Pepin v. Societe St. Jean Baptiste

• Decision Date: 05 June 1901
• Citation: 49 A. 387,23 R.I. 81
• Parties: PEPIN v. SOCIETE ST. JEAN BAPTISTE.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

49 A. 387

23 R.I. 81

PEPIN

v. SOCIETE ST. JEAN BAPTISTE.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 5, 1901.

Action by Marjorique Pepin against the Societe St Jean Baptiste. On demurrer to defendant's plea. Sustained.

Arthur M. Allen, for plaintiff.

Archambault & Gaulin, for defendant.

STINESS, C. J. The plaintiff sues in assumpsit to recover for benefits which he alleges are due to him under the by-laws of the society, to which he also alleges that he has in all things conformed; that he has exhausted all the remedies within the society, and that the society has refused to pay the same. The defendaci pleads specially that a by-law of the society requires every contestation between the society and a member to be referred to and be decided by a committee of five persons, two appointed by the society, two by the member, and the fifth by the other four, and that the decision of the committee is final; that the defendant was always ready and willing to submit said claim of the plaintiff to such committee, but the plaintiff failed to accept said offer, and refused to submit his said claim to the arbitration of such committee. The plaintiff demurs to the plea. The question raised is whether the by-law set up in the plea is a bar to the present action. By-laws of a society are intended for the internal government of its affairs. When they are confined within this scope courts have no Jurisdiction or control over their administration. For example, courts cannot undertake to correct matters which only relate to discipline or procedure in such bodies. By-laws are, however, in the nature of a mutual contract, and to that extent the action of a society under them may be reviewed by a court to preserve personal rights, which involve something more than the mere formal action of the society, such as insurance, rights of property, or an illegal exercise of power. The by-law in this case raises the question whether the provision to submit to an arbitration which shall be final is binding on the plaintiff as a member of the society. It is a question involving a pecuniary interest, which is termed by most cases as a property right Upon this question there have been two lines of decision. On one side are those cases which hold that a person who becomes a member of a society thereby agrees to its by-laws, so as to be bound by them to the extent of having assented to a tribunal whose decision is to be final, and hence not reviewable by a civil court; that such an agreement is not contrary to public policy, because by it such person has waived nothing which he had not the right and power to waive; and that such tribunal is constituted for the express purpose of settling the difference between members and the society without recourse to legal proceedings. Of this class of cases the following are examples: Hembeau v. Great Camp Knights of Maccabees, 101 Mich. 161, 59 N. W. 417, 45 Am. St Rep. 400; Canfield v. Same, 87 Mich. 626, 49 N. W. 875, 24 Am. St Rep. 186; Osceola Tribe v. Schmidt, 57 Md. 98. On the other side it is held that, where there is a contract to pay money, either by way of benefits or insurance, it is in the nature of a property right, which, like all other contracts, is within the jurisdiction of courts of law. We think that the stronger reason is with this class of cases. By this we do not mean that a member is free to come to the courts regardless of the by-laws of his society, but only that he is not in all respects absolutely bound by them. Where, as we have said, the by-laws relate simply to matters of internal administration or of discipline, courts will not undertake to review them. Courts are not established for such a purpose. Also, where the by-laws amount to a condition precedent to a right of action, such as a proper opportunity to hear and examine a claim for the purpose of ascertaining the liability or the amount due, they must be followed before a court will hear a party who has failed thus to conform to his reasonable contract. This is a principle applicable to all contracts. A familiar illustration is found in contracts of insurance in provisions relating to notice, adjustment of loss, and the like; also statutory provisions requiring those who...