People v. Woods

• Decision Date: 23 December 1982
• Docket Number: D,65263 and 65342,Nos. 8,Docket Nos. 63099,s. 8
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald WOODS, Defendant-Appellant, PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James TUCKER, Defendant-Appellant, PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Annette Gail ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant. ec. Term 1981. Calendarto 10.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 707

331 N.W.2d 707

416 Mich. 581

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald WOODS, Defendant-Appellant, PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James TUCKER, Defendant-Appellant, PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Annette Gail ALEXANDER, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 63099, 65263 and 65342, Dec. Term 1981.

Calendar Nos. 8 to 10.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 2, 1981.

Decided Dec. 23, 1982.

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Chief Appellate Asst. Pros. Atty., Michael F. Bakaian, Janice M. Joyce, Timothy A. Baughman, Asst. Pros. Attys., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

State Appellate Defender Office by Peter Jon Van Hoek, Asst. Defender, Detroit, for Ronald Woods.

Carl Ziemba, Detroit, for James Tucker.

Mogill, Bush, Posner, Cohen & Weiss by Kenneth M. Mogill, Detroit, for Annette Gail Alexander.

RYAN, Justice.

We granted leave to appeal in these three cases and consolidated them for oral argument and disposition, primarily to consider the appropriateness of the language of "malice" and "malice aforethought" in the trial courts' murder instructions. Appellants in each of the cases contend that the instructions given were erroneous and misleading, resulting in a denial of due process.

In our review of the record, we have found error in all three cases; however, reversal and a new trial is ordered only as to defendant Alexander.

First, in Tucker and Woods, the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the law will imply malice from an unprovoked, inexcusable, unjustifiable killing. People v. Richardson, 409 Mich. 126, 293 N.W.2d 332 (1980). However, the error was harmless since all the evidence indicated the existence of express malice; there was no evidence from which malice could have been implied by applying the erroneous instruction. We also note that, although the prosecutor in Woods and Tucker informed the jury of a plea agreement made with the informant-witness, in the future under circumstances such as those extant in this case disclosure of such an agreement must be introduced into evidence.

Second, the trial court in Alexander erred in instructing that one is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts in the absence of circumstances that demonstrate something different. People v. Wright, 408 Mich. 1, 289 N.W.2d 1 (1980); see Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). Because the error involved the material element of intent which was directly disputed and for which the evidence was not overwhelming, the error was not harmless. Reversal is required, for Sandstrom must be accorded limited retroactivity, i.e., retroactive to those who raised the issue on direct appeal and whose appeal was pending when Sandstrom was decided.

Finally, we find no other reversible error in the trial courts' jury instructions on malice; however, we do take this opportunity to disapprove the potentially misleading and arcane language of the instructions given in these cases and direct that, henceforth, the elements of murder must be described without the use of the terms "malice" or "malice aforethought".

I. Facts

Defendants Ronald Woods and James Tucker, along with their co-defendant, Jerome McFadden, who is not a party to this appeal, were charged with and convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder. M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548. The three were tried jointly on July 20-29, 1976, in the Recorder's Court of Detroit, and each was sentenced to the mandatory non-parolable life imprisonment.

Annette Gail Alexander was charged with second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. M.C.L. Sec. 750.317; M.S.A. Sec. 28.549; M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). She was found guilty on both counts by a jury on June 17, 1977, in the Recorder's Court, and was sentenced to 2 1/2 to 10 years on the first charge and to the mandatory two-year consecutive sentence on the other.

A

Woods, Tucker, and McFadden were convicted of the murder of John B. Jenkins, an alleged drug pusher, whose body was found in the stairwell of his apartment building in the City of Detroit on January 6, 1976, at about 2:30 a.m. The prosecution relied primarily upon the testimony of Willie Lee Lewis, a drug user, who testified that he was employed by the defendants in a "dope house". He testified that he had overheard two conversations between the three defendants. During the first discussion, four days before the murder, Woods said that Jenkins was a snitch and "something had to be done". The second occurred on the night of the murder, and, at this time, Woods asked McFadden if he would "take out" Jenkins. McFadden replied that he would.

