People v. Worden, Docket No. 21545

• Citation: 71 Mich.App. 507,248 N.W.2d 597
• Decision Date: 18 October 1976
• Docket Number: Docket No. 21545
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edgar D. WORDEN, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)

Page 597

248 N.W.2d 597

71 Mich.App. 507

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edgar D. WORDEN, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 21545.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Oct. 18, 1976.

Released for Publication Jan. 12, 1977.

James R. Neuhard, State Appellate Defender, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Eugene C. Penzien, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before ALLEN, P.J., and D. E. HOLBROOK, Jr. and PAPP, ^* JJ.

ALLEN, Presiding Judge.

In this appeal defendant, found guilty as charged of armed robbery M.C.L.A. § 750.529; M.S.A. § 28.797, and kidnapping M.C.L.A. § 750.349; M.S.A. § 28.581, and sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 to 40 years imprisonment, challenges the legality of his conviction of kidnapping. ¹

About 1:30 a.m. on the morning of May 19, 1973, defendant driving his parents' automobile, pulled into a gasoline station located on Pinconning Road and the I--75 expressway in Bay County accompanied by one Barbara McDonald who thereupon left the car, entered the filling station and asked the attendant for directions to Mount Morris. While the attendant, Joseph Protasiewicz, was giving directions, defendant entered the station, pointed a gun at Protasiewicz and announced 'this is a stick-up'. Protasiewicz gave defendant a coin changer and money pouch. He then went to the safe which he opened and from which he withdrew a metal box, which he gave to defendant. At this point, still holding the gun, defendant informed Protasiewicz he had to be taken 'for a ride down the road'. Obediently, Protasiewicz entered the automobile, and sat on the front seat with Barbara between him and defendant driver. He was driven about a quarter of a mile down the road and released. Defendant and Barbara then drove by way of Pinconning to Au Gres where they registered in a motel and where later that morning they were found by state troopers. Upon being admitted into the motel room by the defendant, the state troopers found some $600 in coins and currency lying on and beneath the bed. Under the bed, the money pouch, money changer and two pistols were found. The trial court's findings of fact as first reported in the record clearly stated that the kidnapping charge contained in Count II 'was incidental' to the underlying armed robbery offense contained in Count I. ² When appeal was first taken to this Court, Plaintiff moved to remand, alleging that the word 'not' was mistakenly omitted from the trial transcript. Plaintiff's motion was granted and at the hearing on remand October 24, 1975, an affidavit by the court reporter was admitted in evidence stating that the word 'not' was mistakenly omitted from the trial transcript. The court reporter was not present at the hearing on remand and the reporter's notes were not offered in evidence.

I. DID THE TRIAL COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF A STENOGRAPHER'S AFFIDAVIT AT A HEARING FOR THE AMENDMENT OF THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE WITNESSES AGAINST HIM, VIOLATE THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE AND

RULES RELATING TO REFRESHMENT OF A WITNESS' MEMORY AND THE

INTRODUCTION OF A PAST RECOLLECTION RECORDED, AND WAS THE

AFFIDAVIT INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY?

The question posed above compels a discussion of the proper procedure to be employed for correcting alleged errors in a trial transcript. Basically, the issue raised is whether a court reporter's Ex parte affidavit may be used to make changes in the transcript. It is well settled that a record on appeal may not be Supplemented by Ex parte affidavits, Dora v. Lesinski, 351 Mich. 579, 88 N.W.2d 592 (1958). Does the otherwise inadmissible Ex parte affidavit somehow attain dignity and become admissible because it is presented at a hearing? We think not. The affidavit, even though introduced at a formal court hearing, remains an out-of-court statement used to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. As such it is hearsay not falling within any of the recognized exceptions to inadmissibility. In her affidavit, the court reporter stated that after examining her original notes and listening to a tape recording of the dictation she determined the word 'not' had been omitted. If a witness' memory is refreshed upon examination of a writing, the witness may be cross-examined. If the witness' memory is not refreshed by perusal of a writing, the writing itself may be admitted after a proper foundation is laid. In the instant case neither the witness nor the writing (original notes) were available. ³

Although the procedure employed was error and should be avoided in future cases where correction of a record is at issue, we find the error harmless. GCR 1963, 529.1, M.C.L.A. § 769.26; M.S.A. § 28.1096. Our examination of the transcript of the hearing on the correction of the record discloses that the trial judge was less influenced by the stenographer's affidavit than he was by examination of his own notes and his own independent recollection. In ordering the amendment the trial judge expressly relied upon his own memory and notes. ⁴ It is totally obvious that in this case the court would have arrived at the same conclusion even if the stenographer had been present and even if the original notes had been available for examination. Such being the case we cannot say that admission of the affidavit was prejudicial.

