Peoples Rights Organization v. City of Columbus
Citation | 925 F. Supp. 1254 |
Decision Date | 21 March 1996 |
Docket Number | No. C-2-95-269.,C-2-95-269. |
Parties | PEOPLES RIGHTS ORGANIZATION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al., Defendants. |
Court | United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Donald Carl Brey, Chester Willcox & Saxbe, Columbus, OH, Stephen P. Halbrook, Fairfax, VA, for Peoples Rights Organization, Inc., Gerald L. Smolak, Paul Dennis Walker.
Glenn Brooks Redick, City Attorney's Office, Columbus, OH, for City of Columbus, Ronald J. O'Brien.
Plaintiffs, Peoples Rights Organization and two of its members, initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by filing a Complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs contend that Columbus City Codes §§ 2323.11, 2323.31, and 2323.32 are unconstitutionally "vague, violate the right to due process of law, create unreasonable discriminations sic, and deny the equal protection of the laws." Complaint, ¶ 1. This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and the trial of this matter on the merits, which have been consolidated by stipulation of the parties.
The ordinances in question prohibit the sale, transfer, possession, and acquisition of certain weapons, defined as assault weapons, and large capacity magazines. The ordinances further prescribe criminal penalties for violation of the prohibitions on sale, transfer, possession, and acquisition.
The relevant portions of the ordinances in question are as follows:
Plaintiffs contend that the ordinances violate their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws inasmuch as they include "grandfather" clauses, §§ 2323.31(B)(3) and 2323.32(B)(2), that irrationally discriminate against the owners of certain weapons and magazines. Complaint, ¶¶ 34, 36. They also contend that the provisions violate their right to due process of law because they "condition the fundamental constitutional right to have arms on prior compliance with an unconstitutional ordinance." Complaint, ¶ 40. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that "persons who registered firearms pursuant to the ordinance, which was declared void by Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250 (6th Cir.1994), may continue to exercise their right to keep such firearms," while "persons who did not do so ... may not continue to exercise their right to keep such firearms." Complaint, ¶ 40. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that the ordinances are unconstitutionally vague in that the manner in which they define "assault weapon" is not sufficiently clear to provide citizens a meaningful warning that their behavior is prohibited. Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare the ordinances unconstitutional and to enjoin their enforcement.
The Court has reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties and has heard argument by counsel concerning the contested ordinances. In addition, the Court has reviewed the parties' memoranda concerning the issue of standing.
The requirement of standing "assures the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2629-30, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), the United States Supreme Court explained that the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" includes three elements:
Id. at 559-60, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. "The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements." Id. (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607-08, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990)).
In this case, the Court concludes that the two individual Defendants, Gerald L. Smolak and Paul Dennis Walker, have established the elements of standing. Both Smolak and Walker possess weapons that may be identified as assault weapons by the ordinances in question. Smolak Affidavit, ¶ 3; Walker Affidavit, ¶ 15. Both men fear that they will be subject to prosecution under the ordinances in question. Plaintiff Walker wishes to purchase a magazine that holds thirty rounds for use with his vintage semiautomatic rifle and contends that he fears prosecution under the ordinances in question in the event that he should purchase the desired magazine. Walker Affidavit, ¶ 20.
"A plaintiff who challenges a statute prior to its enforcement against him must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement." Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)). " Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593, 43 S.Ct. 658, 663-64, 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923)). "When contesting the constitutionality of a criminal statute, `it is not necessary that the plaintiff first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge the statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights." Id. (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1216, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974)). "When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he `should not be required to await and undergo criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.'" Id. (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188, 93 S.Ct. 739, 745, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973)).
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