People v. Woodhead

• Decision Date: 08 September 1987
• Citation: 239 Cal.Rptr. 656,43 Cal.3d 1002,741 P.2d 154
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 741 P.2d 154 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael WOODHEAD, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 25631.

Page 656

239 Cal.Rptr. 656

43 Cal.3d 1002, 741 P.2d 154

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael WOODHEAD, Defendant and Appellant.

Crim. 25631.

Supreme Court of California.

Sept. 8, 1987.

Frank O. Bell, Jr., State Public Defender, Linda Feldman, Deputy State Public Defender, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Martin S. Kaye, Thomas A. Brady and Laurence K. Sullivan, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

KAUFMAN, Justice.

In this case we must decide whether a statute which prohibits commitment to the Youth Authority of any person convicted of a serious felony when he or she was 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense, applies to defendant, who was previously convicted of a serious felony committed when he was 18, but who stands convicted of a nonserious felony in the instant proceeding. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude it does not.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In January 1985, defendant, aged 19, broke into a school in Livermore, was apprehended and charged with burglary. The information also alleged that defendant had been convicted previously of first degree The trial court found defendant guilty of second degree burglary. In accordance with the indicated disposition, the court committed defendant to the Youth Authority for a maximum period of three years. With respect to the prior conviction, the court agreed with defense counsel that it was "irrelevant for purposes of sentencing."

burglary and had been placed on probation for that offense. The trial court informed defendant that upon a plea to second degree burglary, he would be referred to the Youth Authority for a maximum of three years or sentenced to state prison for two years if the Youth Authority rejected him. Defendant pleaded[43 Cal.3d 1006] no contest to second degree burglary and admitted the prior conviction allegation.

The Youth Authority rejected defendant, however, stating in a letter to the court that he was ineligible for commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.5. ¹ That section in pertinent part provides: "... (N)o person convicted of ... any ... serious felony, as defined in section 1192.7 of the Penal Code, committed when he or she was 18 years of age or older shall be committed to Youth Authority." ² Section 1732.5 was one of several penal statutes enacted by the voters of this state when they adopted Proposition 8 in 1982.

Although defendant's current conviction of second degree burglary did not constitute a "serious" felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, the Youth Authority indicated that defendant was ineligible because he had been convicted previously of burglary of a residence, a serious felony under Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18), committed when he was 18 years of age. In the same letter to the court, the Youth Authority suggested the trial judge resentence defendant to state prison and order that he be "transferred" to the Youth Authority for "housing" pursuant to section 1731.5, subdivision (c). ³ The trial court thereupon sentenced defendant to state prison for two years, ordered the prior conviction "stricken for purposes of sentencing only," and referred defendant to the Youth Authority for housing and program participation pursuant to section 1731.5, subdivision (c). The Youth Authority accepted the transfer.

On appeal, defendant claimed that section 1732.5 applies only to current convictions of serious felonies and, therefore, that the Youth Authority erroneously rejected his commitment on the basis of his prior serious felony conviction. The Court of Appeal rejected this contention on two grounds. The court held that the statutory language, "no person ... convicted of any serious felony ...," is clear and unambiguous; the statute does not expressly distinguish between past and current serious felony convictions. Additionally, conceding that the language was ambiguous arguendo, the Court of Appeal found that the purpose of the statute was to separate We accepted review of the matter because construction of the statute presents an issue of first impression of statewide significance. ⁴ For the reasons set forth below, we conclude the interpretation announced by the Court of Appeal was incorrect.

nonserious from serious offenders and to provide more severe punishment for the latter; neither purpose would be served, the court impliedly concluded, by exempting from the statute young adult offenders with prior serious felony convictions.

DISCUSSION

Our analysis starts from the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895, 231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 40, 127 Cal.Rptr. 122, 544 P.2d 1322.) In determining intent, we look first to the words themselves. (Overstreet, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 895, 231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288; Younger, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 40, 127 Cal.Rptr. 122, 544 P.2d 1322.) When the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction. (Overstreet, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 895, 231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288; People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884, 157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473.) When the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, however, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. (People v. Shirokow (1980) 26 Cal.3d 301, 306-307, 162 Cal.Rptr. 30, 605 P.2d 859; Morse v. Municipal Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 149, 156, 118 Cal.Rptr. 14, 529 P.2d 46; Pennisi v. Department of Fish & Game (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 268, 273, 158 Cal.Rptr. 683.)

With respect to the words of the statute themselves, the operative phrase in section 1732.5, "no person convicted of," is obviously susceptible of two reasonable interpretations. The phrase may be narrowly interpreted, as defendant urges, to refer only to current convictions of serious felonies; it may also be more broadly construed, as the Attorney General argues, to include prior convictions as well as current convictions.

There is no merit to the Attorney General's contention that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation--that "no person convicted" means no person ever convicted. It is true that the statute is not expressly limited to current offenses. Nor is it expressly applicable to prior offenses. As this court has recognized, the word "conviction" may have different meanings in different contexts, or even different meanings within a single statute. (People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 170, 177, fn. 2, 228 Cal.Rptr. 25, 720 P.2d 913; see also Helena Rubenstein Internat. v. Younger (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 406, 421, 139 Cal.Rptr. 473.) The word "convicted" conveys no self-evident meaning; its import must be gathered from the overall context in which it appears. (See Pennisi v. Department of Fish & Game, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 275, 158 Cal.Rptr. 683 " '[A] word is merely a symbol which can be used to refer to different things.... It is impossible to determine the referent of the word without a knowledge of the facts involved in its use.' ") Indeed, as will appear below, the statutory scheme of which section 1732.5 is a part virtually compels the conclusion that "convicted," in the particular context of Proposition 8, refers exclusively to current convictions.

Because the words themselves provide no definitive answer, we must look to extrinsic sources. The interpretation of an ambiguous statutory phrase may be aided by reference to other statutes which apply to similar or analogous subjects. (See, e.g. Overstreet v. North Shore Corp. (1943) 318 U.S. 125, 131-132, 63 S.Ct. 494, 498, 87 L.Ed. 656.) Penal Code section 1203 et seq. concern various restrictions on the availability of probation, and in numerous instances begin with the phrase: "..., probation shall not be granted to ... any person convicted of...." (Emphasis added. See, e.g. Pen.Code, §§ 1203.065, 1203.07, 1203.073.) Of particular relevance here is Penal Code section 1203.06, which provides that persons who have personally used a firearm during the commission of certain serious felony offenses are ineligible for probation. Subdivision (a)(2) of Penal Code section 1203.06 defines the scope of the statute with respect to persons who have "previously" been convicted of offenses involving the use of a firearm, as follows: "(a) Probation shall not be granted to ... any of the following persons: ... (2) Any person previously convicted of a felony specified in subparagraphs (i) through (ix) of paragraph (1), who is convicted of a subsequent felony and who was personally armed with a firearm at any time during its commission or attempted commission or was unlawfully armed with a firearm at the time of his or her arrest for the subsequent felony." (Italics supplied.)

By expressly distinguishing within Penal Code section 1203.06 those persons who have been "previously convicted" of serious felonies from those who have been "convicted," the Legislature has made it clear that the word "convicted," standing alone in a statute, may be intended to refer to a current conviction.

The Attorney General objects to this line of reasoning, however, arguing that section 1732.5, unlike Penal Code section 1203.06, was enacted by the voters, who may have intended that the term "convicted" would enjoy a broader scope than that accorded it by the Legislature. Any suspicion that the voters intended a more expansive definition of the term than the Legislature is immediately refuted by reference to the text of Proposition 8 as whole. A...