People v. Yost
| Decision Date | 23 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 119889, Calendar No. 1. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donna Alice YOST, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Joseph K. Sheeran, Prosecuting Attorney, and Martha G. Mettee, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Bay City, MI, for the people.
Bay Justice Associates, P.C., (by Edward M. Czuprynski), Bay City, MI, for the defendant-appellant.
Juan A. Mateo and Gerald K. Evelyn, Detroit, MI, for Dennis Richardson.
David Morse, Michael E. Duggan, and Janice M. Joyce Bartee, Detroit, MI, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.
We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine whether the examining magistrate abused his discretion when he refused to bind defendant over for trial in the circuit court. Finding such an abuse occurred, we affirm the circuit court judgment that reinstated the charges.
Donna Yost was charged with open murder, M.C.L. § 750.316(1)(a), and felony murder, M.C.L. § 750.316(1)(b),1 of her seven-year-old daughter Monique, who died of an overdose of a prescription medication called Imipramine on Sunday, October 10, 1999.
The preliminary examination lasted seven days. The prosecution called several lay witnesses and two expert witnesses, Dr. Kanu Virani, a forensic pathologist who performed an autopsy, and Dr. Michael Evans, a toxicologist who analyzed a blood sample obtained during the autopsy. The defense also called several lay witnesses and three experts, Dr. David Fleisher, an expert in pharmocology; Dr. Laurence Simson, a forensic pathologist; and Dr. Alan Berman, a clinical psychologist. The district judge, in his role as examining magistrate, refused to bind defendant over for trial for lack of credible evidence of a homicide.
The prosecution appealed to the circuit court. That court reviewed the lengthy transcripts and determined that the record established a sufficient basis for finding that a homicide was committed and probable cause to believe that defendant committed it, and that the magistrate therefore had abused his discretion in refusing to bind defendant over.
Defendant appealed the circuit court's decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal "for failure to persuade the Court of the need for immediate appellate review."2 The Court of Appeals subsequently denied defendant's motion for rehearing.3
Preliminary examinations are not constitutionally required. Hall, supra at 603, 460 N.W.2d 520. Rather, the preliminary examination is solely a creation of the Legislature, i.e., it is a statutory right.5
As the statute indicates, the preliminary examination has a dual function, i.e., to determine whether a felony was committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed it. At the examination, evidence from which at least an inference may be drawn establishing the elements of the crime charged must be presented. People v. Doss, 406 Mich. 90, 101, 276 N.W.2d 9 (1979). The probable-cause standard of proof is, of course, less rigorous than the guilt-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. Id. at 103, 276 N.W.2d 9. Probable cause requires a quantum of evidence "sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief" of the accused's guilt. People v. Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich. 334, 344, 562 N.W.2d 652 (1997). Yet, to find probable cause, a magistrate need not be without doubts regarding guilt. The reason is that the gap between probable cause and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is broad, id., at 344, 562 N.W.2d 652, and finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is the province of the jury. People v. Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 469-470, 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998).
Our case law has sometimes indicated that a reviewing court may not reverse a magistrate's bindover decision absent a "clear abuse of discretion," e.g., People v. Dellabonda, 265 Mich. 486, 491, 251 N.W. 594 (1933); Doss, supra at 101, 276 N.W.2d 9. At other times our case law has omitted the word "clear" and has simply required a reviewing court find an "abuse of discretion," e.g., Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich. 115, 121, 215 N.W.2d 145 (1974); Justice, supra at 344, 562 N.W.2d 652.
In defining what an "abuse of discretion" is, this Court has frequently invoked the test adopted in Spalding v. Spalding, 355 Mich. 382, 94 N.W.2d 810 (1959). As Spalding stated the test, an abuse of discretion occurs when the lower court's decision is "so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias." Id. at 384-385, 94 N.W.2d 810.6
Our prior case law recognizes the propriety of an examining magistrate's considering the credibility of witnesses. In People v. Paille, 383 Mich. 621, 627, 178 N.W.2d 465 (1970), the examining magistrate, when faced with several collusive witnesses, was struck with their inability to coordinate their testimony. He concluded that their testimony was incredible and "could not possibly convince a disinterested arbiter of facts of their good faith or their truthfulness." Id. at 624, 178 N.W.2d 465. They were, as he described it, engaged in "calculated prevarication to the point of perjury...." Id. This Court, in reviewing the matter, indicated that a magistrate in determining whether a crime has been committed has not only the right, but the duty, to pass judgment on the credibility of the witnesses.7 Id. at 627, 178 N.W.2d 465.
While this holding clearly allows a magistrate authority to consider the credibility of witnesses, we have also instructed examining magistrates to not refuse to bind a defendant over for trial when the evidence conflicts or raises reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Yaner v. People, 34 Mich. 286, 289 (1876), Doss, supra at 103, 276 N.W.2d 9, and Goecke, supra at 469-470, 579 N.W.2d 868.8
With regard to expert testimony, after the expert has been properly qualified by the court,9 credibility determinations are generally handled in the same manner as for lay witnesses.
Analysis of a blood sample by a laboratory revealed Monique died from an overdose of Imipramine.10 Dr. Virani testified that he did not find any pill residue or granular material in Monique's stomach during the autopsy. He used this fact as the basis for his opinion that Monique had not taken the pills intact, i.e., the pills probably had been liquified and then ingested. Dr. Virani also opined that children at the age of seven do not commit suicide. Putting these propositions together, Dr. Virani concluded that a crime, homicide, had taken place.
Defendant called several expert witnesses. Dr. Fleisher, a pharmacology expert, calculated that Monique had taken eighty-nine Imipramine pills and, because he was familiar with the dissolution characteristics of Imipramine, concluded there was no reason to expect to find pill residue in Monique's stomach even if she had taken the pills whole. A forensic pathologist, Dr. Simson, testified that, having considered Dr. Fleisher's dissolution testimony, he was not surprised that no pill residue was found and he could not conclude that a homicide had occurred. Finally, Dr. Berman, an expert in suicidology, testified that while rare, children as young as seven have been known to commit suicide.
The magistrate in stating his ruling indicated that Dr. Virani's two major premises were rejected as "not credible." First, he disregarded Dr. Virani's opinion that there would have been pill residue in Monique's stomach if the pills had been taken intact because Dr. Virani was not qualified in pharmacology or pharmaceutics and because this conclusion was "completely refuted" by qualified defense expert testimony. Second, he disregarded Dr. Virani's conclusion that children as young as seven do not commit suicide because Dr. Virani had limited training in psychiatry or psychology and because this conclusion was refuted by Dr. Berman. The gist of this was that the magistrate thought Dr. Virani was simply not qualified as an expert in these two areas. Having rejected these two points of Dr. Virani's testimony, the magistrate concluded that one would have to speculate to conclude that a homicide had occurred. Moreover, if a homicide did occur, there was little to link the defendant to it. Thus, the magistrate refused to bind defendant over.
The circuit court found that...
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