People v. Woodard

• Decision Date: 15 February 1979
• Citation: 23 Cal.3d 329,590 P.2d 391,152 Cal.Rptr. 536
• Parties: , 590 P.2d 391 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Samuel L. WOODARD, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 20455.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 536

152 Cal.Rptr. 536

23 Cal.3d 329, 590 P.2d 391

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Samuel L. WOODARD, Defendant and Appellant.

Crim. 20455.

Supreme Court of California.

Feb. 15, 1979.

As Modified Feb. 22, 1979.

Paul N. Halvonik, State Public Defender, Clifton R. Jeffers, Chief Asst. State Public Defender, Philip M. Brooks and Janet M. Lande, Deputy State Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., and Ann K. Jensen, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

BIRD, Chief Justice.

Appellant, Samuel L. Woodard, was convicted by a jury of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) This court must decide if a witness, other than a defendant, may be impeached at trial by felony convictions whose probative value may be outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. (Evid.Code, § 352.)

I

On the evening of October 5, 1976, Florence Spencer, the owner of a cafe in North Richmond, was robbed. She testified that she went to her cafe between 10:30 p. m. and 11 p. m. to close it for the night and to collect the day's receipts. She parked her car in front of a building adjacent to the cafe. As she walked from her car to the cafe, she saw two men standing in front of a telephone booth located about 10 to 15 feet from the front door of the cafe. At trial, she identified the two men as James Johnson and appellant. Although she stated that she had known appellant and his family for many years, she referred to him throughout the trial as Samuel Whitaker. ¹ She did not speak to either of the two men; nor did they speak to her. Although there were other people outside the cafe, she did not know who they were because she "wasn't paying any attention."

When she came out of the cafe with the day's receipts, someone grabbed her purse. She held on to the purse and, as a result, was pulled down and dragged about eight feet. The assailant fled with the purse. Before Spencer got up, she fired two shots at the assailant with a .38 caliber gun which she had in a paper bag. The assailant ran between the cafe and another building and disappeared.

The Contra Costa Sheriff's Department was called. While awaiting their arrival, Spencer followed the path the assailant had taken and discovered her purse and money in the alley behind the buildings. When the officers arrived, she told them that appellant was the perpetrator of the robbery and that he was wearing a gold-brown shirt with brown flowers or dots. Later that evening she identified appellant's picture in a photographic line-up. She also made an in-court identification of appellant as her assailant.

Leonard Stockwell, a friend of Spencer's, testified that he had accompanied Spencer to the cafe that evening. He stated that his purpose in doing so was to see that she safely got in her car after collecting the money from the business. He testified that, as he was about to get in his car, he heard Spencer scream and saw her being robbed. He stated that the person who robbed Spencer had been standing in front of the telephone booth. Although Stockwell had been standing outside the cafe when Spencer came out, he was unable to identify appellant as the robber.

Marjorie and Stylin Woodard, appellant's parents, testified on his behalf that appellant had been home in North Richmond that evening. At 11:30 p. m. he left to go out for a sandwich at the Ace of Clubs in North Richmond. At the time, appellant was wearing a pair of faded blue jeans and a white tee-shirt. When appellant returned home about midnight, his parents noticed that he was limping. They asked him what had happened and he replied that he had heard shooting and, fearing that shots were being fired in his direction, jumped for cover behind a car.

Mr. Woodard testified that he examined appellant's injury, which was in the buttock area. Although he was familiar with gunshot wounds from his 21 years in the Army, he stated appellant's injury did not look like a gunshot wound. Nevertheless, he decided to take appellant to the hospital after his daughter informed them that Spencer claimed to have shot appellant.

Although appellant did not wish to see a doctor, his mother was adamant that he be examined. Appellant was driven to the hospital, where he was treated by Dr. Isaac Slaughter. Dr. Slaughter testified that he had treated hundreds of bullet wounds and that appellant's injury was not caused by a bullet. He stated that appellant's injuries consisted of a sharp-edge cut on the buttock and an abrasion on one of his elbows. The cut was described by the doctor as being an inch long and not deep. An X-ray of the area of the injury revealed no bullet or bullet fragments.

