People v. Young
Citation | 538 N.E.2d 453,128 Ill.2d 1 |
Decision Date | 22 February 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 60190,60190 |
Parties | , 131 Ill.Dec. 78 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. William YOUNG, Appellant. |
Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
The defendant, William Young, an inmate at the Stateville Correctional Center, was indicted in the circuit court of Will County for the murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1) of Brian Jackson, who also was an inmate. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty and, upon the State's motion, a death penalty hearing was held. The jury found that there existed one or more of the aggravating factors in section 9-1(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)) and that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. The defendant was accordingly sentenced to death, but the sentence was stayed pending a direct appeal to this court under section 4(b) of article VI of the Constitution of Illinois (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(b)) and Supreme Court Rule 603 (107 Ill.2d R. 603).
On March 31, 1983, the body of Brian Jackson was discovered in the shower area of the gymnasium at the Stateville Correctional Center. An autopsy showed the cause of death to have been the combined effect of strangulation and 122 stab wounds. The indictment charged the defendant, Robert Amos, Karl Bell, Bruce Dawkins, Robert Tucker and Paul Williams with the murder of Jackson. The defendant and codefendant Amos were jointly tried and found guilty.
The defendant, who is black, argues that his conviction should be reversed and a new trial ordered on the ground that, inter alia, his right to trial by an impartial jury was violated when the prosecution improperly exercised peremptory challenges to exclude all four of the black jurors examined on voir dire. The record shows that 58 prospective jurors were examined and that the State exercised 15 peremptory challenges to exclude jurors, four of whom were black. There were four blacks on the venire. The defendant objected at the time to the exercise of peremptory challenges to the black members of the venire, but the trial court, on the basis of Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759, overruled the objections. In Swain, the Court held that a constitutional question of equal protection in the exercise of peremptory challenges was not presented unless there was a showing of systematic and purposeful exclusion of blacks because of race "in case after case." 380 U.S. at 223, 85 S.Ct. at 837, 13 L.Ed.2d at 774.
The equal protection clause prohibits the exclusion by peremptory challenge of prospective jurors by the prosecution "solely on account of their race." (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 83; Strauder v. West Virginia (1880), 100 U.S. 303, 305, 25 L.Ed. 664, 664.)
A defendant contending that the prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges was racially motivated has the burden of showing purposeful discrimination. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1721, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 85; Whitus v. Georgia (1967), 385 U.S. 545, 550, 87 S.Ct. 643, 646, 17 L.Ed.2d 599, 603-04.) At the time of the defendant's trial, the Supreme Court's holding in Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759, governed this evidentiary burden. (See People v. Lyles (1985), 106 Ill.2d 373, 392-95, 87 Ill.Dec. 934, 478 N.E.2d 291; People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 273-74, 73 Ill.Dec. 360, 454 N.E.2d 220.) Considering the nature of the peremptory challenge, Swain considered there was a presumption that the prosecution properly exercised such challenges. To overcome this presumption, a defendant was required to show a systematic and purposeful pattern of excluding venire members from the jury-selection process on the ground of race in "case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be." Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 223, 85 S.Ct. 824, 837, 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 774.
Following the trial of the defendant here and during the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, which, replacing the test for discriminatory exclusion of Swain, held that a defendant would be able to establish a "prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial." (476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87.) To establish a prima facie case:
"[T]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group [citation] and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' [Citation.] Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination.
* * * * * *
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. * * * The prosecutor * * * must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. The trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination." Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723-24, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 87-89. In Batson, a black defendant was tried and convicted by an all-white jury following the prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges of the only four blacks on the venire. In reversing the conviction, the Court stated that "[b]ecause the trial court flatly rejected the objection without requiring the prosecutor to give an explanation for his action, we remand this case for further proceedings" to determine if the "facts establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination." 476 U.S. at 100, 106 S.Ct. at 1725, 90 L.Ed.2d at 90.
The Supreme Court has announced that the standard in Batson is to be applied retroactively to all cases which pended on direct review and were not yet final. (Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649.) Thus, this case, which is before this court on direct appeal, is to be considered under Batson. On May 1, 1987, this court, pursuant to its supervisory authority (see 107 Ill.2d R. 383), remanded for a hearing, in light of Batson, to determine whether racial motivation in the exercise of peremptory challenges was shown. 107 Ill.Dec. 259, 506 N.E.2d 1314.
On remand, the trial court concluded that the defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the State based simply on the exclusion of all four of the black veniremen through peremptory challenges. The trial court stated:
The court then called upon the State to state its reasons for excusing the black veniremen: Cory McLaughlin, Deborah Glover, Annie Lee and John Mitchell.
The assistant State's Attorney who represented the State at trial stated that he challenged Cory McLaughlin because McLaughlin stated that he knew the defense attorney, Raymond Boldin, and that on his juror questionnaire McLaughlin answered "yes" to the question of whether he had a "physical or mental impairment that would hamper or interfere with * * * jury duty." He stated that he excused Deborah Glover because she was divorced and lived alone and that her ex-husband had been convicted of armed robbery and had also been arrested for murder, attempted murder and armed violence. The assistant State's Attorney said that he excused Annie Lee because:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
US EX REL. HARRIS v. Shaw
..."it does not follow that this in itself shows that the prosecutor's explanations were pretextual." People v. Young, 128 Ill.2d 1, 23, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453 (1989); Harris I, 129 Ill.2d at 179, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357; see People v. Wiley, 165 Ill.2d 259 at 282, 209 Ill.De......
-
Miranda v. Leibach
...injustices are corrected and that the integrity and reputation of the judicial process is preserved. People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d [1] at 46, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453. 157 Ill.Dec. 56, 571 N.E.2d at 1083. The court acknowledged that "the authorities are not in harmony on this is......
-
People v. Fair
...courtroom demeanor. (People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 401, 433, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161; People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 20, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453; see also Harris, 129 Ill.2d at 176, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357.) In light of the fact that the trial judge is......
-
People v. Hampton
...only where the record clearly shows that an alleged error affecting substantial rights was committed. (People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 46, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 86, 538 N.E.2d 453, 461.) We find it difficult to hold that we must consider an otherwise waived allegation that Miranda rights w......
-
Jury Selection
...the trial court to deny a Batson motion without first asking the state to explain why it challenged a particular juror. People v. Young , 128 Ill 2d 1, 538 NE2d 453 (1989). There is no set procedure a court must follow in a Batson hearing to inquire into a prosecutor’s exercise of peremptor......