II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE FILLING STATION ATTENDANT WAS NOT MERELY

INCIDENTAL TO THE UNDERLYING CRIME OF ARMED ROBBERY BUT WAS

INDEPENDENTLY SIGNIFICANT THUS ALLOWING DEFENDANT TO BE

CONVICTED OF BOTH ARMED ROBBERY AND KIDNAPPING?

In this superbly briefed and argued cause the parties sharply disagree whether the record contains sufficient evidence of asportation as defined in People v. Adams, 389 Mich. 222, 205 N.W.2d 415 (1973), to justify the conviction of kidnapping. Defendant contends that the only evidence of asportation was the movement of Protasiewicz a mere quarter of a mile while defendant and Miss McDonald were engaged in the 'getaway' phase of the robbery. This, says defendant, was action taken to effect an escape from the scene of the robbery and for no other reason. Consequently, defendant concludes, the prosecution failed to show that a movement of the attendant--the controlling element of a kidnapping charge--was conduct unrelated to the armed robbery. Defendant rejects the argument that the Adams opinion applies only to situations where the alleged kidnapping occurs in conjunction with a lesser crime rather than in conjunction with another capital offense, as in the instant case. ⁵ Calling attention to California decisions, particularly People v. Beaumaster, 17 Cal.App.3d 996, 95 Cal.Rptr. 360 (1971), ⁶ defendant contends that the threat of additional danger to the victim by reason of the asportation is not sufficient proof by itself of kidnapping. Conversely, the People argue: (1) Adams does not, or at least should not, control where, as here, the underlying offense carries a life maximum sentence thus precluding an overzealous prosecutor from converting a lesser underlying crime into a more serious crime; (2) since the robbery was totally completed and defendant in possession of the money and valuables when at gunpoint the attendant was asported away, the movement was independent of the underlying crime; (3) in Michigan, movement of a victim is 'independent' if, as in the instant case, it enhances the risk or danger to the person being moved.

We reject the first of the three arguments advanced by the People. While it is true that the Adams Court was concerned with the conversion of a simple crime into a capital offense, the logic of the opinion goes further and is directed to prohibiting the conversion of a single offense into two offenses. Thus it matters not whether the single offense is a minor misdemeanor such as simple assault or a capital felony such as armed robbery. If Adams did not extend to situations involving co-equal offenses, reversal and remand for failure to properly instruct on asportation would not have been ordered by this Court in People v. Ford, 47 Mich.App. 420, 209 N.W.2d 507 (1973), involving rape and kidnapping, People v. Leszczynski, 49 Mich.App. 555, 212 N.W.2d 255 (1973), involving kidnapping and armed robbery, People v. Behm, 52 Mich.App. 119, 216 N.W.2d 631 (1974), involving kidnapping and armed robbery, People v. Culpepper, 52 Mich.App. 121, 216 N.W.2d 632 (1974), involving kidnapping and armed robbery. The fact that this Court did reverse and remand in each of these cases evinces the applicability of Adams in the instant situation. ⁷

Nevertheless, we accept and are persuaded by the remaining two arguments advanced by the prosecution. One factor which may be considered in determining whether the victim's movement is independent of the underlying crime is whether the movement was 'for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the underlying offense'. People v. Nash, 47 Mich.App. 371, 376, 209 N.W.2d 432, 435 (1973). ⁸ At the time Protasiewicz was ordered into the car defendant and Miss McDonald had obtained all of the money and valuables from the attendant. The movement of attendant down the road in no way facilitated the commission of the underlying offense. The armed robbery was completed.

The prosecution's third argument is its best one. Regardless of California decisions, including Beaumaster, supra, ⁹ Adams itself holds that one factor to be used in determining whether a victim's movement is independent is whether the movement increased the risk of harm or the threatened risk of harm beyond the risk inherent in the underlying crime.

'4. If the movement adds either a greater danger or threat thereof, that is a factor in considering whether the movement adequately constitutes the necessary legal asportation, but there could be asportation without this element of additional danger so long as the movement was incidental to a...