People v. Woodrum

• Decision Date: 05 October 2006
• Docket Number: No. 99984.,99984.
• Citation: 307 Ill.Dec. 605,860 N.E.2d 259,223 Ill.2d 286
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Robert WOODRUM, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

860 N.E.2d 259

223 Ill.2d 286

307 Ill.Dec. 605

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Robert WOODRUM, Appellee.

No. 99984.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 5, 2006.

Rehearing Denied November 27, 2006.

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Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, Renee G. Goldfarb, John E. Nowak, James E. Fitzgerald and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Samuel Algozin and Steven W. Becker, Assistant Appellate Defenders, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellee.

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

Following a bench trial, defendant Robert Woodrum was found guilty of seven counts of child abduction (720 ILCS 5/10-5(b)(10) (West 1998)). The circuit court sentenced him to 24 months' probation. As conditions of probation, defendant was required to complete a sex offender program and register as a sex offender. Defendant was also ordered to submit blood for HIV/AIDS testing and genetic marker identification. The appellate court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded for the circuit court to expunge the order requiring him to submit blood samples for HIV/AIDS testing and genetic marker identification. 354 Ill.App.3d 629, 290 Ill.Dec. 475, 821 N.E.2d 787.

We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (134 Ill.2d R. 317). The State raises several claims of error on appeal to this court, including that the appellate court erred in finding a presumption in the child abduction statute unconstitutional. We hold that the child abduction statute creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption, but the application of the presumption in this case was harmless error. We therefore reverse the judgment of the appellate court.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant was arrested on November 10, 1999. He was subsequently charged in two indictments with a total of seven counts of child abduction. The first indictment alleged that on or about November 4, 1999, defendant intentionally lured S.S., N.W., G.S., and A.T., each under 16 years of age, into a dwelling without the consent of a parent or lawful custodian in violation of section 10-5(b)(10) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/10-5(b)(10) (West 1998)). The second indictment alleged that on or about November 5, 1999, defendant intentionally lured L.M., A.T., and S.S., each under 16 years of age, into a dwelling without the consent of a parent or lawful custodian in violation of section 10-5(b)(10) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/10-5(b)(10) (West 1998)).

The State later filed amended indictments. The amended indictments, filed on June 22, 2000, essentially restated the previous allegations and added that defendant acted "for other than a lawful purpose." The State subsequently filed a third set of indictments to correct scriveners errors.

Defendant filed a motion for discovery. In his motion, defendant sought, among other things, a bill of particulars stating the "specific act that had an unlawful purpose" and the "specific unlawful purpose" he allegedly possessed. Defendant asserted this information was essential to the preparation of a defense. The State filed an objection to the request for a bill of particulars. The State asserted "a video tape of the crime and the defendant's detailed written confession have been tendered to the defense giving unusually detailed discovery on what evidence the state is relying on to sustain their burden of proof." At the hearing on defendant's motion, the prosecutor stated:

"In this particular case, the evidence against the Defendant is ninety percent on a video tape of the crime and is [sic] a written confession as to what happened. * * * The only thing that is going to be added in this case is to have the victims identify themselves on tape and the parents to say they didn't give him consent. I have never seen a case in this Courtroom where the Defense has a better outline of exactly what the State is going to prove because not one word will be changed on the tape and not one word will be changed on the statement, so Counsel is well prepared on what is going to happen."

The trial court observed that the act of luring a child under 16 years of age into a dwelling without the parent's consent constitutes prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose under the child abduction statute. The court stated that the "[b]urden basically falls to the Defendant to show that it was an affirmative defense. That there was a lawful purpose involved." The trial court, therefore, found a bill of particulars was not necessary and denied defendant's motion.

On July 28, 2000, defendant moved to dismiss the indictments, claiming his right to a speedy trial had been violated. At the hearing on the motion, defendant asserted that any delays in connection with the original charges could not be attributed to him on the subsequent indictments because those indictments contained new and additional charges. The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the subsequent indictments were "just the re-indictment of the original charges."

At trial, the State introduced a videotape of the children and defendant's written statement. Additionally, several of the children and their parents testified. The evidence showed that four girls were playing in front of a condominium building on November 4, 1999. The girls were eight and nine years old. Defendant came outside and began videotaping them. Defendant asked the girls to wrestle or "cat fight." While the girls were fighting, one of them stated another girl's "fly was down." Defendant stated "[l]et's see it" while trying to videotape the girl. The girl turned around and zipped up her pants.

Defendant invited the children to watch the videotape inside the condominium where he lived with his parents. The girls went inside with defendant and watched the tape. While they were still in the condominium, defendant asked the girls if they would like to "have an Olympics show." Defendant videotaped them while they did cartwheels, somersaults, and backbends. Defendant and the children then watched the second videotape. After watching the second tape, defendant became worried that his mother would return and find the girls inside the condominium. Defendant, therefore, told them to leave and "not to say anything to their parents."

The next day, two of the girls and an eight-year-old boy were playing outside when they heard music coming from the building. The children went into the laundry room where defendant was listening to music while doing his laundry. Defendant had his video camera. At defendant's request, the children began wrestling. Defendant videotaped the children as they wrestled and spun around on a chair.

Defendant then invited the children to watch the videotape inside his parents' condominium. While defendant and the children were watching the videotape, the father of one of the children knocked on the door. Defendant answered the door, and the girl left with her father. The other two children also left. As these two children were leaving, defendant told them not to tell anyone that they had been in his condominium watching videotapes. The parents of these children did not give defendant permission to have them in his residence on either of these occasions.

The mother of two of the children involved in these incidents later went to defendant's condominium. She demanded that defendant give her the videotape of her children. Defendant initially refused, but produced the videotape after the mother of the children threatened to call the police. After watching the videotape, the mother of the children gave it to the police.

Defendant was arrested and gave a written statement recounting these events. Defendant asserted that he was sexually excited by the fact that the girl's zipper was open. While that same girl was doing the "Olympics show," he could see her exposed stomach. Defendant stated he was sexually excited and hoped to see more of her body. Defendant thought about masturbating while watching the girls view the videotape. While he was videotaping the girls, he "fantasized that he thought it would be nice to see them naked `cat fighting.'" Defendant further stated that he "had a fantasy about having sex with the four girls he videotaped." Defendant knew it was wrong to have the children in his residence without the consent of their parents.

Defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case. The trial court denied defendant's motion. Defendant's mother then testified that defendant took pictures with his video camera as a hobby.

In closing argument, the prosecutor asserted that defendant's statement showed he invited the children into the condominium for his own sexual gratification or excitement. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to show defendant lured the children inside for an unlawful purpose. After taking a recess to read defendant's statement, the trial court found defendant guilty of child abduction, stating:

"The defense is correct that many cases, just taking a video tape is not an unlawful act, does not have an unlawful purpose. But just as a picture of a naked child could be one of beauty, depending upon the eyes of the beholder, and the purpose of the beholder for taking it, it could also be something which would not have a lawful purpose. The statute states that luring a child into a house, dwelling, motor vehicle, who is under the age of sixteen, is prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose. The Defendant's statement is that he did these things because he enjoyed watching the children, he enjoyed especially watching if they showed parts of their body that were exposed, that these...