People v. Yoder
Decision Date | 07 April 2016 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 14CA1337 |
Citation | 409 P.3d 430 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Charles Edward YODER, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Deborah Isenberg Pratt, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Kamela Maktabi, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.
Opinion by JUDGE BOORAS
¶ 1 Defendant, Charles Edward Yoder, appeals the district court's ruling at sentencing that mandatory protection orders (MPOs) would continue to remain in effect. He contends that the MPOs are invalid generally and that the district court lacked the statutory authority to impose certain conditions in the MPOs. We affirm.
¶ 2 In Mesa County case number 13CR877, the People charged defendant with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), driving after revocation prohibited, and possession of drug paraphernalia. In Mesa County case number 13CR1502, the People charged him with criminal impersonation and false reporting. And in Mesa County case number 14CR21, he was charged with possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), driving after revocation prohibited, possession of drug paraphernalia, and two counts of violation of bail bond conditions.
¶ 3 In each of the three cases, the district court issued a MPO under section 18–1–1001, C.R.S.2015. Each MPO contained the following three conditions:
¶ 4 Two of the MPOs also prohibited defendant from possessing or consuming marijuana "without a doctor's prescription [sic]" (among other conditions).1
¶ 5 Defendant ultimately pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance in both 13CR877 and 14CR21, and false reporting in 13CR1502.
¶ 6 At the combined sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced defendant to eighteen months in prison and one year of mandatory parole in 13CR877, and imposed shorter, concurrent sentences in the other two cases. The court also clarified that the conditions of the MPOs would remain in effect until defendant completed his sentences:
[T]he protection orders do remain in effect throughout the period of Mr. Yoder's sentences. Those do prohibit him from harassing, molesting, intimidating, retaliating against, or tampering with any witness to or victim of the acts charged. He's also not to possess or consume marijuana or controlled substances without a doctor's prescription [sic]. He's not to drive any motor vehicles without a valid driver's license.
¶ 7 Defense counsel objected, arguing:
[W]e are objecting to conditions that he refrain from marijuana use as well as driving. We do not believe either of those conditions [is] necessary to protect any victim or witness to any of these charged offenses, so we believe they'd be inappropriate to continue at this point. So, we would just lodge our objection to those conditions.
¶ 8 However, defense counsel then clarified:
¶ 9 The district court overruled the objection, explaining,
¶ 10 Defendant contends that the MPOs are invalid generally because the cases did not involve any victims or witnesses who needed protection. We deem this particular contention to have been waived in the district court. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel specifically stated that he was not objecting to the "standard protection order[s]," but instead was only objecting to the specific conditions regarding marijuana and driving. This affirmative acquiescence waived any claim that the MPOs are invalid as a general matter. See People v. Rediger, 2015 COA 26, ¶¶ 49–64, ––– P.3d –––– ( )(cert. granted Feb. 15, 2016).
¶ 11 Defendant also contends that the district court lacked the statutory authority to impose the conditions in the MPOs prohibiting defendant from possessing or using drugs, or driving without a valid driver's license (the drug and driving conditions).
¶ 12 Because this preserved contention presents a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Hunsaker v. People, 2015 CO 46, ¶ 11, 351 P.3d 388. If statutory language is clear, we apply its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. Only where statutory language is ambiguous do we resort to other aids of statutory interpretation. See id.
¶ 13 Section 18–1–1001(1) provides for a mandatory protection order against any person charged with a Title 18 offense:
There is hereby created a mandatory protection order against any person charged with a violation of any of the provisions of this title, which order shall remain in effect from the time that the person is advised of his or her rights at arraignment or the person's first appearance before the court and informed of such order until final disposition of the action. Such order shall restrain the person charged from harassing, molesting, intimidating, retaliating against, or tampering with any witness to or victim of the acts charged.
¶ 14 Section 18–1–1001(3) provides for modification of a protection order. The initial part of subsection (3) provides broad authority for the trial court to dismiss or modify a protection order required under subsection (1):
Nothing in this section shall preclude the defendant from applying to the court at any time for modification or dismissal of the protection order issued pursuant to this section or the district attorney from applying to the court at any time for further orders, additional provisions under the protection order, or modification or dismissal of the same. The trial court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce, modify, or dismiss the protection order until final disposition of the action.
¶ 15 Defendant's contention is based on the latter part of subsection (3), which provides:
¶ 16 According to defendant, because this statutory provision authorizes a district court to impose the additional enumerated conditions in domestic violence cases and in certain Victims' Rights Act cases, the statute prohibits the district court from imposing any such conditions in his cases (which did not involve domestic violence and did not fall under the Victims' Rights Act).
¶ 17 Ordinarily, specific language in a statute acts to restrict more general language. See People v. Campbell, 885 P.2d 327, 329 (Colo.App.1994) (). On the other hand, we must also look at the statute as a whole in order to interpret the meaning and purpose of its language. See Curtis v. Hyland Hills Park & Recreation Dist., 179 P.3d 81, 83 (Colo.App.2007). "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Id. (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) ).
¶ 18 Looking at the statute as a whole, subsection (3) is referenced in section 18–1–1001(5), which refers to "additional provisions added pursuant to subsection (3) of this section," and provides for special procedures that would apply to MPOs issued in domestic violence cases. This later reference to subsection (3) creates ambiguity as to the purpose of the statutory language defendant relies upon—whether it was intended as restrictive language as defendant contends, or whether it was intended to set out the additional provisions that are subject to the enhanced procedural protections contained in subsection (5). Because the intended purpose of the language in subsection (3) is unclear, we may apply other rules of statutory construction and look to pertinent legislative history to determine its intended scope. See People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374, 376 (Colo.1990).
¶ 19 Looking at the legislative history, we disagree with defendant's interpretation that the language in the latter part of subsection (3) restricts the language which precedes it. First, we note that the latter part of section 18–1–1001(3), upon which defendant relies, was added by amendment...
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