People v. Young

• Court: Colorado Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: LOHR
• Citation: People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1991)
• Decision Date: 09 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90SA201,90SA201
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph L. YOUNG, Roger L. Young a/k/a Roy Young, and Kevin Fears, Defendants-Appellees.

Page 834

814 P.2d 834

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Joseph L. YOUNG, Roger L. Young a/k/a Roy Young, and Kevin Fears, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 90SA201.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

July 9, 1991.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

July 29, 1991.

Norman S. Early, Jr., Dist. Atty., Nathan B. Coats, Chief Appellate Deputy Dist. Atty., Martin Egelhoff, Deputy Dist. Atty., Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.

Montano and Encinas, P.C., Duane Montano, Denver, Arthur S. Nieto, Denver, for defendant-appellee Joseph L. Young.

Holland, Seelen & Pagliuca, Jeffrey S. Pagliuca, Denver, Pozner, Hutt, Gilman & Kaplan, P.C., David S. Kaplan, Denver, for defendant-appellee Roger L. Young.

David F. Vela, Colo. State Public Defender, Terri L. Brake, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Michael J. Heher, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellee Kevin Fears.

Justice LOHR announced the Judgment of the Court and delivered an Opinion in which Justice KIRSHBAUM and Justice MULLARKEY joined.

This case presents a question concerning the facial constitutionality of the Colorado death penalty sentencing statute, § 16-11-103, 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1990 Supp.), under article II, sections 20 and 25, of the Colorado Constitution. The Denver District Court held the statute invalid. We agree.

I.

The defendants, Joseph L. Young, Roger L. Young, and Kevin Fears, are charged with first-degree murder ¹ and other crimes in connection with the June 1989 deaths of two men, and the prosecution has stated that it intends to seek the death penalty. In May 1990 the district court, on the defendants' motions, ruled that the statute creating the procedure for deciding whether the death penalty should be imposed as a sanction for first-degree murder facially violates the Colorado Constitution. ² The People appealed, relying on subsection 16-12-102(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986), as authority to obtain appellate review of the district court's interlocutory ruling.

II.

At the outset we must determine whether we have jurisdiction over this case. We conclude that section 16-12-102(1) does not authorize this appeal but that we can and should exercise our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 to review the district court's ruling invalidating Colorado's death penalty sentencing statute.

A.

We turn first to the language of section 16-12-102, which provides authorization for appeals by the prosecution in certain circumstances. Well established principles will guide us in construing that legislation. In interpreting a statute, our primary task is to give effect to the legislature's intent, which is to be discerned when possible from the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. E.g., People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 180 (Colo.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1018, 111 S.Ct. 662, 112 L.Ed.2d 656 (1991); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986). Statutory provisions are not to be subjected to a strained or forced interpretation. E.g., Anderson v. Kautzky, 786 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Colo.1990); Kern v. Gebhardt, 746 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo.1987). Moreover, a statute must be construed as a whole so as to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. E.g., People v. District Court, 713 P.2d at 921; Massey v. District Court, 180 Colo. 359, 364, 506 P.2d 128, 130 (1973).

Subsection 16-12-102(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986), provides in relevant part:

The prosecution may appeal any decision of the trial court in a criminal case upon any question of law. If any act of the general assembly is adjudged inoperative or unconstitutional in any criminal case, it is the duty of the district attorney of the judicial district in which the court making such decision is situated to appeal on behalf of the people of the state of Colorado, unless the same issue of constitutionality is already pending before a reviewing court in another case. Nothing in this section shall authorize placing the defendant in jeopardy a second time for the same offense.... The procedure to be followed in filing and prosecuting appeals under this section shall be as provided by applicable rule of the supreme court of Colorado.

