Peoples v. Roach
Decision Date | 28 December 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 94-SP-337.,94-SP-337. |
Citation | 669 A.2d 700 |
Parties | Curtis L. PEOPLES, Appellant, v. David ROACH, Appellee. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Bradford P. Johnson, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for appellant.
Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman and Richard E. Dominguez II, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before STEADMAN, KING and REID, Associate Judges.
This case, before us for the third time, is an appeal from the trial court's denial of appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.
In 1977, appellant was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery, robbery, attempted robbery while armed, assault with intent to rob, assault with a deadly weapon, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.1 He appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court erred in allowing the government to introduce certain statements he made to the police following his arrest. We held that the statements were properly admitted under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its progeny; accordingly, we affirmed. Peoples v. United States, 395 A.2d 41 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 2826, 61 L.Ed.2d 277 (1979).2
In 1989, appellant filed a motion for post-conviction relief under D.C.Code § 23-110 (1989 Repl.). He argued, inter alia, that new law had been announced by the Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), which—had it been announced earlier —would have compelled the suppression of his statements to the police. The trial court denied appellant's 23-110 motion, concluding that the admissibility of his statements would not have been affected by Edwards. We affirmed in an unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Judgment, marking the second time that we have ruled on the admissibility of appellant's statements.3
In 1994, appellant filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The sole ground that appellant advanced in support of his petition was the same ground asserted on his direct appeal and in his § 23-110 motion; that admission of his statements violated his rights under Miranda and its progeny. The trial court concluded that it could not consider the issues raised in the petition, as they were the same issues that had already been considered and decided by this Court. The trial court accordingly denied the petition without a hearing, and that order is now before us on appeal.
The Supreme Court has characterized § 23-110(g) as an "unequivocal statutory command to federal courts not to entertain an application for habeas corpus after the applicant has been denied collateral relief in the Superior Court." Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 377, 97 S.Ct. 1224, 1227-28, 51 L.Ed.2d 411 (1977) (emphasis in original); see also Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 725-26 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993, 107 S.Ct. 595, 93 L.Ed.2d 595 (1986). Section 23-110(g) is equally unequivocal in commanding the Superior Court not to entertain such an application. This approach is identical to that of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994), which prohibits the federal courts from entertaining habeas corpus petitions from federal prisoners who have been denied relief under § 2255. See Swain, supra, 430 U.S. at 377, 97 S.Ct. at 1227-28 () (footnote omitted); Butler v. United States, 388 A.2d 883, 886 n. 5 (D.C.1978) ( ).4
Although § 23-110(g) permits the Superior Court to entertain habeas corpus petitions if the remedy under § 23-110 is inadequate or ineffective, appellant alleges no such inadequacy or ineffectiveness, and absolutely none appears to exist on this record. See Swain, supra, 430 U.S. at 384, 97 S.Ct. at 1231 ( ). Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that it had no authority to entertain appellant's habeas corpus petition.
Even to the extent that appellant's petition might be construed as a second § 23-110 motion, see Doepel v. United States, 510 A.2d 1044, 1045 (D.C.1986), the trial court did not err in refusing to consider appellant's claim. We had already rejected the same claim in two separate appeals, and "it is well-settled that where an appellate court has disposed of an issue on appeal, it will not be considered afresh on collateral attack in a trial court of the same judicial system, absent special circumstances." Id. at 1045-46 (footnote and citations omitted).5 Moreover, appellant had previously filed a § 23-110 motion, and the trial court is not "required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." D.C.Code § 23-110(e); see Vaughn v. United States, 600 A.2d 96, 97 (D.C.1991) ( ); Hurt v. St. Elizabeths Hospital, 366 A.2d 780, 781 (D.C.1976) (same); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-16, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1077-78, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) ( ).
We also note that appellant's inability to bring his latest application for relief as a § 23-110 motion does not render the remedy under § 23-110 "inadequate or ineffective" within the meaning of § 23-110(g), and therefore does not permit the Superior Court or any other court to entertain his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Garris, supra, 794 F.2d at 724, 727. "It is the inefficacy of the § 23-110 remedy, not a personal inability to utilize it, that is determinative, and appellant's difficulty here is simply that his circumstances preclude him from invoking it." Id.
1 Appellant was also convicted of second-degree murder while armed, but the trial court subsequently dismissed that count.
2 The statements that appellant made to the police and the circumstances surrounding them are discussed in detail in our 1978 opinion. See Peoples, supra, 395 A.2d at 42-43.
4 Under § 2255, "an application for a writ of habeas...
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