James Johnson was the last witness called and he testified for appellant under subpoena. He stated that he had been in the immediate area of the cafe but had not noticed Spencer arrive. However, he did see Spencer come out of the cafe while he was talking to a man and a woman near the cafe. He testified he had known appellant for about one year but "we don't run together or anything." Johnson saw the robbery and was certain that the perpetrator was not appellant.

Johnson further testified that he approached Spencer immediately after the incident, picked up her keys from the sidewalk and handed them to her. As he did so, Spencer asked: "Who is that, Jimmy?" Johnson replied he did not know. Spencer then stated: "Well, I know who he is."

Out of the presence of the jury, appellant's attorney moved to exclude evidence of Johnson's prior felony convictions for voluntary manslaughter (Pen.Code, § 192, subd. 1) in 1971 and for felon in possession of a concealable firearm (Pen.Code, § 12021) in 1975. The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that since the appellate courts had not held that this was "a matter of constitutional magnitude, then this trial court should obey the mandate of the legislature." He went on to state that he felt "our justice is getting further and further away from being even-handed and becoming a one-sided battle. . . . They foreclose the prosecution from finding out anything about the defense or the defense witnesses, whereas the defense has complete access as to what the prosecution is going to do. . . . Hopefully, someday they will equalize the battle." The prosecution then asked Johnson about his convictions in the presence of the jury.

During the nearly six hours of deliberations, the testimony of Spencer and Johnson was reread to the jurors at their request. Subsequently, the jury returned a guilty verdict of second degree robbery (former Pen.Code, § 211a). Appellant appeals from the judgment entered following this conviction.

II

In People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1, this court unanimously held that although Evidence Code section 788 ² authorizes the admission of prior felony convictions to impeach the credibility of a witness, a trial court must, when requested, exercise its discretion under section 352 ³ and exclude this evidence if the probative value of the prior convictions is outweighed by other factors, such as the risk of undue prejudice. (People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 452-453, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1; People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 96-99, 123 Cal.Rptr. 475, 539 P.2d 43; People v. Rist (1976) 16 Cal.3d 211, 218-219, 127 Cal.Rptr. 457, 545 P.2d 833; People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 115-116, 141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771.)

Some of "the more important factors that must be considered by trial courts . . ." in deciding whether to admit prior felony convictions to impeach a witness' credibility were enumerated in People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 453, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1. Since section 788 authorizes the use of such evidence only "(f)or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness," the first factor which the trial court must evaluate is whether the prior felony conviction reflects adversely upon credibility. Although the commission of any felony is sometimes said to reflect upon the Character of the individual convicted, such a belief would not justify the use of every type of felony conviction to impeach Credibility. "Character is only an abstract group-term; what actually exists is a number of virtually Separate traits, e. g. honesty, violence, benevolence, etc." (Wigmore, Science of Judicial Proof (1937) p. 106; original emphasis.)

The Legislature has provided that the sole Trait relevant to impeaching credibility is truthfulness: "Evidence of traits of his character other than honesty or veracity, or their opposites, is inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of a witness." (§ 786.) While a prior felony conviction may be probative of one or more "separate traits" of character, it may not involve the one trait truthfulness which is relevant to impeaching credibility. If a prior felony conviction does not involve the character trait of truthfulness, it must be excluded as irrelevant at the outset, since section 350 unequivocally provides that "(n)o evidence is admissible except relevant evidence." ⁴ Moreover, even felony convictions which are relevant to establish truthfulness are not equally probative of that issue. "No one denies that different felonies have different degrees of probative value on the issue of credibility. Some, such as perjury, are intimately connected with that issue; others, such as robbery and burglary, are somewhat less relevant; and ' "Acts of violence . . . generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity. " ' " (People v. Rollo, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 118, 141 Cal.Rptr. at p. 181, 569 P.2d at p. 775.) Therefore, if a court determines that a prior conviction involves truthfulness, it must consider the "degree of probative value" it has on that issue when ruling on a Beagle motion.

The second factor to be considered is the...