People v. Young

• Decision Date: 30 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. 1-90-2357,1-90-2357
• Parties: , 188 Ill.Dec. 456 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angela YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1026

618 N.E.2d 1026

248 Ill.App.3d 491, 188 Ill.Dec. 456

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angela YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-90-2357.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Third Division.

June 30, 1993.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 7, 1993.

Jack O'Malley, State's Atty. of Cook County, Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William D. Carroll, Andrew R. Dalkin, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Rita A. Fry, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (Lisa S. Ottenfeld, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Justice GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, defendant Angela Young was convicted of first degree murder for the stabbing death of Vanessa Odum and sentenced to 35 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to quash defendant's arrest and suppress evidence when it refused to hear evidence regarding the reliability of the two occurrence witnesses who provided the police with information which led to the arrest of defendant; (2) prejudicing the jury against defendant by its alleged maltreatment of defense counsel in the presence of the jury; (3) limiting defense counsel's questioning of witnesses; (4) refusing to give jury instructions on second degree murder premised on serious provocation and on involuntary manslaughter; (5) allowing the prosecutor to make improper remarks during closing argument; (6) imposing an excessive 35-year sentence; and (7) not declaring the murder statute unconstitutional because it relieves the State from proving every element of murder.

For all the reasons which follow we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence and also find that the murder statute is constitutional.

Vanessa Odum, the victim, died of stab wounds. There is no dispute that defendant and the victim had engaged in a fist fight on the night the victim died.

The State's position throughout the course of this case has been that defendant fatally stabbed the victim during the fist fight. On the other hand, defendant claims that someone else (specifically Darryl Smith or D'Angelo Allen) stabbed the victim after defendant left the scene of the fight. During trial, defense counsel wanted to show that Smith and Allen were drug dealers but was precluded from doing so.

The following individuals were present at the fight: defendant, the victim, Mae (defendant's sister), Darryl Smith, D'Angelo Allen, and Leonard Davis.

In her confession, defendant, who was known by her middle name Tawana, admitted that she had a fist fight with the victim and that she had a knife in her hand during the fight. Defendant's confession includes the following statement recorded by the police:

"Tawanna raised her right hand and came down on the girl [the victim], but she was only trying to scare the girl and did not mean to stab her, and Tawanna did not know if she had stabbed the girl. * * * The girl walked across the street * * * and was screaming * * *."

After driving around the block, Tawana saw the victim still laying in the same place.

Prior to trial, defendant moved to quash her warrantless arrest and suppress her confession. At the hearing on this motion, the trial court heard the testimony of Detective Michael Rowan and the parties stipulated to the contents of the testimony of Detective Jones if he were called to testify.

Detective Rowan testified that he was assigned to investigate the stabbing death of Ms. Odum. In reviewing the original case report on the incident, Rowan discovered that there had been two eyewitnesses to the crime, i.e., Smith and Allen. Rowan brought Smith and Allen to the police station for questioning. Rowan and two other detectives (John Duffy and Jones) interviewed Smith who indicated he had been a witness to the stabbing and had more information than he had given to the original beat officers. Smith identified the stabber, stated that she was known by the name of Tawana, and gave the police a description of defendant and her family's residence but not the exact address. Smith said he saw defendant stab the victim while they were engaging in a fight. Allen recounted the same events in more detail, identifying defendant as the stabber but not aware of defendant's place of residence.

Smith then accompanied the police and directed them to the home of defendant. Smith remained in a police car with Detective Jones while Rowan spoke to defendant's grandmother outside the building. The grandmother said that defendant no longer lived with her. Rowan then saw Jones and Smith pointing at a second floor window where defendant and another woman could be seen sticking their heads out the window. The grandmother ran into the building to the second floor apartment and three police officers followed. Rowan found defendant hiding under a bed and arrested her.

