Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home v. Industrial Com'n

• Decision Date: 20 February 1987
• Docket Number: No. 63065,63065
• Citation: 115 Ill.2d 524,505 N.E.2d 1026,106 Ill.Dec. 235
• Parties: , 106 Ill.Dec. 235 PEORIA COUNTY BELWOOD NURSING HOME, Appellant, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Wanda J. Cagle, Appellee).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1026

505 N.E.2d 1026

115 Ill.2d 524, 106 Ill.Dec. 235

PEORIA COUNTY BELWOOD NURSING HOME, Appellant, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Wanda J. Cagle, Appellee).

No. 63065.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 20, 1987.

Law Office of Jay H. Janssen, Peoria, for amicus curiae, Illinois Trial Lawyers Ass'n Jerome Schur, Richard K. Johnson, Katz, Friedman, Schur & Eagle, Chicago, for amicus curiae UAW-CAP Council.

Thomas D. Nyhan, Harry E. Kinzie, III, Chicago (Pope, Ballard, Shepard & Fowle, Ltd., Chicago, of counsel), for amici curiae Illinois State Chamber of Commerce, Illinois Self-Insurer's Ass'n.

Goldfine & Bowles, P.C. by John Lesaganich, Peoria, for appellee, Wanda J. Cagle.

Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria (Rex K. Linder, Mark D. Henss, of counsel), for appellant, Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home.

Stevenson, Rusin & Friedman, Ltd., Chicago (Douglas F. Stevenson, of counsel), for amicus curiae Illinois Mfrs. Ass'n.

Chief Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Wanda Cagle, filed a claim for compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) (the Act) on August 24, 1979, alleging that she developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of her employment in the laundry room of her employer, Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home (Belwood). Both the arbitrator and, on review, the Industrial Commission found that the claimant had sustained an accidental injury as a result of repeated trauma to her wrist in her operation of two large washing machines in the laundry room of the nursing home. The circuit court of Peoria County confirmed the Commission's decision, and Belwood appealed to the appellate court. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court judgment and declared that the instant case involved a substantial question warranting consideration by this court. (138 Ill.App.3d 880, 93 Ill.Dec. 689, 487 N.E.2d 356.) Belwood filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court pursuant to our Rule 315(a) (94 Ill.2d R. 315(a)), and we granted its petition.

The issue raised in this appeal is whether an injury sustained as a result of work-related repetitive trauma is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act without a finding that the injury occurred as a result of one specific incident traceable to a definite time, place and cause.

In the case at bar, the claimant worked for respondent for 12 years, the last six years in the laundry room. The duties of her employment required her to carry bags of laundry weighing between 25 and 50 pounds. After sorting the laundry in these bags, she would load two 200-pound-capacity washing machines by operating a spring-loaded door into each of three compartments. Each day the claimant loaded the machines six times.

Although claimant initially alleged that her injury occurred on October 5, 1976, the arbitrator amended the claimant's application to reflect the date of injury as October 4, 1976, a date when claimant testified she experienced symptoms at work. On October 5, 1976, claimant consulted Dr. John McLean, a neurologist, regarding her symptoms of pain, numbness, and tingling. She continued to work until August 23, 1977, when she underwent outpatient surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome--"a complex of symptoms resulting from compression of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel with pain and burning or tingling parathesias in the fingers and hand, sometimes extending to the elbow." Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1289 (26th ed. 1981).

The arbitrator awarded benefits for temporary total disability and for 25% permanent total disability. The Industrial Commission affirmed that award, and the circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court judgment.

Before this court, Belwood raises two related issues. The first issue is whether the Industrial Commission's finding that the claimant sustained an "accidental injury" is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Second, Belwood maintains that, since there is no specific "accident," the claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitations (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, par. 138.6(d)).

The more narrow issue presented in this appeal is what is meant by the term "accidental injury" within the meaning of the Act.

In the instant case, the claimant was found to have presented sufficient medical evidence to establish that her injury was work related. We do not believe that finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, whether the claimant's injury is "accidental" is the crux of this case. We believe that the purpose behind the Workers' Compensation Act is best served by allowing compensation in a case like the instant one where an injury has been shown to be caused by the performance of the claimant's job and has developed gradually over a period of time, without requiring complete dysfunction. In order to achieve this result we believe the case of International Harvester Co. v. Industrial Com. (1973), 56 Ill.2d 84, 305 N.E.2d 529, and that line of cases following International Harvester, should be interpreted so as to include a case like the instant one. We do not believe that in so doing we are partaking in judicial legislation; rather we are engaging in necessary and proper judicial statutory interpretation so as to implement the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act.

The Workers' Compensation Act was intended to provide financial protection for injured workers regardless of a showing of negligence or contributory negligence, while precluding the employee from common law tort remedies. (Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Com. (1976), 62 Ill.2d 556, 563, 343 N.E.2d 913.) To that end, it has been consistently held that the Act should be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose and objects. 62 Ill.2d 556, 563, 343 N.E.2d 913.

Requiring complete collapse in a case like the instant one would not be beneficial to the employee or the employer because it might force employees needing the protection of the Act to push their bodies to a precise moment of collapse. Simply because an employee's work-related injury is gradual, rather than sudden and completely disabling, should not preclude protection and benefits. The Act was intended to compensate workers who have been injured as a result of their employment. To deny an employee benefits for a work-related injury that is not the result of a sudden mishap or completely disabling penalizes an employee who faithfully performs job duties despite bodily discomfort and damage.

As the appellate court correctly stated, an employee who alleges injury based on repetitive trauma must still meet the same standard of proof as other claimants alleging an accidental injury. There must be a showing that the injury is work related and not the result of a normal degenerative aging process.

The claimant in the instant case testified that she experienced pain and tingling in her left arm while working her regular shift on October 4, 1976. She informed Dr. McLean on October 5, 1976, that she had extreme difficulty gripping the washer doors on October 4, due to the pain she was experiencing. The medical testimony the claimant presented was uncontroverted. Therefore, we now hold that the Industrial Commission's finding that the claimant suffered an accidental injury under the Act is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

We now address the second issue raised by respondent, regarding the three-year statute of limitations: whether the claimant is barred from bringing her claim since her injury is not allegedly traceable to a specific date of accident.

Section 6(d) of the Workers' Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 48, par. 138.6(d)) provides in pertinent part that a claimant must file a claim for compensation within three years after the date of the accident.

The appellate court...