People v. Zepeda
| Decision Date | 04 November 1969 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 52720 |
| Citation | 253 N.E.2d 598,116 Ill.App.2d 246 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jesse ZEPEDA (Impleaded), Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Gerald W. Getty, Chicago, Saul H. Brauner, Norman W. Fishman, James J. Doherty, Chicago, of counsel, for defendant-appellant.
Edward V. Hanrahan, Chicago, Elmer C. Kissane, Thomas M. Walsh, Chicago, of counsel, for plaintiff-appellee.
Jesse Zepeda, defendant, was indicted for the crime of murder. On June 20, 1967, at a bench trial and plea of not guilty, the court found the defendant guilty of murder as charged and sentenced him to be committed to the Illinois Youth Commission. This appeal raises the question of the propriety of the trial court's ruling admitting into evidence over objection a confession of the defendant.
At the time of the alleged offense the defendant was a minor, sixteen years old. He made a pre-trial motion to suppress a confession, but the trial court overruled the motion.
The defendant's main contention is that he did not receive adequate warning concerning his constitutional rights and that when he did make a statement to the police, and later to the State's Attorney's Office, he had not knowingly waived any of his rights. He argues that anything said by him to the police or the State's Attorney should have been suppressed, and that the trial court therefore committed reversible error by admitting such statements into evidence.
The facts are that a certain Gabriel Moreno was found dead, his body having been placed under a porch. It was stipulated that if Dr. Kearns of the Coroner's Office were called upon to testify he would state that he examined the body of Gabriel Moreno on March 7, 1967, and that it was his opinion that the death was caused by hemorrhage resulting from multiple stab wounds of the face and neck; that the lethal weapon appeared to have been a broken bottle.
Jesse Zepeda and his co-defendant, Larry Zavala, were arrested on March 9, 1967, and taken to Area 2 police station on Cottage Grove Avenue where they were placed in separate rooms. No juvenile officer was called until after statements had been given and the boys were being taken to the State's Attorney's Office at about 3:30 p.m. The arresting officer testified that it was standard procedure to call a juvenile officer immediately after such an arrest, but he admitted that the procedure was not followed in the instant case and that no juvenile officer was present at any of the interrogations of the boys.
Two statements given by the defendant--one to the police and one to the State's Attorney--were substantially the same, and both statements placed the blame for the actual killing on Zavala, although the defendant admitted dragging the deceased across an alley after he had been beaten and before he was stabbed. The defendant also admitted standing by and watching Zavala kill the victim with a broken bottle, although a statement taken from Zavala claimed that the defendant had killed Moreno. A severance had been granted so that Zavala's statement was not introduced at defendant's trial.
The defendant maintains that his statement to the police officers was obtained illegally and that any subsequent statement was also tainted with illegality. The defense has concluded that the defendant's statements should have been suppressed and that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting those statements into evidence.
At the pre-trial hearing on the motion to suppress, William Boreczky, the arresting officer, testified for the State concerning both defendant and Zavala. Before the hearing an agreement had been reached between the State and the parties-defendant that the motion would be joint, with the understanding that if it were denied there would be a severance in the trial of the defendants. The officer said that when he took the written statement from the defendant he warned him of his constitutional rights, and that he heard the Assistant State's Attorney give the required warning to the two boys at the time the second statement was taken. The documents containing questions and answers were signed by the defendant after he was asked to verify them. The following was included in the statement given to the police officer:
Det. Boreczky: Do you realize that you have the right to remain silent, if you choose not to remain silent anything you say or write can and will be used as evidence against you in court: you have a right to consult a lawyer before any questioning, and you have a right to have the lawyer present with you during any questioning; you not only have a right to consult with a lawyer before any questioning, but, if you lack the financial ability to retain a lawyer, a lawyer will be appointed to represent you before any questioning, and you may have the appointed lawyer present with you during any questioning. Do you fully understand what I have stated to you?
Zepeda: Yes.
Boreczky: Do you still wish to give us this statement?
Zepeda: Yes.
Boreczky: Can you read and write the English language, and how far did you progress in school?
Zepeda: Yes, I can, and I went to Bowen High School and dropped out in my second year.
The following was included in the later statement given to the State's Attorney:
Q. Jesse, before I ask you any questions, before you might give me any answers, I want first to caution you and warn you of certain constitutional rights. First, you have an absolute right to remain silent at this time, do you understand that? Secondly, anything that you might say now might be held against you at a later time in a court proceedings, do you understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. Thirdly, under the Constitution of the United States you have an absolute right to consult with an attorney and have an attorney present before you might make any statement or make answers to any questions, do you understand that?
A. Yes.
Q. Fourthly, if you cannot afford an attorney and you don't have the financial resources to hire one, under the law an attorney must be provided for you before you make any statement or answer any questions, do you understand that?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Knowing these things, do you now wish to waive these rights understandably and intelligently and make a statement and answer any questions?
A. I will make a statement.
Q. And do you further waive these rights which I just explained to you, knowing that no promise of benefit is made to you or has been made to you, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And further that no threats have been made against you?
A. Yes.
Q. And you now wish to waive these rights which I told you about and make a statement, is that correct?
A. Yes.
When the Assistant State's Attorney had completed the questioning he said, 'Jesse, if you read the statement and find it to be a true and correct copy of what you have just said, will you sign the statement?' The defendant agreed and signed the statement.
Officer Boreczky testified that prior to the written warning he had explained to the defendant his constitutional rights, and that the defendant affirmed that he fully understood his rights; that he did not want to call a lawyer and that he would make a statement. The testimony disclosed that the defendant had been questioned about half an hour before agreeing to make his first written statement.
The defendant testified on his own behalf that he had asked to speak to his mother when the police officer started questioning him. He admitted hearing a statement regarding constitutional rights, but alleged that one officer was making the statement to another and not to him; that he was not asked if he wanted a lawyer; that although he received a statement of his rights at the State's Attorney's Office, he had not understood its meaning. He said he could read and write and admitted signing his name to the statements, but that he had only been allowed to 'glance' at the one given the State's Attorney before signing it.
Officer Sullivan, who had typed defendant's first statement, testified that Officer Boreczky had informed the defendant of his constitutional rights two or three times before taking his statement; and that as soon as the defendant was informed of his rights he was charged with murder.
The Assistant State's Attorney, who took statements from both boys, testified that he read each word or each statement to the boys while they followed the reading from a carbon copy; that he questioned each boy if what he read to them was exactly in accord with their answers to the questions asked. Each boy indicated the readings were accurate and each boy signed his statement.
The defendant argues that testimony from State officials that the confession was voluntary is not adequate here because 'surrounding circumstances' throw doubt upon the authenticity of the voluntary character of the statements in dispute. After stating that a confession was essential in the care if a conviction were to be obtained, because the evidence was very weak, the defendant said: 'The police set out in the beginning to extract a confession from the defendants without any regard to our constitutional safeguards.'
We do not feel that the facts support the conclusion of the defendant. The State has presented a strong case indicating that the defendant did receive the necessary warnings and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his privileges. There was consistent testimony that the warnings were explained to the defendant several times prior to his first statement, and the written statement which the defendant signed contained the warnings. The defendant admitted that he can read and write; there is no evidence indicating that he was of subnormal intelligence, nor does defendant make any serious allegation of physical intimidation.
Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 37, § 703--2 became effective on January 1, 1966, and was applicable to this...
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