Peoples v. Evening News Ass'n

• Decision Date: 13 June 1883
• Citation: 51 Mich. 11,16 N.W. 185
• Parties: PEOPLES v. EVENING NEWS ASS'N.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

16 N.W. 185

51 Mich. 11

PEOPLES v. EVENING NEWS ASS'N.

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 13, 1883

Where the fact that a fire-insurance company contested a claim for loss is stated in a publication charging plaintiff with himself setting fire to his house to procure the insurance the agent of the insurance company may be asked whether or not the company contested the claim.

Where it is expressly conceded that an article in a newspaper claimed to be libelous, referred to the plaintiff, it is not a material error to refuse to admit another article offered to show that plaintiff was the party intended by the libelous publication.

The charge of the court in this case properly directed the jury that they must find that all the charges made were justified and that, if there were four charges, justification as to three would not excuse the libelous publication of the fourth.

In an action for a libelous publication charging plaintiff with the commission of a crime, the criminality charged need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; and the jury will be justified in finding a verdict on a mere preponderance of the evidence, as in other civil actions.

Upon examination of the evidence in this case, the verdict of the jury must be held to be warranted thereby.

Error to superior court of Detroit.

C.I. Walker, for plaintiff and appellant.

John Atkinson, for defendant.

CAMPBELL J.

Plaintiff sued defendant for publishing a libel against him, the substantial charges being connected with the murder of one Martha Whitla, whose body was found in Detroit river in the spring of 1879, and whose murder was alleged to have taken place January 11, 1879. The article, while it gave no name, pointed out a particular person easily identified with plaintiff, and in the course of it indicated illicit relations between him and the deceased, and also an act of arson committed some years before to defraud insurers. Defendant pleaded the general issue, and appended a notice of special matters not now necessary to refer to. It also contained a notice of justification of the entire libel. The jury found for the defendant. The substantial charges against plaintiff were three,--the burning of his house, criminal relations with Martha Whitla, the deceased, and her murder. The errors assigned include two on the admission and rejection of testimony, and three to the charge, which are substantially a failure to charge--First, that defendant must, in order to justify, establish the truth of the entire article; second, that proof of a portion of the accusations less than all, would not be a complete justification; and, third, that there was not sufficient evidence of the truth of the charges to authorize a verdict for the defense.

The first allegation of error relates to the refusal of the court to rule out a question put to an insurance agent: "Will you state whether or not the insurance company contested the claim made by Mr. Peoples for indemnity under the policy of that company." The fact of such a contest was referred to in the libel, and we think it was admissible to show it. It was not claimed and was not held that such a contest had any tendency to prove the fact of arson, but it was part of the narrative bearing more or less against the plaintiff, and which ought, also, to have some bearing on the extent of malice in making the principal charge. It does not appear to have been regarded as a very serious point, and was not much pressed on the argument.

The second allegation of error relates to the exclusion of an article published on the eve of the trial, referring to the action, and also setting out a narrative of the facts connected with the search for the cause and instrumentalities of Martha Whitla's death. It named plaintiff as pointed out by circumstances suggested, and, it is claimed by counsel, practically acknowledged him to be the person aimed at in the article sued on, which gave no name. The record shows this article to have been offered "for the purpose of showing the identity of the plaintiff." The defendant objected that it was "incompetent for that purpose," and it was ruled out. It was not offered for any other purpose, and no ruling was asked on the pertinency of it for any other purpose. The record shows that it was expressly conceded that the article sued on referred to plaintiff, and the whole record indicates that the trial proceeded on that understanding. There was, therefore, no damage caused by this ruling, and we need not examine whether or not the article went far enough to identify plaintiff as the alleged criminal referred to in the libel, or whether, if not confined by the offer to the single purpose of identification, there might have been other grounds on which it could have been let in.

We do not think the record supports the claim that the court refused to charge that nothing less than proof of all the libelous statements would amount to a justification. On the contrary, the charge was emphatic, and fully as direct and clear as the two instructions specifically asked on that subject. "The allegations must all be justified. If there are four charges, justifying three of them will not excuse the publication of the fourth. So that there must be a reasonable justification, a substantial justification, a substantial proof of the probability, of the preponderance, so to speak, of the testimony, which will establish them in their entirety."

Except as to the measure of the preponderance of proof, instead of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, we can see nothing which would authorize the jury to find a verdict of justification on anything less than a complete justification. No exception was taken to the charge as actually given, but in the measure of proof required it is insisted the third assignment of error is well taken, and that the proof fell short of the legal standard.

Some authorities were cited to show that where proof of criminality becomes material to the issue in a civil case and is directly involved in that issue, the rule is the same as in criminal trials, and that a preponderance of evidence is not enough to authorize the jury to find it. That question is not an open one in...