People v. Wright

• Decision Date: 01 May 1992
• Docket Number: Docket No. 90512
• Citation: 490 N.W.2d 351,441 Mich. 140
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rodney Agustus WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant. ,
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 351

490 N.W.2d 351

441 Mich. 140

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rodney Agustus WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 90512, May Term, 1992.

Calendar No. 1.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued May 7, 1992.

Decided Sept. 29, 1992.

John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., County of Wayne, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, & Appeals, Jeffrey Caminsky, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Rolf E. Berg, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Peter Jon Van Hoek, Detroit, Mich., for amicus curiae Criminal Defense Attys. of Mich.

OPINION

MALLETT, Justice.

We are asked today to consider whether a criminal defendant can voluntarily waive his Fifth Amendment rights without the knowledge that his attorney is trying to contact him. Further, we are asked to determine whether not providing a defendant with food, water, or the opportunity or place to sleep while he awaits questioning renders his statements involuntary.

I

Defendant Rodney Agustus Wright shot and killed Clifford "Terry" Harrell during the early morning hours of March 7, 1987. Around midnight, Mr. Harrell's car became stuck in the mud across the street from defendant's house. He asked defendant and other residents for help. A fight ensued between Mr. Harrell and some of the bystanders. Mr. Wright went to his house, retrieved his shotgun, and unloaded it on the front porch. After unsuccessfully attempting to break up the fight, he went back to his porch, loaded the gun, and again tried to stop the fight. However, in the midst of the affray, the gun discharged, fatally wounding Terry Harrell. ¹

At about 5:00 a.m., Rodney Wright was arrested for shooting Terry Harrell. He was taken to the Fourteenth Precinct, and, after approximately four and one-half hours, he was transferred to the homicide section of police headquarters. At police headquarters, he was put into a room adjoining the office of Sergeant George Taylor, where he remained for approximately one and one-half hours.

Rodney Wright was first questioned by Sergeant Taylor between 10:30 and 10:50 a.m. Mr. Wright asked for, but was denied, permission to phone his grandfather. Sergeant Taylor then took defendant into his office where he advised him of his rights and defendant agreed to make a statement. Sergeant Taylor, however, did not take the statement. Instead, he told defendant that he wanted to search his home, which Mr. Wright gave him permission to do. Again, defendant asked to use the phone. Sergeant Taylor told him that he did not have time for telephone calls. He then lead defendant into a smaller room, about four feet by five feet, and left defendant there for roughly four hours.

While in the second room, defendant was never offered anything to eat or the opportunity to go to sleep. By the time Sergeant Taylor returned, Rodney Wright had been in custody for over nine hours. He was taken out of the room once at about 2:00 p.m. to get some water, but still was not allowed to make the requested telephone call.

At about 3:00 p.m., Mr. Wright was brought back into Sergeant Taylor's office. It was at this time that defendant learned that Terry Harrell had died. According to the defendant, at this time police officers tried to convince him to confess to the murder. The police encouraged defendant to admit that he killed in retaliation to Mr. Harrell's beating him. He was to confess in order to prevent them from charging him with "murder one."

Instead of confessing, Mr. Wright denied all guilt. He was then returned to the four by five room. Sergeant Taylor told defendant that he was lying and that he was being put in this room so that the next time the officers came to get him, Mr. Wright would be ready to talk.

The second time Sergeant Taylor confronted defendant, they went into Sergeant Taylor's office. Rodney Wright said that he was ready to make a statement, but as the defendant was talking, the phone rang. Sergeant Taylor talked to the person on the phone, hung up, and told Mr. Wright that he had just spoken with Mr. Wright's uncle. When asked why he did not let defendant speak, Sergeant Taylor said that as soon as defendant made his statement, he could call his uncle.

Without being re-read his rights, defendant gave a statement to Sergeant Taylor. When the statement was typed and signed, Sergeant Taylor allowed defendant to make a phone call and then told him that his attorney was waiting for him outside.

