People v. Youngs

Decision Date12 December 1899
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesPEOPLE v. YOUNGS.

Error to circuit court, Hillsdale county; Guy M. Chester, Judge.

Clarence Youngs was convicted of an attempt to enter and break a dwelling, and brings error. Reversed.

Grant C.J., dissenting.

William C. Chadwick, for appellant.

Horace M. Oren, Atty. Gen., and Wm. H. Frankhauser, Pros. Atty., for the People.

MONTGOMERY J.

Two questions present themselves: (1) Does the statute in question change the common-law rule as to what constitutes an attempt to commit an offense? (2) If not, whether the facts stated show an attempt, as defined at the common law. In my opinion, both these questions should be answered in the negative. The statute, in terms, relates to attempts to commit a crime and, to make the intent still more certain, provides that, before the offense shall be complete, the accused shall do some act towards the commission of such offense. This does not eliminat any of the elements of the common-law offense of attempt to commit crime. On the contrary, it enumerates them. To constitute an attempt, at the common law, something more than an intention or purpose to commit crime is necessary. As was said by Field, C.J., in People v. Murray, 14 Cal. 159: 'Between preparation for the attempt and the attempt itself there is a wide difference. The preparation consists in devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of the offense. The attempt is the direct movement towards the commission after the preparations are made.' In Reg. v. Taylor, 1 Fost. & F. 512, the chief baron said: 'The act, to constitute a criminal attempt, must be one immediately and directly tending to the execution of the principal crime, and committed by the prisoner under such circumstances that he has the power of carrying his intention into execution. If two persons were to agree to commit a felony, and one of them were, in execution of his share in the transaction, to purchase an instrument to be used in the course of the felonious act, that would be a sufficient overt act in an indictment for conspiracy, but not in an indictment of this nature.' See, also, McDade v. People, 29 Mich. 49; Hicks v. Com. (Va.) 9 S. E. 1024; To view preceding link please click here Reg. v. McCann, 28 U. C. Q. B. 514; Stabler v. Com., 40 Am. Rep. 653; Com. v. McDonald, 5 Cush. 367; Griffin v. State, 26 Ga. 493; People v. Machen, 73 Mich. 27, 40 N.W. 925; 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 266. The sentence should be set aside, and the prisoner discharged.

HOOKER, MOORE, and LONG, JJ., concurred.

GRANT C.J. (dissenting).

The respondent was convicted under the following statute: 'Every person who shall attempt to commit a crime prohibited by law, and in such attempt shall do any act towards the commission of such offense, but shall fail in the perpetration, or shall be intercepted or prevented in the execution of the same, when no express provision is made by law for the punishment of such attempt, shall be punished as follows,' etc. Comp. Laws 1897, � 11,784. The information charges an attempt to break and enter the dwelling house of one Ralph Walker on May 27, 1899. The acts charged are that 'he, the said Clarence Youngs, came to Hillsdale, Michigan, said Hillsdale being towards the dwelling house of the said Ralph Walker from the home of the said Clarence Youngs, at which place, Hillsdale, he loaded a revolver, secured other cartridges therefor, and purchased a drug known as 'chloroform,' to be used in the commission of said offense, but that he failed in the perpetration of said offense, and was intercepted and prevented in the execution of the same by being arrested.' The facts shown by the prosecution are these: Respondent lived about nine miles southeast of Hillsdale. Had worked husking corn in the fall of 1898 for Mr. Walker, who lived about 10 miles northeast of Hillsdale. On May 22d one Munson Foughty met respondent in a saloon in Hillsdale. He proposed to Foughty to go over to Walker's and get his money. He stated to Foughty that Walker was possessed of a considerable sum of money; that he knew where Walker kept it,--in the bureau drawer; and that he would get a pair of carpet slippers and a little chloroform. He fixed the following Saturday night as the time for the commission of the crime, telling Foughty that he would be in Hillsdale on Saturday for that purpose, and requested Foughty to meet him at the saloon. Foughty met him on that day at the appointed place. Respondent had a revolver, went out and purchased some cartridges, and returned to the saloon, and the two went down in the basement of the saloon. Respondent then loaded his revolver, saying, 'That came pretty near killing one man the other night, and I am going to have that money to-night, or it will kill another man.' He asked Foughty if he had a revolver, and Foughty replied that he had. Respondent then went into a drug store and purchased some chloroform, to be used in the commission of the crime. He had the slippers upon his person, to be used in entering the house. On emerging from the drug store he was arrested, and the slippers, chloroform, revolver, and cartridges were found upon his person. He further stated to Foughty that he knew where Walker lived; that he would get in through the window and chloroform him. When arrested, he denied having any chloroform, and, when it was found, said that his mother had sent him for it. These facts were not controverted, as respondent introduced no testimony.

It is contended that these acts do not constitute an attempt to commit the crime, but only a preparation which the statute does not cover. Two things are essential to constitute an attempt, under the statute: (1) The intent to commit the crime; (2) some act or acts which are necessary towards its perpetration. Hochheimer, in his recent work on the Law of Crimes and Criminal Procedure (section 516), thus defines a common-law attempt: 'Any act in the nature of a direct movement towards the commission of an effense is an attempt to commit the offense. It is sufficient that one step be taken towards the actual commission of the crime, but mere preparation or planning is insufficient.' Wharton says: 'An attempt is such an intentional preliminary guilty act as will apparently result, in the usual course of natural events, if not hindered by causes outside of the actor's will, in a deliberate crime.' 1 Whart. Cr. Law, � 179. See, also, 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 250. The authorities generally recognize the difficulty in determining what constitutes an attempt under this and similar statutes. How remote the act, coupled with the felonious intent, must be from the consummation of the crime, depends upon the various circumstances of each case. There is no simple and infallible test. 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 265. The act need not be the last proximate one prior to the consummation. The felonious intent in this case is clearly established. The acts done were clearly in furtherance of that intent. Whether they were too remote is the sole question. In the early case of Rex v. Sutton, 2 Strange, 1074, the prisoner was held properly convicted for having in his custody and possession two iron stamps, with the intent to impress the scepters on sixpences and to pass them off for half guineas. The prisoner was held properly convicted of an attempt to commit burglary where he was intercepted while going up the steps of a house, in the nighttime, where he had no legitimate business, and had burglarious tools in his possession. Com. v. Clark, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 444. The statute in that case authorized conviction for an attempt to commit the crime. It contained no language like that in the statute before us. The court commented upon the fact that the prisoner had left the public street, to go upon private property. If he had been arrested in the highway, why would not the attempt have been as complete? In an attempt to commit arson, it was held that those who were absent, knowing with what intent the other went, and assenting to it, are principals. Uhl v. Com., 6 Grat. 706. Where one procured dies for stamping and imitating coin, but was apprehended before he obtained the metal and the chemical preparations necessary for making them, he was held properly convicted of an attempt. Reg. v. Roberts, 33 Eng. Law & Eq. 553. The chief justice in that case stated that he would not attempt to law down any rule as to what act done in furtherance of criminal intent will warrant an indictment, saying that he did not see the line precisely himself, but said, 'No one can doubt that the procuring of dies and machinery was necessarily connected with the offense, and was for the express purpose of the offense.' Procuring indecent prints, with the intent to publish them, was held an indictable offense,...

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  • State v. Tripp
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • June 27, 1921
    ... ... discussion. In addition to the cases referred to in State v ... Rains, we will cite the following: People v. Youngs, ... 122 Mich. 293, 81 N.W. 114, 47 L. R. A. 109; People v ... Petros, 25 Cal.App. 236, 143 P. 246 ...          The ... ...

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