People v. Wright

• Decision Date: 08 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85SC275,85SC275
• Citation: 742 P.2d 316
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Austin J. WRIGHT, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 316

742 P.2d 316

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Austin J. WRIGHT, Respondent.

No. 85SC275.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Sept. 8, 1987.

Nolan L. Brown, Dist. Atty., E. Ronald Beeks, Deputy Dist. Atty., Golden, for petitioner.

David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Victoria J. Koury, John S. Portman, Deputy State Public Defenders, Golden, for respondent.

Charles H. Richardson, Claybourne M. Douglas, Aurora, for amicus curiae City of Aurora, Colo.

QUINN, Chief Justice.

We granted the People's petition for certiorari to review a judgment of the District Court of Jefferson County, which affirmed a county court dismissal of state misdemeanor and misdemeanor traffic offense charges on the grounds that the compulsory joinder bar of section 18-1-408(2), 8B C.R.S. (1986), precluded prosecution of the state offenses which were different from but arose out of the same criminal episode as a municipal ordinance violation to which the defendant had previously pled guilty in municipal court. We reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the case to the district court with directions to return the case to the county court for further proceedings.

I.

On November 22, 1984, Austin J. Wright (defendant) was involved in an automobile accident at the corner of 88th Avenue and Sheridan Boulevard in the City of Westminster in Jefferson County, Colorado. As a result of the accident, a Westminster police officer issued a summons and complaint charging the defendant with violating the Westminster Municipal Code by failing to yield to oncoming traffic while turning left, ¹ and ordering him to appear in the Westminster Municipal Court to answer this charge. By separate summons and complaint, the defendant was charged with the state misdemeanor of driving under suspension in violation of section 42-2-130, 17 C.R.S. (1984 & 1986 Supp.), ² and the state misdemeanor traffic offense of driving without compulsory insurance in violation of section 42-4-1213, 17 C.R.S. (1984), ³ and was ordered to appear in Jefferson County Court to answer these charges. On December 18, 1984, the defendant pled guilty to the municipal ordinance violation and on February 7, 1985, was sentenced to thirty days in jail under a work release program, of which twenty days were suspended, and was ordered to pay restitution.

In the Jefferson County Court prosecution, the defendant entered a not guilty plea to the state charges on January 11, 1985, and the case was set for trial on March 11, 1985. Prior to trial the defendant moved to dismiss the charges, claiming that the prosecution was barred by the compulsory joinder provisions of section 18-1-408(2), 8B C.R.S. (1986). After noting that the police report contained references to both the municipal ordinance violation and the state offenses, the county court ruled that, because knowledge of the dual prosecutions could be imputed to the district attorney, the county court prosecution was barred by section 18-1-408(2). The People appealed to the district court, which affirmed the judgment of dismissal. We granted the People's petition for certiorari to consider whether the compulsory joinder bar of section 18-1-408(2) is applicable where, as here, the defendant is initially prosecuted in a municipal court for a municipal ordinance violation and then in a county court for state misdemeanor and misdemeanor traffic offense charges based on conduct different from the municipal ordinance violation but arising out of the same criminal episode as the ordinance violation.

II.

Section 18-1-408(2) states as follows:

If the several offenses are known to the district attorney at the time of commencing the prosecution and were committed within his judicial district, all such offenses upon which the district attorney elects to proceed must be prosecuted by separate counts in a single prosecution if they are based on the same act or series of acts arising from the same criminal episode. Any offense not thus joined by separate count cannot thereafter be the basis of a subsequent prosecution. ⁴

We acknowledge that the purpose of this statutory provision is to protect an accused against the oppressive effect of sequential prosecutions based on conduct arising during the same criminal episode by requiring that all charges be joined in a single prosecution or be barred whenever the conditions for mandatory joinder have been fulfilled. E.g., Jeffrey v. District Court, 626 P.2d 631, 636 (Colo.1981); accord Corr v. District Court, 661 P.2d 668 (Colo.1983). We are satisfied, however, that the statutory bar was not intended to prohibit a prosecution in a county court for state offenses under circumstances where the accused was initially subjected to a completed prosecution in a municipal court for a municipal ordinance and is then prosecuted in a county court for state offenses based on conduct different from the ordinance violation, even though both the state charges and the ordinance violation arose out of the same criminal episode.