When Rodney Wright was asked if he wanted an attorney that morning, he had told the officers that he did not have one. The officers told him that one would be provided for him, but did not indicate when. They also never informed him that his family had hired an attorney or that the attorney, Thaddeus Dean, had been trying to contact him since the morning.

In fact, Mr. Dean came to police headquarters while Sergeant Taylor searched defendant's home. He spoke to Sergeant Ralph Wolfolk, who did not allow him to see defendant. Sergeant Wolfolk called Sergeant Taylor who informed him that defendant knew his rights and did not want an attorney. Mr. Dean left for a short time and returned while Sergeant Taylor was talking to defendant. He again asked to see defendant. Again, Sergeant Wolfolk called Sergeant Taylor, and, again, Sergeant Taylor said defendant did not want an attorney.

After Mr. Wright made and signed the statement, the officers told him that his family hired an attorney for him and that Mr. Dean was present. The police officers also allowed defendant to make a phone call at this point.

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Before defendant's trial, the defense filed a motion to suppress the statement made to Sergeant Taylor. At defendant's Walker ² hearing, Judge Sharon Tevis Finch found that defendant wanted to make a statement and never explicitly asked for a lawyer. She also concluded, relying on Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986), that the police purposely kept defendant from his attorney. She concluded that although the police conduct was reprehensible, the law did not require the suppression of defendant's statements.

During a bench trial, defendant testified that he got the gun in order to stop the fight, that Terry Harrell came at him, grabbed at the gun, and that it accidentally discharged. Judge Kaye Tertzag found defendant guilty of second-degree murder and felony-firearm. Defendant was sentenced to seven to twenty years for murder and a consecutive two-year term for felony-firearm.

Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals. 186 Mich.App. 566, 465 N.W.2d 339 (1990). The panel felt that Moran v. Burbine, supra, was nearly identical on its facts. Although the United States Supreme Court concluded that states are free to impose more stringent standards on police conduct, the panel declined to do so.

Defendant then appealed here. We granted leave to consider whether a defendant has a right to know of his attorney's efforts to contact him. We also granted leave to determine whether the failure by police to provide a defendant with proper food, water, or opportunity to sleep, renders a defendant's statements involuntary.

II

A defendant's right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and by the Michigan Constitution of 1963, art. 1, Sec. 17. This includes the rights to remain silent and to be represented by an attorney. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that "[t]he defendant may waive effectuation" of these rights "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." The inquiry is two- First, a suspect's waiver must be the product of "a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception." Moran, supra 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141. Second, the waiver must be made with full knowledge of the right being relinquished and the consequences of this choice. "Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." Id. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141. Accentuating the importance of these rights, the Court stated "[a]ny evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege." Miranda 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. at 1629.

A defendant's decision to speak is clearly his own and must be made with full knowledge of its consequences. We have held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require a clear demonstration of waiver. People v. Paintman, 412 Mich. 518, 528, 315 N.W.2d 418 (1982). Further, we have held that under Const. 1963, art. 1, Sec. 17, involuntary confessions are inadmissible at trial. People v. Louzon, 338 Mich. 146, 153-154, 61 N.W.2d 52 (1953). We must determine, thus, whether defendant's statements were voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. People v. Robinson, 386 Mich. 551, 558, 194 N.W.2d 709 (1972).

III

Although the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant's knowledge of his attorney's presence is irrelevant to the voluntariness of a waiver, we disagree. Moran v. Burbine, supra. In Moran, the defendant confessed to the murder of a young woman after being informed of his Miranda rights. While the defendant was in police custody, his sister retained an attorney to represent him. At no point during the interrogation did the defendant request an attorney. The attorney telephoned the police station and was assured that all questioning would cease until the next morning. However, the interrogation period that resulted in the defendant's confession occurred later that evening. The Supreme Court held that defendant...