Peoples Nat. Bank of Tyler v. Cranek

Decision Date25 August 1977
Docket NumberNo. 16919,16919
Citation557 S.W.2d 330
PartiesThe PEOPLES NATIONAL BANK OF TYLER, Texas, et al., Appellants, v. Louis V. CRANEK, Sr., et al., Appellees. (1st Dist.)
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Schleider & Ewing, Ben H. Schleider, Jr., Houston, for appellant truxton shaw.

Carter, Jones, Magee, Rudberg, Moss & Mayes, Joe Hill Jones, Dallas, for appellant Helen K. Phillips.

Johnson & Cravens, Hubert D. Johnson, H. Dee Johnson, Jr., Dallas, for appellants The Peoples National Bank of Tyler, Texas and certain others.

Scott & Douglass, Ivan D. Hafley, Austin, for appellees.

EVANS, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the trial court overruling the defendants' plea of privilege.

The plaintiffs, owners of an oil, gas and mineral lease in Colorado County, Texas, known as the Cranek lease, brought this suit against the owners of the Frederickson lease, which is adjacent to the Cranek lease, alleging that the defendants had illegally drained gas from the Cranek leasehold. In amended pleadings, the plaintiffs named additional party defendants and alleged that there was further controversy as to the parties' rights in the oil, gas and minerals underlying an adjacent tract of land known as the Drlik tract. The plaintiffs sought recovery for the alleged damage from the Cranek tract and a declaratory judgment upholding the validity of the plaintiffs' lease in the Drlik tract. All defendants save one, William J. Amis, filed pleas of privilege and have perfected this appeal from the court's order overruling such pleas.

The plaintiffs contend that the trial court properly maintained venue in Colorado County under Subdivision 14, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1995. Venue under this Subdivision depends upon the principal right asserted and the relief sought by the plaintiffs, a matter which may be determined by reference to the plaintiffs' petition. 1 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 4.22.2, p. 488. Where the allegations of the plaintiffs' petition show the suit to be one for the recovery of land or for damages thereto, and that the land is in the county of suit, Subdivision 14 is applicable. Piazza v. Phillips, 153 Tex. 115, 264 S.W.2d 428 (1954).

In the case at bar the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' well on the adjacent Frederickson lease was illegally draining gas and condensate from the Cranek lease, and that by reason of such illegal drainage, the defendants were liable for the fair market value of the gas illegally produced and, alternatively, for the diminution of the fair market value of the Cranek lease. These allegations set forth a cause of action for damages to land, notwithstanding that the plaintiffs' sought, in the alternative, a measure of damages based upon the value of the gas produced. 1 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 4.55, p. 612.

The additional count in the plaintiffs' petition, seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to the parties' mineral rights in the Drlik tract, also alleged a cause of action to quiet title to land within the meaning of Subdivision 14. Renwar Oil Corporation v. Lancaster, 154 Tex. 311, 276 S.W.2d 774 (1955). The defendants contend, however, that the undisputed evidence shows, as a matter of law, that the title dispute was fraudulently alleged by the plaintiffs for the purpose of maintaining venue in Colorado County. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs knew or should have known that their lease on the Drlik tract was only effective upon termination of the defendants' lease and that the evidence shows, as a matter of law, that the defendants' lease had not terminated. In order to establish that the plaintiffs' allegations were fraudulently cast the defendants were required to prove that the plaintiffs did not have a valid lease on the Drlik tract, and that the plaintiffs knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, at the time such allegations were presented, that the defendants' lease was valid and in force and effect. Hagan v. Anderson, 513 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.1974). The defendants failed to meet their burden before the trier of fact, and the evidence does not support their contention as a matter of law.

It is the further contention of the defendant The Peoples National Bank of Tyler, Texas that it was entitled to have venue transferred to Smith County under the provisions of the federal venue statute applicable to national banks. This statute, 12 U.S.C. § 94, provides:

"Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be had in any district or Territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction in similar cases. R.S. § 5198; Feb. 18, 1875, c. 80, § 1, 18 Stat. 320; Mar. 3, 1911, c. 231, § 291, 36 Stat. 1167."

The plaintiffs contend that venue was properly maintained in Colorado County under a recognized exception to the federal statute since their cause of action was local in nature, as distinguished from transitory. This exception was initially stated in Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 26 L.Ed. 52 (1880). In Texas, the exception has been held applicable to actions for the recovery of land or for damages to land within the meaning of Subdivision 14, Article 1995. Houston National Bank v. Farris, 549 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.Civ.App. Waco 1977, writ dism'd, w. o. j.); Lone Star Producing Co. v. Bird, 406 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Civ.App. Tyler 1966, writ dism'd); Fort Worth National Bank v. Ballanfonte, 469 S.W.2d 9 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (14th) 1971, no writ).

The Peoples National Bank of Tyler, Texas argues that the three Texas cases which applied the Casey v. Adams exception were erroneously decided, and that the exception should be limited to those...

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4 cases
  • Stephenson v. Leo N. Walker Trust
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 17 Enero 1980
    ...U.S.C. § 94.' " The Casey v. Adams exception has been recognized by the courts of Texas. Peoples National Bank of Tyler v. Cranek, 557 S.W.2d 330 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (1st Dist.) 1977, writ dism'd). In determining whether Stephenson's cause of action in this case is local or transitory, it......
  • DRG Financial Corp. v. Wade
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 31 Enero 1979
    ...in the pleadings and evidence to determine the true nature and purposes of the lawsuit. Peoples National Bank of Tyler v. Cranek, 557 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston (1st Dist.) 1977, writ dism'd); Continental Oil Company v. Anderson, 405 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland 1966, w......
  • Mellon Exploration Co. v. Manges
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 5 Agosto 1982
    ...at 351; Renwar Oil Corporation v. Lancaster, 154 Tex. 311, 276 S.W.2d 774, 775 (1955); People's National Bank of Tyler v. Cranek, 557 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd). The distribution of funds, after a review of the above-described testimony and an exam......
  • Parker v. Petro-Lewis Corp., PETRO-LEWIS
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 28 Diciembre 1983
    ...v. Grayshon, 577 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Peoples National Bank of Tyler v. Cranek, 557 S.W.2d 330 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd). It is well established in Texas that a royalty and an overriding royalty in minerals are cons......

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