People v. Wood
| Citation | 450 Mich. 399,538 N.W.2d 351 |
| Decision Date | 22 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 99391,No. 15,15 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrew Russell WOOD, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
The question presented is whether Andrew Russell Wood was "operat[ing] a [motor] vehicle," within the meaning of the OUIL statute, in the presence of the arresting officers. 1 We hold that he was, and that the circuit judge erred in suppressing evidence seized following his OUIL arrest on the basis that it was obtained as a result of an illegal search in this prosecution for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver 2 and operation of a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor. 3 The Court of Appeals affirmed. 4 We reverse and remand for trial.
On the night of June 15, 1992, police officers found Wood unconscious in his van at a McDonald's drive-through window in Howell. Wood was slumped forward, with his head resting on the steering wheel. The vehicle's engine was running, and the automatic transmission was in drive. Wood's foot, which rested on the brake pedal, kept the vehicle from moving. Wood had a twenty-dollar bill in his hand, and a Budweiser beer between his legs. He smelled of alcohol and, when the police awakened him, appeared confused. Wood was arrested, and the police searched the front seat of the vehicle. They found a cooler containing baggies of marijuana, money, a list of names, and a calculator.
Wood moved to suppress the evidence of the marijuana and of blood-alcohol and field-sobriety tests. The judge granted the motion, ruling that the evidence was the product of an unlawful arrest. The judge reasoned that the police were not justified in arresting Wood because they did not see him committing a misdemeanor by "operating" the vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 5 The judge relied on this Court's decision in People v. Pomeroy (On Rehearing) and People v. Fulcher (On Rehearing), 419 Mich. 441, 355 N.W.2d 98 (1984).
A police officer may make an arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant when the crime is committed in the officer's presence. 6 Because the police arrested Wood for OUIL, the legality of the arrest depends on whether Wood was "operat[ing] a vehicle" when the police found him. We conclude that he was. 7
A statute provides that an "operator" is anyone "in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway." 8 This Court addressed the definition of "operate" in Pomeroy and the companion case, Fulcher. We there said that a conscious person in a stationary vehicle might have "actual physical control," and thus operate it. 9 We suggested that no particular state of mind is required to operate a motor vehicle. We also said that a person who is sleeping in a moving vehicle might be found to "operate" it. 10
But the combination of a stationary vehicle and an unconscious driver in Pomeroy/Fulcher persuaded the Court that the defendants there were not operating their vehicles when found by the police.
In Pomeroy, the defendant was found asleep in a parked vehicle outside a bar. The engine was running, but the manual transmission was in neutral. Pomeroy testified that he had only entered the vehicle to sleep, and had turned on the engine and heater because he was cold. 11 No other evidence was offered that Pomeroy had driven while intoxicated.
In Fulcher, police found Fulcher's automobile with its rear end in a ditch and the front end in the roadway. Fulcher was asleep in the driver's seat with the engine idling. Fulcher's foot was off the accelerator, but the automatic transmission was in drive. The vehicle was motionless. It had furrowed tire tracks into the ground. 12 In both Pomeroy and Fulcher, this Court found that the driver was not operating a motor vehicle at the time of arrest. 13
We conclude that "operating" should be defined in terms of the danger the OUIL statute seeks to prevent: the collision of a vehicle being operated by a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor with other persons or property. Once a person using a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle has put the vehicle in motion, or in a position posing a significant risk of causing a collision, such a person continues to operate it until the vehicle is returned to a position posing no such risk.
The Pomeroy/Fulcher Court stated that "a person sleeping in a motionless car cannot be held to be presently operating a vehicle while sleeping." 14 We read that statement as reflecting an assumption that there was no danger of collision in such a case. The facts of this case show that this assumption was an overgeneralization. Pomeroy/Fulcher is overruled to the extent it holds, for purposes of construing what conduct is within the meaning of "operate a vehicle," that "a person sleeping in a motionless car cannot be held to be presently operating a vehicle while sleeping." 15
Wood had put the vehicle in motion and in a position posing a significant risk of collision. The vehicle had not been returned to a position of safety. Only Wood's foot resting on the brake pedal kept the vehicle from moving forward. Were Wood, who had then become unconscious, to have slipped to the side, his foot might have moved off the brake, putting the vehicle in motion. Wood had not returned the vehicle to a position posing no risk of collision with other persons or property. We conclude that he continued to operate the vehicle when he was observed by the officers.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
WEAVER, J., not participating.
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that our decision today marks the complete demise of People v. Fulcher (On Rehearing), 419 Mich. 441, 355 N.W.2d 98 (1984). I write separately first to state the basis for that observation and, second, to observe that even if the defendant were not technically "operating" his vehicle in the presence of the officer, he would not be entitled to suppression of the evidence.
The majority states that the OUIL statute "seeks to prevent ... the collision of a vehicle being operated by a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor with other persons or property." Majority op. at 353. While prevention of imminent collisions, one purpose of the statute, is more than sufficient to explain why this defendant was "operating" in the officer's presence, it is clearly not the only purpose of the OUIL statute. That statute is a prophylactic measure intended to prevent persons with impaired coordination, judgment, or sensation from being at the wheel of a car, regardless of the immediate risk of collision.
Even when there is no immediate risk of collision, an intoxicated driver's loss of consciousness does not render him in compliance with the OUIL statute. Loss of consciousness is not a defense to drunk driving; it is symptomatic of the very worst offenders. For that reason, it would be fair to say that an unconscious person behind the wheel of a vehicle is "operating" the vehicle within the meaning of the statute if he would be considered to be "operating" were he awake. 1
Consequently, our decision today is inconsistent not only with the language, 2 but the result of People v. Fulcher. 3 The defendant in that case was found with his automatic transmission in drive, his front wheels on the road, and his rear wheels in a ditch. Because that is also a "danger [that] the OUIL statute seeks to prevent," Majority op. at 353, this Court's decision that the defendant was not operating his vehicle at the time he was found is no longer viable.
In addition, I agree with the amicus curiae that even if the defendant were not technically "operating" his vehicle in the presence of the officer, he would not be entitled to the remedy he is seeking--suppression of evidence.
It should be clear that the defendant's arrest does not implicate the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 4 because there appears to be much more than probable cause to believe that defendant operated his vehicle while intoxicated. Whether suppression is appropriate is a question of statutory interpretation and thus one of legislative intent. At issue here is M.C.L. § 764.15; M.S.A. § 28.874, which provides, in pertinent part:
A peace officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person in the following situations:
(a) When a ... misdemeanor ... is committed in the peace officer's presence.
* * * * * *
(h) When the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person was, at the time of an accident, the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident and was operating the vehicle upon a public highway or other place open to the general public.
Although nothing in the statute alludes to exclusion of evidence, the Court of Appeals held that because the arresting officer did not have a warrant, the evidence must be suppressed if the Court finds that defendant was not committing a misdemeanor in the presence of the officer.
Even if the defendant did not commit a misdemeanor in the presence of the arresting officer, suppression is not an appropriate remedy. In People v. Burdo, 56 Mich.App. 48, 52, 223 N.W.2d 358 (1974), the Court of Appeals held that it was not error to admit evidence of a Breathalyzer test even though the officer who arrested the defendant never saw him operate his vehicle:
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