According to Lewis, Tucker then produced a pistol, wiped it, and handed it to Woods, who also wiped it and gave it to McFadden. The scheme was to intoxicate Jenkins with drugs and then kill him. The next morning McFadden told Lewis that he had "done it", that he had killed Jenkins on the first floor stairway of his apartment building. J.B. Jenkins was found dead with three bullet wounds in his body, and there was morphine in his blood as well as needle marks on his arm. Medical testimony established that he died from the bullet wounds.

Several others also gave testimony. Virginia Boddy testified that at about 2 a.m. on the day of the murder McFadden came to a foster care home at which she was employed and at which the deceased resided to see Jenkins, and that he and Jenkins left together. Tommie Lee Jones, a tenant of the apartment building where Jenkins was found, said that at about 2 a.m. he heard an argument, some shots, and then running. He looked out a window into the alley and saw a man and a woman, both elderly looking, get into a car. Clarine Williams, another tenant, said she heard three shots and someone holler and then, about a minute later, saw a girl come out the front of the apartment building. The girl put a shiny object, which Williams told police might have been a gun, into her purse and then got into a car 15 minutes later.

All three defendants filed motions to suppress their prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes, should they choose to testify. The trial judge took Tucker's and McFadden's motions under advisement. Woods' motion to suppress his prior conviction of carrying a dangerous weapon was denied after the judge learned that the deceased died from gunshot wounds. None of the defendants took the stand.

At the trial, in his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that an agreement had been reached with Lewis to allow him to plead guilty to unarmed robbery, a lesser offense of the charged crime of armed robbery, in return for his truthful testimony against the defendants. He also told the jury that his own statements were not evidence. Yet, during both direct and cross-examination, Lewis denied that any deal had been made. When defense counsel tried to show the inconsistency of Lewis' testimony with the prosecutor's earlier statement to the jury, the prosecutor objected on the basis that his opening statement was not evidence. Apparently the court sustained the objection. A similar objection to defense counsel's closing argument statements on the substance of the agreement was sustained. However, in his closing and rebuttal arguments, the prosecutor again stated that a deal had been made with Lewis, describing Lewis' denials as "evasive" because he was being a "snitch". In his instructions to the jury, the judge once again reminded the jury that his own statements and those of the attorneys were not testimony and that only the witness's testimony and the exhibits were to be considered in determining the facts.

The trial judge also instructed the jury on the charged offense of first-degree murder and on the included offense of second-degree murder. In his instruction on the malice element for murder, he said:

"However, malice aforethought is the necessary element of murder both in the first and second degree. Malice includes, not only anger, hatred, and revenge, but every other unlawful, unjustifiable motive. It is not confined to a particular ill will to the deceased, but is intended to denote an act evolving from a wicked and corrupt motive that came down under such circumstances as carry in them the plain indication of a heart fatally bent on mischief.

"Malice means that condition of mind which prompts one to do a wrongful, felonious act intentionally without legal justification; therefore, malice is implied from any deliberate or cruel act against another, however sudden. The time within which the wicked purpose is formed is immaterial. Malice may be either implied or expressed, either one of which is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the law.

"Expressed malice is where one with a sedate and deliberate mind and a formed design kills another, which formed design may be evidenced by certainly several circumstances disclosing an inward intention. For instance, threats, former grudges, lying in wait, those things would be evidence of expressed malice.

"Implied malice is where the law draws inferences and conclusions from the act itself. For instance, A meets B on the street. A is armed with a revolver. A takes the gun out of his pocket and shoots and kills B without any provocation, without any explanation or justification. This is a showing that this is done with malice. And it's said to be implied malice because the law will imply the existence of malice from the very act itself, from the circumstances under which it was committed.

"The proof of either expressed or implied malice is all the law requires in order to have malice." Appendix for Defendant Tucker at 33a-34a.

Defendant Tucker's timely appeal as of right, and Woods' granted delayed appeal, were consolidated by the Court of Appeals. That court issued an unpublished per curiam opinion...