During cross-examination, Rowan testified that the victim's mother, Betsy Odum, had told Rowan that she believed Smith and Allen were involved in the death of the victim. After Rowan transported Smith and Allen to the police station, he read them their Miranda warnings.

Also during cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to elicit testimony that two black males had gone to the victim's house during the day of the stabbing and told the victim's mother that the victim was going to be physically harmed. The State objected to such evidence as irrelevant and speculative since the two individuals who allegedly visited the victim's home earlier on the day of the stabbing were never identified. Defense counsel argued that the proffered information impacted on the credibility of Smith and Allen and the reliability of their statements. Defense counsel conceded that he could not show that Smith and Allen were the two men who had gone to the victim's house before the stabbing but nevertheless stated that Smith and Allen were drug dealers and the two unidentified men who had earlier issued threats to the victim were drug dealers.

The trial court sustained the State's objection and reasoned that reliability was an issue for trial but was irrelevant in the present hearing. The trial court, in denying defendant's motion, further explained that if Allen and Smith had been brought before a judge to secure a warrant and had attested that they witnessed the event, the judge would not inquire into their reliability.

At trial, the testimony of three eyewitnesses (Smith, Allen and Davis) revealed essentially the same events leading to the victim's death. On the evening of May 11, 1989, Davis was driving defendant and her sister Mae to their mother's house when they saw Smith at a public telephone booth and Allen in the driver's seat of a parked car. Defendant asked Davis to stop his car so that she could talk to Smith. While Davis and Mae remained in the car, defendant walked over and talked to Smith and then proceeded to Allen's car to talk to Allen at the driver's side of his car.

Defendant began to argue with the victim who was seated on the passenger side of Allen's car. As the argument continued, defendant walked around to the passenger side of the car.

When she reached the passenger side of the car, defendant began to swing her arms at the victim's face, struck the victim several times, opened the car door, grabbed the victim by her hair, and pulled the victim out of the car. A physical struggle ensued between defendant and the victim and attempts to separate the two women failed. Eventually, Smith and Mae pulled defendant off of the victim and got her into Davis' car. Davis then left with defendant and Mae in his car.

Defendant did not testify at trial. In her confession, defendant stated that she was arguing with the victim and when she got to the passenger side of Allen's car, the victim raised the car window on defendant's hands. After Allen told the victim to get out of the car, the victim opened the car door and defendant hit her. Defendant and the victim struggled inside the car for awhile and then the fight continued outside the car. While she had the knife open in her hand, defendant raised her hand "and came down on the" victim. Defendant did not know that she had stabbed the victim. After being pulled away by Smith, defendant got into Davis' car. Defendant heard the victim screaming and saw her walk across the street to a parking lot and fall. Davis then drove around the block and defendant saw the victim laying in the same place.

The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and the trial court sentenced her to 35 years in prison.

On appeal, defendant first asserts that in the pretrial hearing on her motion to quash arrest and suppress her confession, the trial court erred in limiting the evidence regarding the reliability of the two witnesses, Smith and Allen, because they had a motive to lie and were suspects in the killing. Absent additional evidence, defendant argues, there was no probable cause to arrest her and her confession should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest.

The State contends that in light of the totality of the circumstances, the warrantless arrest of defendant was proper and the evidence tending to show the reliability of the witnesses' statements was irrelevant.

A reviewing court ordinarily will not disturb the decision of a trial court on a motion to quash and suppress unless its finding is determined to be clearly erroneous. People v. Foskey (1990), 136 Ill.2d 66, 76, 143 Ill.Dec. 257, 554 N.E.2d 192.

We exam the totality of the circumstances in determining whether probable cause exists to support a warrantless arrest. People v. Earnest (1991), 224 Ill.App.3d 90, 95, 166 Ill.Dec. 491, 586 N.E.2d 449, citing Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527.

In Gates, the United States Supreme Court adopted the totality of circumstances approach and abandoned the two-prong test which required a strict analysis of (1) the basis of the informant's knowledge, and (2...