People v. Yates

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: SIMKINS; SMITH, P.J., and CRAVEN
• Citation: People v. Yates, 308 N.E.2d 679, 17 Ill.App.3d 765 (Ill. App. 1974)
• Decision Date: 07 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 11903,11903
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph P. YATES, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 679

308 N.E.2d 679

17 Ill.App.3d 765

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joseph P. YATES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11903.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

March 7, 1974.

John F. McNichols, Dist. Defender, Ill. Defender Project, Springfield (J. Daniel Stewart, Staff Atty., Michael Logan, Springfield, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Basil G. Greanias, State's Atty., Macon County, Decatur (Jon C. Baxter, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

SIMKINS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding defendant, Joseph P. Yates, guilty of disobeying a traffic control device in violation of a municipal ordinance and disorderly conduct in violation of Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, sec. 26--1 and imposing a fine of $15 and $100 respectively.

On June 11, 1970, defendantwas observed by a Decatur, Illinois police officer 'creeping forward' into an intersection while waiting for a red light. The officer then stopped defendant in order to issue a traffic citation, but the defendant immediately became indignant and launched a verbal assault upon the officer complaining that he 'was tired of the God Damned Decatur cops arresting him--that it was a God Damned humbug--that he felt he was stopped unjustly as he always is.' While the officer wrote the ticket, defendant continued his name calling, screaming and yelling 'loud enough to be heard in the immediate area' by people who had subsequently gathered on the street. The officer proceeded to ask defendant what the initial on his license stood for, and defendant answered loudly 'Self, It stands for Self.' The officer told him that if he didn't calm down and cooperate he would be arrested for disorderly conduct, but defendant said he didn't give a damn and resumed his badgering at which point the officer arrested him.

Of the various issues raised by defendant on appeal this court deems dispositive his contention that he was not granted a speedy trial as mandated by statute in Illinois.

Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 38, sec. 103--5 states in pertinent part:

(b) Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial Unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for competency ordered pursuant to Section 104--2 of this Act, by a competency hearing, by an adjudication of incompetency for trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114--4 of this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal. (emphasis added.)

This court has stated that 'The criterion or test establshed by the Supreme Court is whether the act of the defendant in fact contributed to cause the delay, or created the necessity for the postponement of the trial.' People v. Rice, 109 Ill.App.2d 212, 218, 248 N.E.2d 332, 335 (Fourth District). This court will not presume delay occasioned by a defendant where the record is silent in that regard. People v. Spicuzza, 10 Ill.App.3d 447, 294 N.E.2d 105 (Fifty District).

In the instant case defendant demanded a jury trial on September 2, 1970, and seventeen months transpired until defendant's trial on Januray 26, 1972, a time period clearly in excess of the 160 day period stipulated by the statute. Defendant then was clearly denied his right to a speedy trial unless the record indicates that the delay was occasioned by the defendant.

The State contends that the delays resulted...