People v. Woods

• Decision Date: 09 September 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1-17-3022,1-17-3022
• Citation: 170 N.E.3d 1050,2020 IL App (1st) 173022,446 Ill.Dec. 524
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Devon WOODS, Defendant-appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2020 IL App (1st) 173022

170 N.E.3d 1050

446 Ill.Dec. 524

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-appellee,

v.Devon WOODS, Defendant-appellant.

No. 1-17-3022

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, THIRD DIVISION.

September 9, 2020

James E. Chadd, Patricia Mysza, and Ann B. McLennan, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Daniel Piwowarczyk, and Kim Przekota, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant Devon Woods was convicted of violating a provision of the Sex Offender Registration Act that requires individuals "lack[ing] a fixed residence" to report weekly to the "law enforcement agency where the sex offender is located." 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2016). As the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant lacked a fixed residence within Chicago from June 4 to June 9, 2016, we reverse defendant's conviction outright.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Evidence of defendant's prior criminal history is unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal. It suffices to say that defendant was subject to the reporting requirements mandated by the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA). See 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2016).

¶ 4 In July 2016, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging defendant with violating section 6 of SORA. See 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2016). The indictment alleged that between June 4 and June 9, 2016, defendant (1) was required to report under SORA, (2) lacked a fixed residence, and (3) failed to report weekly with the Chicago Police Department.

¶ 5 At the short bench trial, Doris Gaskew, who worked in criminal registration for the Chicago Police Department, testified that defendant had appeared before her 11 different times in 2015 and 2016 to register. (He did not register every week as required but tended to register every other week, sometimes every third week. That is not the basis of the charge here.)

¶ 6 When defendant would register, he presented an identification card that listed his residence as 11201 South Vernon Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. Despite that address, defendant told Ms. Gaskew that he was homeless, and in his last registration with Gaskew on May 27, 2016, defendant indicated that he had spent the previous week staying and sleeping on the Red Line train that runs through Chicago. Defendant also filled out a registration "for a person lacking a fixed residence" during those past registrations, including the last time he registered on May 27, 2016.

¶ 7 Chicago police officer Michael Hurley testified that, on June 9, 2016, in the 900 block of West 87th Street in Chicago, he conducted a vehicular stop of defendant, who presented an identification card that listed his address as 11201 South Vernon Avenue in Chicago. The car defendant was driving was registered at that address as well. Hurley learned that defendant was not current on his sex-offender registration and took him into custody. The following exchange occurred on direct examination:

"Q. When you processed the defendant did you ask him where he lived?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he indicate where he lived?

A. I believe he gave the address that was on the I.D. and the registered address of the vehicle.

* * *

Q. [W]hen you process an individual do you put that information in the arrest report under offender registration?

A. Yes. We would have confirmed the address he gave us. That would be the address listed as his address of residence."

¶ 8 The police report of defendant's arrest was not admitted as an exhibit, but on cross-examination, Officer Hurley admitted that he wrote down in his report that "the fact that there was a vehicle registered to Mr. Woods in Chicago *** was not consistent with homelessness." The officer said, "I don't recall" when asked whether he had a discussion with defendant "about where he stayed from the night of June 4th to June 9th."

¶ 9 The court ultimately found defendant guilty. In so doing, it provided the following assessment of the evidence:

"The case here is very clear to me that the defendant was registering every week. The Defense Exhibit No. 1 shows that sometimes it was every week. Sometimes he may have skipped a week, but he was registering—which a reasonable inference is with a lack of fixed address for quite some time.

Additionally, the testimony that was presented through Ms. Gaskew was that it had a next court date when his date—not court date but next date when he is supposed to register by, June 3rd. There was nothing presented that he did that. He basically did not. He did not do that.

The next time there is contact with the Chicago Police Department is when he is arrested while driving a vehicle, and he gave an address. At that point it's the same address that he had on an I.D. that he gave to the registering officer, but regardless of that he knew that he was supposed to be back it's very clear on June 3rd and he wasn't.

And basically the prior registering show that he lacked a fixed address, and that's what the State is alleging is that he lacked a fixed residence and therefore failed to report as required any time that following week.

So I find that the evidence is clear here that the defendant did in fact violate the Sex Offender Registration Act, and I am going to find him guilty."

