th arraignment because at the May 8th proceeding he said: 'I cannot accept his plea' and 'I am not going to accept his plea'.
The argument that a plea is not 'finally' accepted until sentence is passed is based on a concept that is at odds with decisions of this court which have held that sentence is the judgment imposed on a prior conviction and the conviction has viability entirely apart from the validity of the sentence. People v. Adams, 95 Mich. 541, 542, 543, 55 N.W. 461 (1893); People v. Burridge, 99 Mich. 343, 58 N.W. 319 (1894).
2. Was the plea properly accepted?
This question can be answered only by deciding whether there was adequate compliance with the statute 3 and court rule. 4
The judge questioned the defendant at length about his understanding of the charge and of his rights at trial and the voluntariness of his plea.
The defendant acknowledged that he had driven the robbers to the scene of the crime and that he knew they were going to commit a robbery. This established an adequate factual basis for acceptance of the plea.
We conclude that before the judge said that he would accept the plea he had adequately performed all the duties imposed on him by the statute and court rule. The plea was properly accepted.
3. May a plea that is properly accepted be set aside?
The court May set aside a properly accepted plea on the motion of the accused before or after sentence is imposed. This is not an unqualified right however. Even before sentencing, the failure of the accused to present a 'persuasive...
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