Peoples v. Sec'y, Dep't. of Corr.

• Docket Number: 8:18-cv-1618-WFJ-AAS
• Decision Date: 03 August 2023
• Parties: CHYVAS ARIEL PEOPLES Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

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CHYVAS ARIEL PEOPLES Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

No. 8:18-cv-1618-WFJ-AAS

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

August 3, 2023

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

WILLIAM F. JUNG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Chyvas Ariel Peoples petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and challenges the validity of his state conviction for manslaughter with a weapon, for which Mr. Peoples serves thirty years' imprisonment. After careful consideration of the petition, the response (Doc. 18), and the supplemental response (Doc. 26), the Court denies the petition.^[1]

Factual Background and Procedural History^[2]

On October 8, 2006, Demetrius Johnson asked Mr. Peoples to pick him up at a club in the Ybor City area of Tampa, Florida. Mr Peoples arrived at the club around 2:30 a.m. Shauntay Cummings was at the club as well. She ran into Kim Holmes and some other friends before Holmes walked Cummings to her car.

Mr Peoples saw Cummings and approached her vehicle to speak with her. The conversation was of a sexual nature. When Holmes heard the conversation, a verbal altercation ensued between Holmes and Mr. Peoples. Eventually a fight broke out between the two and Mr. Peoples stabbed Holmes with a knife. Holmes died from a single stab wound to the abdomen.

Mr. Peoples was arrested and charged by Information with second-degree murder with a weapon. He unsuccessfully asserted self-defense based on Holmes's alleged attempt to commit a robbery by forcibly taking Mr. Peoples's jewelry. A jury convicted Mr. Peoples of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter with a weapon. He was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment.

The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. (Doc. 19-3, Ex. 16). Mr. Peoples's motion for rehearing was denied. (Doc. 19-3, Ex. 18). The state courts subsequently denied Mr. Peoples's myriad post-conviction motions challenging his conviction and sentence and his petitions for writs of habeas corpus, prohibition, and certiorari.

Standard of Review

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this petition. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11^th Cir. 1998).

Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states in pertinent part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:

In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied - the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) “was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the state case. “The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 655, 694 (2002). A federal court must afford due deference to a state court's decision. “AEDPA prevents defendants-and federal courts-from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second guess the reasonable decisions of state courts.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (“This is a ‘difficult to meet,' . . . and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings, which demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt' ....”) (citations omitted). When the last state court to decide a federal claim explains its decision in a reasoned opinion, a federal habeas court reviews the specific reasons as stated in the opinion and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (“[A] federal habeas court simply reviews the specific reasons given by the state court and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable.”). When the relevant state-court decision is not accompanied with reasons for the decision, the federal court “should ‘look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Id. “[T]he State may rebut the presumption by showing that the unexplained affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different grounds than the lower state court's decision ....” Id.

As Pinholster explains, review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the state court:

We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state court adjudication that “resulted in” a decision that was contrary to, or “involved” an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward looking language requires an examination of the state court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time, i.e., the record before the state court.

563 U.S. at 181-82. Mr. Peoples bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state court factual determination. “[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to a finding of fact but not to a mixed determination of law and fact. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir. 2001).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Mr Peoples claims ineffective assistance of counsel, a difficult claim to sustain. “[T]he cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between.” Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994)). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), governs an ineffective assistance of counsel claim:

The law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well settled and well documented. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. According to Strickland, first, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 1998).

Strickland requires proof of both deficient performance and consequent prejudice. 466 U.S. at 697 (“There is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”); Sims, 155 F.3d at 1305 (“When applying Strickland, we are free to dispose of ineffectiveness claims on either of its two grounds.”). “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.” Id. Strickland requires that “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id.

Mr Peoples must demonstrate that counsel's alleged error prejudiced the defense because “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant...