People v. York

• Decision Date: 27 September 1963
• Docket Number: No. 37465,37465
• Citation: People v. York, 193 N.E.2d 773, 29 Ill.2d 68 (Ill. 1963)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff in Error, v. Connie YORK et al., Defendants in Error.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 773

193 N.E.2d 773

29 Ill.2d 68

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff in Error, v. Connie YORK et al., Defendants in Error.

No. 37465.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 27, 1963.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 25, 1963.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Edward J. Hladis and Marvin E. Aspen, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Frank G. Whalen, Chicago, for defendants in error.

SCHAEFER, Justice.

The defendants, Rocco Secino, Connie York, Rocco Muscato and Joseph Corngold, were indicted in the criminal court of Cook County on charges of gambling and keeping a gambling house. Before their case came on for trial, they moved to quash a search warrant, and to suppress certain evidence seized under the warrant. The motion to quash the warrant was sustained on the ground that 'the facts stated in the complaint do not show sufficient probable cause for issuance of this search warrant.' The People have prosecuted this interlocutory writ of error from the order quashing the warrant. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 38, par. 747.) Since a construction of the constitution is involved, this court has jurisdiction. People v. Jackson, 22 Ill.2d 382, 385, 176 N.E.2d 803; People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433; People v. Mayo, 19 Ill.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440.

The search warrant was issued upon the sworn complaint of John Farrell, who stated that he 'has reasonable grounds to believe and does believe that gaming implements and apparatus are concealed, kept and provided to be used in unlawful gaming in the first floor of premises located' at a certain address in Cicero, Illinois. Farrell swore that he had 'talked with an informant who had previously given reliable information concerning gambling,' who told Farrell that he 'had been in the above described premises on four previous occasions during the preceding two weeks and that he had seen bookmaking on horse races and poker being played on each occasion.' Farrell also swore: 'I * * * went to the above described premises at about 2:30 P.M. I gained admittance by following two men into the premises after the door was opened from the inside by a man standing at the door. After I got inside the door I saw about twenty men standing around a room. Some of them were holding scratch sheets and racing forms. I overheard a conversation in which somebody said something about the first race. I was inside a little over a minute when the man who had let us in order me to leave.'

Following decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, (Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327,) we have held that probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant may be established by hearsay, if there is a substantial basis for relying upon it. (People v. Jackson, 22 Ill.2d 382, 387, 176 N.E.2d 803; People v. Williams, 27 Ill.2d 542, 190 N.E.2d 303.) In this case, the statement of the informant that he had seen gambling in the premises in question on four recent occasions was confirmed by what Farrell himself saw and heard when he visited the premises. The constitutional mandate that 'no warrant shall issue without probable cause' neither requires a showing of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, (People v. Fiorito, 19 Ill.2d 246, 257, 166 N.E.2d 606) nor commands a naive evaluation of the facts by the judicial officer who issues the warrant.

Upon oral argument the defendants suggested that the record does not show that the warrant was issued upon the complaint of a police officer, and argued that the statements of the informant should therefore be disregarded. The record shows, however, that this contention was not advanced in the trial court. On the contrary, it appears that, in the trial court as well as in their brief in this court, the defendants referred to Farrell as a police officer. The contention that a warrant based in part upon hearsay may issue only upon the sworn complaint of a police officer is therefore not now available to the defendants, and we express no opinion concerning it. We hold that probable cause for the issuance of the warrant was properly shown.

Defendants' motion to quash asserted other defects in the proceedings. The People have urged that since the ground upon which the trial court quashed the search warrant in question was the lack of probable cause for its issuance, these other alleged defects should not be considered. But the question before a reviewing court is the correctness of the result reached by the trial court, and not the correctness of the reasoning upon which that result was reached. (People ex rel. Kunstman v. Nagano, 389 Ill. 231, 238, 59 N.E.2d 96; Troup v. Hunter, 300 Ill. 110, 112, 133 N.E. 56; City of Chicago v. Farwell, 260 Ill. 565, 569, 103 N.E 606.) The other grounds upon which the defendants seek to support the order are therefore properly before us.

Defendants contend that the search arrant was void because no return of the warrant was made when the defendants were brought before a justice of the peace to be charged, and because the articles seized were never brought before any court. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 38, pars. 693, 696, 697.) Since it has been determined that failure to comply with statutory requirements concerning the steps to be taken after the warrant has been served does not render the search warrant void, the contention cannot be sustained. People v. Guston, 338 Ill. 52, 169 N.E. 822.

The statute under which the warrant was issued provides that 'Any such judge or justice of the peace may, * * * issue search warrants, * * *. To search for and seize gaming apparatus, or implements used, or kept and provided to be used in unlawful gaming, in any gaming house, or in any building, apartment, or place resorted to for the purpose of unlawful gaming.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961, chap. 38, par. 692.) The...