Peoples v. United States
| Decision Date | 28 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL 2:18cr8,Civil 2:20cv255 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | ANDRE NAVON PEOPLES, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
This matter is before the Court on a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence filed by Petitioner Andre Navon Peoples ("Petitioner") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 75. Petitioner contends that his convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and § 924 (c) as well as his probation revocation sentence are all invalid. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner's motion is DISMISSED AND DENIED.
On January 18, 2018, a grand jury indicted Petitioner on six counts: (1) conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) distributing crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); (3) possessing with intent to distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D); (4) possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 922(g) (1) and 924(a)(2); (5) possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (A); and (6) maintaining a drug-involved premises, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) and (b). ECF No. 13. On March 2, 2018, Petitioner pled guilty to the § 922 (g) and § 924 (c) firearm offenses in exchange for the dismissal of the other four counts. ECF No. 22, at 1-2, 5. On June 22, 2018, the Court sentenced Petitioner to consecutive sentences of 46 months on the § 922(g) count and 60 months on the § 924 (c) count, for a total of 106 months of imprisonment. ECF No. 49, at 2.
At the time of his conviction in the instant case, Petitioner was serving a five-year term of probation in a previous case prosecuted in this district. See United States v. Peoples, No. 2:16cr42 (E.D. Va.), ECF No. 28. In that matter, Petitioner pled guilty to conspiring to obtain a firearm by making a false statement, and the assigned district judge imposed a five-year sentence of probation on October 27, 2017. Id., ECF Nos. 17, 30. After Petitioner pled guilty in this case, the district judge in No. 2:l6cr42 revoked Petitioner's probation and sentenced him to 20 months of imprisonment for violating the terms of his probation. See id., ECF No. 47. The 20 months were ordered to be served consecutively with the sentence imposed in the instant case. Id.
Petitioner filed his § 2255 motion on May 15, 2020, contending that his § 922 (g) conviction, his § 924 (c) conviction, and his probation revocation sentence are all invalid. ECF No. 75. The Government filed an opposition brief on August 26, 2020, ECF No. 81, and Petitioner filed a reply on October 23, 2020, ECF No. 84.
A federal prisoner may collaterally attack his sentence or conviction by moving the district court "to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) . To obtain such relief, a petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that his sentence or conviction was "imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States," (2) that the district court "was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence," (3) that the sentence exceeds "the maximum authorized by law," or (4) that the sentence or conviction is "otherwise subject to collateral attack." Id.; Miller v. United States, 261 F.2d 546, 547 (4th Cir. 1958) . Because a § 2255 motion "is ordinarily presented to the judge who presided at the original conviction and sentencing . . . the judge's recollection of the events at issue" may inform the resolution of the motion. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 n.4 (1977).
While a § 2255 motion enables a petitioner to collaterally attack his sentence or conviction by initiating a new proceeding, the existence of the right to pursue a collateral attack does not displace a direct appeal as the "usual and customary method of correcting trial errors." United States v. Allgood, 48 F.Supp.2d 554, 558 (E.D. Va. 1999) . On the contrary, with limited exceptions, a petitioner advancing new claims asserted for the first time in a § 2255 motion "must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982).
The "higher hurdle" applies because, once a petitioner's opportunity to pursue a direct appeal has been waived or exhausted, there is "a final judgment [that] commands respect." Id. at 165-66. For this reason, the doctrine of procedural default generally prevents a district court from reaching the merits of a § 2255 claim that could have been raised on direct appeal unless a petitioner can show two things: (1) "cause" excusing the failure to directly appeal the alleged error; and (2) "actual prejudice" resulting from the alleged error. United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 492-93 (4th Cir. 1999) . Alternatively, a Petitioner may overcome his default by demonstrating "actual innocence." Id.
"The existence of cause for a procedural default must turn on something external to the defense, such as the novelty of the claim or a denial of effective assistance of counsel." United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 280 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 493) . As for prejudice, it is not enough for a petitioner to demonstrate "a possibility of prejudice"; rather, he must show that errors imposed an "actual and substantial disadvantage," infecting the entire criminal proceeding with an "error of constitutional dimensions." Frady, 456 U.S. at 170.
However, a § 2255 petitioner need not overcome the procedural default bar to advance a freestanding claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as such a claim is properly asserted for the first time in a § 2255 motion. See United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997) . To obtain relief based on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish two things: (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that counsel's inadequate performance resulted in prejudice to the petitioner. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) . Conclusory statements are insufficient to carry a petitioner's burden. See United States v. Dyess, 730 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2013) .
Satisfying the first prong of Strickland requires a showing that counsel "made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Reviewing courts strongly presume that counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment, and only in "relatively rare situations" will a § 2255 motion establish that, "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87, 102 (4th Cir. 2011) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The second prong of Strickland requires a petitioner to "affirmatively prove prejudice," which means he must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. The prejudice prong is slightly modified where, as here, a petitioner challenges a conviction entered after a guilty plea; in such circumstances, the petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) .
Petitioner advances four claims in support of his § 2255 motion, and the Court will address each in turn.
Petitioner first challenges the validity of his § 924(c) conviction on constitutional grounds. ECF No. 75, at 4. Section 924(c) prohibits using or carrying a firearm in connection with any "crime of violence or drug trafficking crime." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (A) (emphasis added). A "crime of violence" is a felony that either (1) has an element that requires use or threatened use of physical force ("the force clause"), or (2) "by its nature, involves a substantial risk of physical force" ("the residual clause") . Id. § 924(c) (3) . A "drug trafficking crime" is a "felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act." Id. § 924 (c) (2) .
Petitioner's § 2255 motion does not state why his § 924(c) conviction is invalid beyond asserting that it violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights in light of a ``[r]ecent Supreme Court ruling" issued after this Court sentenced him. See ECF No. 75, at 4. Construing Petitioner's pro se motion liberally, the Government posits that Petitioner is alluding to United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019), but argues that a Davis claim lacks merit here. ECF No. 81, at 3-4. Despite the Government's opposition, Petitioner's reply brief does not clarify (or even address) this claim. See ECF No. 84. After careful consideration, the Court agrees with the Government's construction of Petitioner's claim and further concludes that Petitioner's Davis claim lacks merit.
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that the residual...
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