A.

Several factors support our construction of section 18-1-408(2) as not applicable to successive prosecutions for an ordinance violation in a municipal court and for state offenses in a county court based on conduct different from the conduct underlying the ordinance violation. First, we take guidance from the long-standing rule of statutory construction which requires statutory terms to be given their plain and obvious meaning. E.g., People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986); People v. Owens, 670 P.2d 1233 (Colo.1983); McMillin v. State, 158 Colo. 183, 405 P.2d 672 (1965); City and County of Denver v. Hobbs' Estate, 58 Colo. 220, 144 P. 874 (1914). The compulsory joinder bar of section 18-1-408(2) is an integral part of the Colorado Criminal Code, which by its express terms governs "the construction of and punishment for any offense defined in any statute of this state, whether in this title or elsewhere, and which is committed on or after July 1, 1972, as well as the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense." § 18-1-103(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986). The term "offense" is defined in section 18-1-104(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986), as meaning "a violation of, or conduct defined by, any state statute for which a fine or imprisonment may be imposed." (Emphasis added). The reference in section 18-1-408(2) to "offenses," coupled with the definition of that term in section 18-1-104(1), clearly indicates that the General Assembly did not intend to extend the compulsory joinder bar to municipal ordinance violations. ⁵

Second, we look to prior case law construing section 18-1-408(2). In People v. Pinyan, 190 Colo. 304, 546 P.2d 488 (1976), this court dealt with the applicability of the compulsory joinder bar to successive prosecutions in municipal and state courts for different offenses arising out of the same criminal episode. The defendant in that case was charged with an illegal left turn in violation of the City of Englewood's traffic code and was also served with a separate summons and complaint for the state misdemeanor offense of driving without a valid license. The defendant mailed a fine in payment of the municipal ordinance violation, and later filed a motion to dismiss the county court misdemeanor offense on the basis of the compulsory joinder bar of section 18-1-408(2). The county court granted the motion, and the order of dismissal was affirmed by the district court. In reversing the judgment of the district court, this court stated:

It is clear ... that these are two separate and distinct offenses which violate the laws of two different jurisdictions--one, the municipality, the other, the state. Each offense must be prosecuted in the jurisdiction where the respective criminal acts occurred. Neither offense could be tried in the court of the other jurisdiction.

These two violations, even if "known to the district attorney at the time of commencing the prosecution," are not within the class of offenses which must or can be prosecuted by separate counts in a single prosecution.

190 Colo. at 307, 546 P.2d at 490-91 (citations omitted); accord People v. Talarico, 192 Colo. 445, 560 P.2d 90 (1977).

Finally, we consider pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the prosecution of state criminal offenses and municipal ordinance violations. A county court is a state constitutional court with limited criminal jurisdiction as may be provided by law. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 17. By statute, county courts have jurisdiction in "[c]riminal actions for the violation of state laws which constitute misdemeanors or petty offenses," except actions involving children over which juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction. § 13-6-106(1)(a), 6 C.R.S. (1986 Supp.). The office of district attorney is also created by the Colorado Constitution. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 13. A district attorney is a member of the executive branch of government, e.g., Beacom v. Board of County Comm'rs, 657 P.2d 440 (Colo.1983); People v. Losavio, 199 Colo. 212, 606 P.2d 856 (1980); People v. District Court, 186 Colo. 335, 527 P.2d 50 (1974), and is vested with authority to initiate criminal prosecutions for crimes (i.e., violations of state criminal law) committed within the geographical boundaries of the judicial district served by the district attorney. See People v. Taylor, 732 P.2d 1172, 1177-78 (Colo.1987).

While a district attorney is constitutionally authorized to initiate a criminal prosecution in a state court for a violation of a state statute, article VI, section 1 of the Colorado Constitution expressly reserves to home rule cities and towns the power "to create municipal and police courts." Statutory cities and towns have also been granted the authority to establish municipal courts. § 13-10-104, 6 C.R.S. (1973). The jurisdiction of municipal courts is limited to municipal ordinance violations. Id. Municipal prosecutions are generally...