Although subsection 16-12-102(1) provides that "it is the duty of the district attorney" to appeal a trial court decision adjudging a Colorado statute unconstitutional in any criminal case, that subsection does not specify whether prosecutors are authorized to take interlocutory appeals of such decisions. In contrast, subsection 16-12-102(2), 8A C.R.S. (1990 Supp.), specifically provides for interlocutory appeal by the prosecution

from a ruling of the trial court granting a motion made in advance of trial by the defendant for the return of property and to suppress evidence or granting a motion to suppress an extrajudicial confession or admission if the prosecution certifies to the judge who granted such motion and to the supreme court that the appeal is not taken for the purposes of delay and the evidence is a substantial part of the proof of the charge pending against the defendant. The prosecution may also file an interlocutory appeal in the supreme court from a ruling of the trial court granting a motion in limine pertaining to the matters described in this subsection (2).[ ³

In construing section 16-12-102 as a whole, we presume that the legislature's specific authorization of prosecutorial interlocutory appeals in subsection 16-12-102(2) combined with its failure to provide such authorization for other interlocutory appeals under subsection 16-12-102(1) indicates its intention to confine interlocutory appeals to those specified under subsection 16-12-102(2). See, e.g., Buder v. Sartore, 774 P.2d 1383, 1387-88 (Colo.1989) (where statute specifies particular situations in which it is to apply, the statute is ordinarily to be construed as excluding from its operation all other situations not specified); Meyer v. Charnes, 705 P.2d 979, 982 (Colo.App.1985) (same). The concern expressed in subsection 16-12-102(2) by the requirement that the prosecution certify "that the appeal is not taken for the purposes of delay and the evidence [suppressed] is a substantial part of the proof of the charge pending against the defendant" also indicates legislative intent to limit interlocutory appeals.

In addition to setting out specific instances in which interlocutory appeal is authorized, section 16-12-102 allows for appeal "as provided by applicable rule of the supreme court of Colorado." We have adopted C.A.R. 4.1 to govern interlocutory appeals from suppression orders and other orders covered by subsection 16-12-102(2). Other appeals are governed by C.A.R. 1, which provides in pertinent part that "[a]n appeal to the appellate court may be taken from: (1) A final judgment of any district, superior, probate, or juvenile court in all actions or special proceedings whether governed by these rules or by the statutes." C.A.R. 1(a)(1) (emphasis added). We have considered dismissal of a charge from a multi-count information to be a "final judgment" for purposes of appellate review under C.A.R. 1(a)(1). People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223, 1224 (Colo.1988). We deemed it important that dismissal of a charge "disposes of the opportunity to try that defendant on that particular charge at the same time other charges are pending before the trial court." Id. at 1225.

In People v. Romero, 801 P.2d 1192 (Colo.1990), we declined to extend our holding in Jefferson. In Romero, the defendant sought relief under Crim.P. 35(c) to vacate a judgment of conviction. Id. at 1193. The prosecution sought dismissal, asserting that the Crim.P. 35(c) motion was barred by subsection 16-5-402(3), 8A C.R.S. (1986), which limits collateral attacks on convictions. Id. The trial court ruled that subsection 16-5-402(3) was unconstitutional and ordered a hearing on the merits. Id. The prosecution appealed this interlocutory order. Id. We dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that subsection 16-12-102(1) did not confer jurisdiction on this court to consider the prosecution's interlocutory appeal. Id. at 1195. We noted that unlike the dismissal in Jefferson, the trial court's ruling that the statutory limit on collateral attacks was unconstitutional would lead to a hearing on the merits. Romero, 801 P.2d at 1194. We stated that denying appellate review in Romero was

consistent with the law and policy concerning interlocutory appeals by the prosecution in criminal cases. Because the prosecution in criminal cases generally is denied later appellate review, the prosecution is afforded more opportunity than is the defendant to appeal adverse interlocutory rulings.... This relatively greater ability of the prosecution to bring interlocutory appeals, however, is severely limited out of concern that the prosecution may "wear down" the defendant by taking an interlocutory appeal and because of the defendant's interest in the swift resolution of the case.

Id. at 1194-95 (citations omitted).

We are persuaded by the concerns raised in Romero that we should not extend our holding in Jefferson. We cannot consider a pre-trial ruling that the death penalty statute violates the Colorado Constitution a "final judgment" for the purposes of appeal under subsection 16-12-102(1). Our review of subsections (1) and (2) of section 16-12-102, taken as a whole and giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all the statutory language, also persuades us that an interlocutory appeal is not authorized under these circumstances. Accordingly, the prosecution's reliance on section 16-12-102(1) as the source of our jurisdiction to review the district court's interlocutory ruling is misplaced.

B.

Our jurisdictional inquiry does not end, however, with our conclusion that subsection 16-12-102(1) does not authorize this interlocutory appeal. An original proceeding under C.A.R. 21 can be utilized "to test whether the trial court is proceeding without or...