People v. Woodard
| Decision Date | 19 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 336512,336512 |
| Citation | 321 Mich.App. 377,909 N.W.2d 299 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Glorianna WOODARD, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Jerard M. Jarzynka, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jerrold Schrotenboer, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.
Robert K. Gaecke, Jr., for defendant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Meter and K. F. Kelly, JJ.
In this interlocutory appeal, defendant, Glorianna Woodard, has been charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, third offense, MCL 257.625, and operating a vehicle while her license was suspended or revoked, MCL 257.904. In the trial court, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of her blood alcohol content, asserting that the analysis of her blood constituted an illegal search performed after she withdrew her consent for a blood test. The trial court denied this motion and denied defendant's motion for reconsideration. Defendant filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal, which this Court granted.1 Because the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress, we affirm and remand for further proceedings.
On March 6, 2015, Michigan State Police Trooper Anthony Ramirez conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by defendant. Initially, Ramirez stopped the vehicle because the license plate light was not working and the license plate had a "smoke tinted" cover. However, based on defendant's watery and bloodshot eyes, the smell of alcohol in the vehicle, and defendant's unsteady gait and performance on field sobriety tests, Ramirez believed that defendant was intoxicated. At Ramirez's request, defendant agreed to perform a preliminary breath test. Ramirez then arrested defendant for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and Ramirez asked defendant to consent to a blood test. Defendant consented to a blood test, and Ramirez transported defendant to a hospital where blood was drawn. The blood sample was then sent to the Michigan State Police Laboratory for analysis.
On March 9, 2015, before testing on defendant's blood sample had been conducted, defendant's attorney sent Trooper Ramirez, the Jackson County Prosecutor, and the Michigan State Police Forensic Science Division a document entitled "Notice of Defendant's Withdrawal of Consent to Search, Demand to Cease and Desist Further Warrantless Search, and Demand for Return of Blood Samples." In relevant part, this document stated:
The parties who received this notice did not heed its demand to cease further testing and return the blood sample. The subsequent analysis of defendant's blood sample revealed that she had a blood alcohol content of 0.212% at the time of the blood draw. The prosecutor charged defendant with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, third offense, and operating a vehicle while her license was suspended or revoked.
In the circuit court, defendant moved to suppress the results of her blood alcohol test, asserting that although she consented to the blood draw, she revoked her consent before the tests were conducted and, in the absence of a warrant, the analysis of her blood constituted an unlawful search. In response, the prosecutor maintained that defendant did not have a privacy interest that would prevent the analysis of a lawfully obtained blood sample. Citing People v. Perlos , 436 Mich. 305, 462 N.W.2d 310 (1990), the trial court agreed with the prosecutor, concluding that testing of a lawfully obtained sample did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In denying defendant's motion for reconsideration, the trial court similarly reasoned that "once consent is given, blood is drawn, then they can go forward with the testing at that point ...." Following denial of her motion for reconsideration, defendant filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal, which we granted.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the results of her blood test. In making this argument, defendant does not dispute that she voluntary consented to Ramirez's request for a blood test and she does not challenge the lawfulness of the blood draw at the hospital. Instead, defendant maintains that the subsequent analysis of her blood constituted a separate and distinct search. Because consent may be withdrawn at any time, defendant argues that until her blood was analyzed, she could withdraw her consent to the blood test and demand the return of her blood sample. In view of her notice to authorities withdrawing her consent, defendant contends that any tests on her blood without a warrant were per se unreasonable and that the results of the testing must be suppressed.
A trial court's factual findings made when ruling on a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error. People v. Tavernier , 295 Mich. App. 582, 584, 815 N.W.2d 154 (2012). "But the application of constitutional standards regarding searches and seizures to essentially uncontested facts is entitled to less deference[.]" People v. Williams , 472 Mich. 308, 313, 696 N.W.2d 636 (2005). We review de novo whether the Fourth Amendment was violated and whether the exclusionary rule applies.
People v. Mungo (On Second Remad) , 295 Mich. App. 537, 545, 813 N.W.2d 796 (2012). We also review de novo the trial court's ultimate decision on a motion to suppress. Williams , 472 Mich. at 313, 696 N.W.2d 636.
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its counterpart in the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures." People v. Kazmierczak , 461 Mich. 411, 417, 605 N.W.2d 667 (2000), citing U.S. Const., Am. IV and Const. 1963, art. 1, § 11. "[A] search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment occurs when the government intrudes on an individual’s reasonable, or justifiable, expectation of privacy." People v. Antwine , 293 Mich. App. 192, 195, 809 N.W.2d 439 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In comparison, "[a] ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property." United States v. Jacobsen , 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). The touchstone of these protections is reasonableness, which "is measured by examining the totality of the circumstances." Williams , 472 Mich. at 314, 696 N.W.2d 636. "Ordinarily, searches or seizures conducted without a warrant are unreasonable per se," and "when evidence has been seized in violation of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, it must be excluded from trial." People v. Dagwan , 269 Mich. App. 338, 342, 711 N.W.2d 386 (2005).
However, there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, including a search conducted pursuant to consent. People v. Borchard–Ruhland , 460 Mich. 278, 294, 597 N.W.2d 1 (1999). " ‘Fourth Amendment rights are waivable and a defendant may always consent to a search of himself or his premises.’ " People v. Frohriep , 247 Mich. App. 692, 702, 637 N.W.2d 562 (2001) (citation omitted). When conducting a consent search, the police are limited by the terms of the defendant's consent.
People v. Powell , 199 Mich. App. 492, 496, 502 N.W.2d 353 (1993). "The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect." Frohriep , 247 Mich. App. at 703, 637 N.W.2d 562 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, just as a suspect may limit the scope of the search at the outset, a suspect may also withdraw consent at any time. Dagwan , 269 Mich. App. at 343, 711 N.W.2d 386 ; Powell , 199 Mich. App. at 498, 500, 502 N.W.2d 353. However, revocation of consent does not operate retroactively to invalidate the search conducted before withdrawal of consent. Powell , 199 Mich. App. at 497, 499, 502 N.W.2d 353. More fully, this Court has explained the revocation of consent as follows:
[A] suspect may revoke his consent to search at any time. The revocation of the consent to search, however, does not invalidate the search conducted pursuant to the valid consent of the suspect before that consent was revoked. Any evidence obtained during the consensual portion of that search is admissible. However, once the consent is revoked, the police must stop the search unless continuing the search may be justified under some basis other than the suspect's consent. Finally, any evidence obtained during the consensual portion of the search may be considered in determining...
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