People v. Woodell

• Decision Date: 11 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. S060180,S060180
• Citation: 17 Cal.4th 448,950 P.2d 85,71 Cal.Rptr.2d 241
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 17 Cal.4th 969B, 950 P.2d 85, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1051, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1455 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Russell D. WOODELL, Defendant and Appellant

Page 241

71 Cal.Rptr.2d 241

17 Cal.4th 448, 17 Cal.4th 969B, 950 P.2d 85,

98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1051,

98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1455

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Russell D. WOODELL, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S060180.

Supreme Court of California

Feb. 11, 1998.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 1, 1998.

Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Running Springs, for Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Sanjay T. Kumar, Pamela C. Hamanaka and David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

CHIN, Justice.

In determining whether an out-of-state conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under California law, the trier of fact may look to the entire record of the conviction but no further. (People v. Myers (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1193, 1195, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 911, 858 P.2d 301; People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 355, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150.) The question here is whether the appellate opinion disposing of the appeal in the case is part of the record of the conviction for this purpose. Specifically, we must decide whether the jury was entitled to consider the appellate opinion to help determine whether the conviction was based upon personal use of a deadly weapon, a requirement for the sentencing provision involved here.

We conclude the record of the conviction is not limited to the trial court record but extends to the appellate court record, including the appellate opinion. The trier of fact in this case properly considered the appellate opinion to help determine the existence and nature of the defendant's prior conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

I. THE FACTS

An information charged defendant, Russell D. Woodell, with burglary. It also alleged that he had been convicted of and served prison terms for two prior violent or serious felonies in North Carolina. The prior conviction at issue here was for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.

At trial, the prosecution presented documents showing that defendant had been indicted in North Carolina for assault with a pair of scissors, a deadly weapon, with the intent to kill and inflicting serious injury, and that he pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. Over defense objection, the court also admitted the opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals on the subsequent appeal to help prove that defendant had been convicted of a crime on the basis that he personally used a deadly weapon.

The opinion stated that defendant contended "the court erred by failing to find as a statutory mitigating factor that defendant acted under strong provocation. He testified that over a two-month period the victim had been threatening to sexually assault him if he did not repay an alleged debt and that on the morning of the assault, the victim told him that 'if I didn't come to school in the afternoon don't come.' Defendant stated he interpreted this statement as a threat to sexually assault him." The North Carolina court rejected the contention. "We do not believe the evidence compels a finding that he acted under adequate provocation. The evidence shows that at approximately 8:45 a.m. on the morning of the assault, defendant told another inmate that he was going to 'kill somebody.' This inmate also indicated that he saw defendant sharpening a scissor blade at 1:00 p.m. and that defendant was still sharpening the blade at 1:35 p.m. Approximately five minutes later, he saw defendant stab the victim from behind with the scissor blade. Under these circumstances, we hold the court did not err by failing to find the mitigating factor."

A jury convicted defendant of first degree burglary and found the allegations, including the prior assault conviction, to be true. The court sentenced defendant to state prison for a total of 35 years to life. The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing but otherwise affirmed. It concluded that the appellate opinion was not part of the record of conviction, but it "was admissible in this case to explain the indictment and guilty plea," which were part of the record. We granted defendant's petition for review.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Introduction

Various sentencing statutes in California provide for longer prison sentences if the defendant has suffered one or more prior convictions of specified types. A highly publicized example is the "Three Strikes" law adopted in 1994, which is involved in this case. (See People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628.) In general, this "legislation provides longer sentences for certain prior serious or violent felonies popularly denoted 'strikes.' " (People v. Hazelton (1996) 14 Cal.4th 101, 104, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 443, 926 P.2d 423.)

Sometimes the definition of the qualifying prior conviction is not completely congruent with the definition of the crime of which the defendant has been convicted. For example, in Guerrero, the alleged prior conviction was for a " 'burglary of a residence.' " (People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 346, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150 [quoting Pen.Code, former § 1192.7, subd. (c)(18) ].) The statutory use of the phrase, "burglary of a residence," posed a problem because "there is no offense specifically so defined in the Penal Code." (Guerrero, supra, at p. 346, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150.) A particular burglary conviction might or might not have involved a residence. We had to decide how the trier of fact in that and similar situations could determine whether the prior conviction qualified under the sentencing scheme.

In Guerrero, we concluded that, "in determining the truth of a prior-conviction allegation, the trier of fact may look to the entire record of the conviction" but, we made clear, "no further. " (People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 355, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150, original italics.) This rule, we explained, "is both fair and reasonable. To allow the trier of fact to look to the entire record of the conviction is certainly reasonable: it promotes the efficient administration of justice and, specifically, furthers the evident intent of the people in establishing an enhancement for 'burglary of a residence'--a term that refers to conduct, not a specific crime. To allow the trier to look to the record of the conviction-- but no further--is also fair: it effectively bars the prosecution from relitigating the circumstances of a crime committed years ago and thereby threatening the defendant with harm akin to double jeopardy and denial of speedy trial." (Ibid., original italics.)

The problem often arises when the defendant's prior conviction is from another jurisdiction. As the Court of Appeal in this case succinctly stated, "In order for a prior conviction from another jurisdiction to qualify as a strike under the Three Strikes law, it must involve the same conduct as would qualify as a strike in California." There is, however, no guarantee the statutory definition of the crime in the other jurisdiction will contain all the necessary elements to qualify as a predicate felony in California. In this case, defendant was convicted in North Carolina of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. To qualify for the sentencing scheme at issue here, that conviction must be for a "felony in which the defendant personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon." (Pen.Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)(23).) The weapon use must be personal, not vicarious; aiding and abetting another who used a deadly weapon would not suffice. (See People v. Piper (1986) 42 Cal.3d 471, 475-476, 229 Cal.Rptr. 125, 722 P.2d 899.) The parties agree that, under North Carolina law, defendant's conviction itself does not necessarily show he personally used a deadly weapon.

In People v. Myers, supra, 5 Cal.4th 1193, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 911, 858 P.2d 301, we held that the rule of People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d 343, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150, applies to out-of-state convictions as well as to California convictions. Because a "defendant whose prior conviction was suffered in another jurisdiction is ... subject to the same punishment as a person previously convicted of an offense involving the same conduct in California," we said, "the trier of fact must be permitted to go beyond the least adjudicated elements of the offense and to consider, if not precluded by the rules of evidence or other statutory limitation, evidence found within the entire record of the foreign conviction." (People v. Myers, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1201, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 911, 858 P.2d 301; see also id. at p. 1195, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 911, 858 P.2d 301 ["Just as it may do when the prior conviction was suffered in California [citing Guerrero ], the trier of fact may consider the entire record of the proceedings leading to imposition of judgment on the prior conviction to determine whether the offense of which the defendant was previously convicted involved conduct which satisfies all of the elements of the comparable California serious felony offense."].)

To prove that defendant was convicted of a crime in North Carolina involving conduct satisfying the elements of the California statute, i.e., to prove that he was convicted of a crime based on personal use of a deadly weapon, the prosecution presented documents showing the crime with which he was charged and to which he pleaded guilty. Additionally, the court admitted a copy of the opinion in the subsequent appeal. That opinion indicated defendant did personally use the deadly weapon. It contained no suggestion that defendant merely aided and abetted some other person who actually wielded the weapon. We must decide whether the court properly admitted the opinion for this purpose.

Defendant argues: (1) the opinion is not...