People v. Yoder, Court of Appeals No. 14CA1337
Docket Nº | Court of Appeals No. 14CA1337 |
Citation | 409 P.3d 430 |
Case Date | April 07, 2016 |
Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
409 P.3d 430
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Charles Edward YODER, Defendant–Appellant.
Court of Appeals No. 14CA1337
Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.
Announced April 7, 2016
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Deborah Isenberg Pratt, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.
Opinion by JUDGE BOORAS
¶ 1 Defendant, Charles Edward Yoder, appeals the district court's ruling at sentencing that mandatory protection orders (MPOs) would continue to remain in effect. He contends that the MPOs are invalid generally and that the district court lacked the statutory authority to impose certain conditions in the MPOs. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 In Mesa County case number 13CR877, the People charged defendant with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), driving after revocation prohibited, and possession of drug paraphernalia. In Mesa County case number 13CR1502, the People charged him with criminal impersonation and false reporting. And in Mesa County case number 14CR21, he was charged with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), driving after revocation prohibited, possession of drug paraphernalia, and two counts of violation of bail bond conditions.
¶ 3 In each of the three cases, the district court issued a MPO under section 18–1–1001, C.R.S.2015. Each MPO contained the following three conditions:
• defendant "[s]hall not harass, molest, intimidate, retaliate against, or tamper with any witness to or victim of the acts charged";
• defendant "[s]hall not possess or consume ... controlled substances without a doctor's prescription"; and
• "[n]o driving without a valid driver's license."
¶ 4 Two of the MPOs also prohibited defendant from possessing or consuming marijuana "without a doctor's prescription [sic]" (among other conditions).1
¶ 5 Defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance in both 13CR877 and 14CR21, and false reporting in 13CR1502.
¶ 6 At the combined sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced defendant to eighteen months in prison and one year of mandatory parole in 13CR877, and imposed shorter, concurrent sentences in the other two cases. The court also clarified that the conditions of the MPOs would remain in effect until defendant completed his sentences:
[T]he protection orders do remain in effect throughout the period of Mr. Yoder's sentences. Those do prohibit him from harassing, molesting, intimidating, retaliating against, or tampering with any witness to or victim of the acts charged. He's also not to possess or consume marijuana or controlled substances without a doctor's prescription [sic]. He's not to drive any motor vehicles without a valid driver's license.
¶ 7 Defense counsel objected, arguing:
[W]e are objecting to conditions that he refrain from marijuana use as well as driving. We do not believe either of those conditions [is] necessary to protect any victim or witness to any of these charged offenses, so we believe they'd be inappropriate to continue at this point. So, we would just lodge our objection to those conditions.
¶ 8 However, defense counsel then clarified: "Obviously, the standard protection order, we do not object to that portion of that remaining while sentence continues. That's ... clearly authorized by law, so we are aware of that. It's the extra conditions that we'd object to as conditions of the protection order."
¶ 9 The district court overruled the objection, explaining, "I am overruling that objection given the nature and circumstances of these offenses. I find they're necessary to protect the community."
II. Analysis
¶ 10 Defendant contends that the MPOs are invalid generally because the cases did not involve any victims or witnesses who needed protection. We deem this particular contention to have been waived in the district court. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel specifically stated that he was not objecting to the "standard protection order[s]," but instead was only objecting to the specific conditions regarding marijuana and driving. This affirmative acquiescence waived any claim that the MPOs are invalid as a general matter. See People v. Rediger, 2015 COA 26, ¶¶ 49–64, ––– P.3d –––– (discussing waiver of an issue based on defense counsel's affirmative acquiescence) (cert. granted Feb. 15, 2016).
¶ 11 Defendant also contends that the district court lacked the statutory authority to impose the conditions in the MPOs prohibiting defendant...
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People v. Hoggard, Court of Appeals No. 14CA1393
...has held that waiver requires some "affirmative conduct," albeit to varying degrees. See, e.g. , People v. Yoder , 2016 COA 50, ¶ 10, 409 P.3d 430 (finding waiver where counsel objected to certain protective order provisions, but stated that he had no objection to others); Rail , ¶¶ 36-37 (......
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Red Flower, Inc. v. McKown, Court of Appeals No. 14CA2409
...of the issuance of the deed.¶ 42 Our conclusion is supported by another provision of the statute. See People v. Yoder , 2016 COA 50, ¶ 17, 409 P.3d 430 (We "look at the statute as a whole in order to interpret the meaning and purpose of its language."). Under subsection 128(1)(b), when the ......
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Spohr v. & Fremont Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs., Court of Appeals No. 18CA1918
...of subsection 309(1)’s language best effectuates the statute under the statutory scheme as a whole. People v. Yoder , 2016 COA 50, ¶ 17, 409 P.3d 430 ("[W]e must also look at the statute as a whole in order to interpret the meaning and purpose of its language."); Morgan , 160 P.3d at 358. S......
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Huffman v. City of Denver, Court of Appeals No. 19CA0124
...specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." People v. Yoder , 2016 COA 50, ¶ 17, 409 P.3d 430 (citation omitted).¶ 10 Section 24-72-708 authorizes a district court to seal a defendant's municipal criminal conviction records.(1) Sealin......
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People v. Hoggard, Court of Appeals No. 14CA1393
...has held that waiver requires some "affirmative conduct," albeit to varying degrees. See, e.g. , People v. Yoder , 2016 COA 50, ¶ 10, 409 P.3d 430 (finding waiver where counsel objected to certain protective order provisions, but stated that he had no objection to others); Rail , ¶¶ 36-37 (......
-
Red Flower, Inc. v. McKown, Court of Appeals No. 14CA2409
...of the issuance of the deed.¶ 42 Our conclusion is supported by another provision of the statute. See People v. Yoder , 2016 COA 50, ¶ 17, 409 P.3d 430 (We "look at the statute as a whole in order to interpret the meaning and purpose of its language."). Under subsection 128(1)(b), when the ......
-
Spohr v. & Fremont Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs., Court of Appeals No. 18CA1918
...of subsection 309(1)’s language best effectuates the statute under the statutory scheme as a whole. People v. Yoder , 2016 COA 50, ¶ 17, 409 P.3d 430 ("[W]e must also look at the statute as a whole in order to interpret the meaning and purpose of its language."); Morgan , 160 P.3d at 358. S......
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Huffman v. City of Denver, Court of Appeals No. 19CA0124
...specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." People v. Yoder , 2016 COA 50, ¶ 17, 409 P.3d 430 (citation omitted).¶ 10 Section 24-72-708 authorizes a district court to seal a defendant's municipal criminal conviction records.(1) Sealin......