¶ 10 At the sentencing hearing, defendant was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Defendant raises four arguments on appeal, but we need only consider one—that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 13 Due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the offense for which a defendant is charged. People v. Lucas , 231 Ill. 2d 169, 178, 325 Ill.Dec. 239, 897 N.E.2d 778 (2008) ; People v. Nelson , 2020 IL App (1st) 151960, ¶ 48, 443 Ill.Dec. 339, 161 N.E.3d 991. The trier of fact need not "disregard inferences that flow normally from the evidence before it, nor need it search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt." People v. Jackson , 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 70, 443 Ill.Dec. 589, 162 N.E.3d 223. At the same time, no conviction can rest in whole or in part on speculation or guesswork. People v. Smith , 185 Ill. 2d 532, 546, 236 Ill.Dec. 779, 708 N.E.2d 365 (1999) ("It is no help to speculate that the defendant may have killed the victim. No citizen would be safe from prosecution under such a standard.").

¶ 14 In this case, the State charged defendant with violating SORA's section 6 for failing to register in Chicago for the period of June 4 to June 9, 2016. That provision provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ny person who lacks a fixed residence must report weekly, in person, to the appropriate law enforcement agency where the sex offender is located." 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2016). SORA defines a "fixed residence" as "any and all places that a sex offender resides for an aggregate period of time of 5 or more days in a calendar year." Id. § 2(I). An "aggregate period" of five days within "a calendar year" could mean five consecutive days or five days spread out over the calendar year.

¶ 15 In other words, sex offenders whom society would consider "homeless" do not lack a "fixed residence" under SORA if they have " ‘an occasional but predictable place to stay.’ " People v. Wlecke , 2014 IL App (1st) 112467, ¶ 31, 379 Ill.Dec. 417, 6 N.E.3d 745 (quoting People v. Peterson , 404 Ill. App. 3d 145, 152, 343 Ill.Dec. 895, 935 N.E.2d 1123 (2010) ); see also Peterson , 404 Ill. App. 3d at 153, 343 Ill.Dec. 895, 935 N.E.2d 1123 ("A person could have a ‘fixed residence’ by the Act's definition and yet be homeless by the ordinary way of speaking."). We agree with our supreme court and a previous decision of this court that, in the context of defining the housing status of a sex offender in the context of "fixed residences" and "temporary domiciles," SORA "leaves something to be desired, in terms of clarity and consistency." People v. Pearse , 2017 IL 121072, ¶ 39, 417 Ill.Dec. 674, 89 N.E.3d 322 ; see also People v. James , 2019 IL App (1st) 170594, ¶ 18, 431 Ill.Dec. 877, 128 N.E.3d 1047 (noting same).

¶ 16 In any event, as one might expect, to sustain a conviction under section 6 for failing to report on a weekly basis as a sex offender who lacks a fixed residence, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "(1) lacked a ‘fixed residence’ and (2) failed to report weekly." Wlecke , 2014 IL App (1st) 112467, ¶ 21, 379 Ill.Dec. 417, 6 N.E.3d 745 ; see also id. ¶ 31 ("Whether [defendant] lacked a ‘fixed residence’ was a critical element for the State to prove to sustain a conviction for violation of section 6 of the Act.").

¶ 17 Section 6 of SORA is jurisdiction-specific, as the sex offender lacking a fixed residence must report to "the appropriate law enforcement agency where the sex offender is located" ( 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2016) ), which is determined by reference to section 3 of SORA (id. § 3(a)). See James , 2019 IL App (1st) 170594, ¶ 20, 431 Ill.Dec. 877, 128 N.E.3d 1047 (location of offender's residence is "critical element" in proving SORA violation); People v. Gomez , 2017 IL App (1st) 142950, ¶¶ 28-30, 412 Ill.Dec. 162, 74 N.E.3d 1085 (same).

Here, the claim is that defendant was residing in Chicago while lacking a fixed residence, meaning he was supposed to report to the Chicago Police Department. 730 ILCS 150/3(a)(1) (West 2016). So the State was required to prove not only that defendant lacked a fixed residence during this window of time and failed to report to the Chicago Police Department, but also that defendant was residing in Chicago during the relevant time and failed to so report.

¶ 18 Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the State might have proven that defendant was residing in Chicago during this time period. Officer Hurley believed he...